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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the political and economic transformation in the two 
Yemeni states - the YAR and the PDRY - over the period of 1968 to 1998. 
The unification process between the YAR and the PDRY is critically assessed 
in preparation and implementation phases over the period 1972 to 1990 under 
minority rule in both states. The thesis is critically focused on the minority 
impact of northern Shafais in the ex-PDRY leadership which led to serious 
struggles within and between the two Yemens out of which a hasty unification 
was resulted. 
The methodology employed in the research utilises many materials and 
opportunities made available to myself as a high-ranking member of the 
administration of the ex-PDRY and, subsequently, the Presidential Office of 
the ROY. Due to my position, I was able to witness the political system and 
procedures of Yemen first-hand. The data collected includes information from 
formal sources in Aden, San'a and the UK. This material was substantially 
added to with extensive interviews and meetings with public figures in Yemen 
and abroad who were, and are, important actors in the political history and 
contemporary political system of Yemen. 
The integration process was not successful because of several necessary 
conditions which were not present in either state in the preunification era or, 
indeed, after it. 
The two states had different experiences in terms of administration, policies 
and above all power structures. 
The two states had political and military confrontations in 1972 and 1979 
along their border mainly because of the northern Shafais who wanted power 
legitimacy in either state or independently. Under such minority impact, the 
south sponsored revolutionary insurgencies in northern areas to force the 
admission of northern Shafais into the power centre of the north. 
I X 
The unification process throughout the 1970's and the 1980's was 
controversial but suddenly achieved its objective in May 1990 though in a 
hasty manner. A series of agreements took place on both sides with regional 
monitoring. The platforms on which these agreements were carried out, 
technically, politically and economically, were weak and rushed as varying 
factors were not taken seriously into account and the unification process was 
undertaken in an emotionally charged atmosphere. 
During the period of 1990 to 1994, the cooperafive unificafion did not achieve 
success. The unified system had relatively good northern/southern 
representation but it was not effective. The northern tribal and the southern 
factional attitudes and approaches were too strong in the power centre to 
enhance the level of integration. The tribally-dominated power centre did not 
encourage a change in the administrative setup and the two sides wanted to 
impose their former systems on the national administration. As the capital, 
Sanaa, was in the ex-YAR territory, the central administration was 
predominantly characterised by the latter's system which was cumbersome 
and corrupt. 
The acceleration of political tensions between the two sides increased after the 
1993 elections as a third northern party shared government, diminishing the 
southern share to a third. In view of the supremacy of southern natural 
resources, the southerners had a motive to seek deunification, and they duly 
did so. This was put down by the northern side which used force in the 1994 
civil war. 
The thesis is concluded with three scenarios discussing the possible directions 
of the fiiture political development of the Republic of Yemen, with a focus on 
how the ROY can escape from the predicament of sectarian dominated 
politics. The first of these scenarios envisages fundamental reforms taking 
place immediately so as to preserver the present unification system. The 
second proposes that amalgamated unification could be replaced by 
federalism. The third forwards a possibility that Yemen could fragment into 
many small states as a result of poor national administration and state 
management. These scenarios are founded in the analysis presented in the 
main body of the thesis by employing the arguments and dynamics identified 
as the failings of the current system in an analysis which would allow Yemen 
to enjoy a more prosperous and stable fiiture. 
X I 
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Preface 
Sectarianism, regionalism and tribalism have undoubtedly played significant roles in 
the political and socio-economic history of the two Yemens since their independence 
in the 1960s. Yemeni politicians tend to reject this view while in power, yet accuse 
each other of pursuing sectarian, regional or tribal objectives when they are out of 
power. 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which sectarianism, regionalism 
and tribalism played roles in the power struggle between the two Yemeni states and 
during the period of unification (1990-1998). The main focus of the thesis is on 
Yemeni integration and how it came about. A central aspect of this which needs to be 
to addressed is the role of northern Shafais in the southern Yemeni state and how 
they manipulated leftist policies in that state in order to widen the policy gap between 
the north and south, effectively pushing the unification process back each time. 
The problem of northern Shafais will be posed and illuminated in the thesis as a key 
and common element in both the north and the south of Yemen in terms of their 
substatus position in the north, and minority position in the south. The northern 
Shafais were hardly incorporated in top political positions in the north despite their 
substantial presence while they enjoyed substantial political power in the south. 
Furthermore, the researcher will attempt to show how the PDRY was forced to adopt 
strong leftist policies which damaged its foreign standing, and how these policies 
were intended partly to bring the Zaydi rule down in the north, and partly to 
eliminate as many southern nationalists as possible who were dedicated to go steadily 
through with the unification process. 
Various academic studies have been made on Yemeni unification, but they have 
mainly focused on the period of integration (1990 onwards) without analysing the 
political dynamics sufficiently. These political dynamics were more significant in the 
south than the north particularly during the period 1978-1989, yet the above-
mentioned literature has largely ignored political dynamics in the south. 
The researcher sees her thesis, therefore, as being unique in terms of its illumination 
of the political dynamics of the Yemeni unification and its analysis of how it was 
brought about in a hasty manner. It also provides a unique account of the linkages of 
the events and factors that occurred between the two states and among the northern 
and southern leaderships. 
The thesis addresses the continuation of the regionalism and tribalism problem in 
terms of attitudes and approaches to state-building under a unified power structure. It 
shows how under the impact of tribalism the two leaderships (the GPC and the YSP) 
failed to carry out an objective unification. It also shows how southern leaders in the 
YSP were disappointed by their northern Shafais colleagues in the YSP in the 1993 
election which put the party in a disadvantaged position politically and 
administratively. 
The thesis is developed over five chapters in addition to a conclusion. The four 
chapters are structured chronologically in covering political developments in each 
state. 
The first introductory chapter identifies the problem, the focus of the thesis, and 
presents different theoretical perspectives on unification. The problem of Yemeni 
unification is translated in terms of the northern Shafai problem in the two states and 
how it was originally a northern problem transferred into a problem in the southern 
state, causing political tensions inside the two Yemeni states and beyond their 
borders. 
The second chapter covers the political dynamics and economic progress in the two 
states (before unification) and shows how the political dynamics in the south 
reflected on the north. The interaction of the unification process is clearly and 
logically traced among the policy makers in both the YAR and PDRY. 
Chapter three outlines the unification steps between the two states, with an analysis 
provided of the political dynamics which affected the unification steps. 
Chapter four deals with the cooperative integration between the two states and the 
power conflicts between southerners and northerners which occurred at all levels. 
Critically, the chapter analyses the dynamics of political events: political clashes over 
administration mechanisms, assassinations of YSP members, southerners' frustration 
over their accommodation in Sana'a and over the activities of the northern security 
forces. 
Chapter five develops the argument on imposed integration and explains how the 
power structure was turned into a one-man rule - of the Zaydi faction - as formerly 
in the YAR; and how the whole administrative and financial mechanisms went back 
into the former structure of the YAR. It also explicitly shows the decline of the south 
in all respects. 
Introduction 
The story of Yemen unification or integration has been on the stage since the 
establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in 1962 at a time when the 
southern Yemeni state was still under British rule and protection in the form of a 
federation of several trucial states. The north of Yemen achieved its republic status 
five years before the southern part and this status contributed to the sponsorship of a 
'guerrilla' war in the south against the British forces and the regime of the sultanates. 
It was the hope that when the south gained its independence, a unification between 
the two Yemeni states would take place immediately. This did not happen and 
instead the two Yemeni states existed side by side but at variant axes from each other 
in terms of policies, social norms and values. It was only after 23 years had passed 
(1990) that unification took place. Initially the unification was cooperative but that 
did not last long and it turned into a 'coercive' type of unification with the southern 
state highly victimised by the northern leadership under the unified system. 
The focus of the thesis is on the Yemeni integration: its processes, progress and the 
future outlook. The theme of the thesis will therefore run into analysing all political 
and economic dynamics of the two Yemeni states: the YAR and PDRY and those 
dynamic events between the two states in the pre-unification period (1968-1990). 
The theme is continued by analysing the unification progress over the period 1990-
1998 and develop the arguments of how the impact of past experiences of each state 
has been influencing each leadership attitudes, behaviours and approach towards the 
unified power structure in the Republic of Yemen. 
The thesis develops the arguments for the theme of the thesis in the chapters as 
follows: 
Chapter One: 
Beside providing background on the country, the chapter lays down the methodology 
and introduces the theoretical material for understanding both the power struggle in 
the political structure of each state and of the unified system. Special emphasis shall 
be placed on the southern Yemeni state for three reasons: 
a. The unique power structure of the PDRY had integrated 17 ex-trucial states 
of so-called "South Arabian Federation" into the PDRY as, creating a 
particularly complex set of political dynamics. 
b. The Marxist-Leninist regime in the south was for much of the time run by a 
northern Shafai group headed by Abdel-Fattah Ismail, who maintained the 
highest post as Secretary-General of the political structure for over a decade. 
This was crucial to hindering integration. 
c. The political dynamic after 1978 was more complex in the south as power 
shifter three time up to 1990, while in the north there was one continuing 
regime. Political dynamics in the south had a strong political impact on the 
north. 
Chapter Two: 
Chapter two covers an important background for understanding the unification 
process. It shows the nature of the power struggle in each state, with how minorities 
internally or externally fighting for power. The chapter lays emphasis on the basic 
problem of the northern Shafais who failed to be incorporated in the top power 
structures in the north (at any time) and could easily climb to the top political power 
structure(s) in the south through which they strove for political legitimacy. The 
chapter shows how the northern Shafais used political tactics, manoeuvres and 
instruments to seek to achieve power within the political structure of the north and 
the south. 
Chapter Three 
Chapter three covers the series of unification arguments between the two Yemeni 
states. The argument in this chapter is that violent conflicts between the two states 
were concomitant with the implementation of the unification process. In other words, 
the closer the two states came towards unification, the more did variant local policies 
or violent events come in to drive the two states apart. 
Chapter Four 
Chapter four explains the cooperative integration between the two states. It traces the 
cooperative unification steps since 1989 until May 1990. It goes on to explain the 
unification attitudes, behaviour and approach of each party in the top power and the 
maintaining of the political power and administrative of each system. The two states 
existed side by side with representation in the three top political structures: the 
Presidential Council, the Parliament and the Cabinet (with a 50/50 ratio in each). The 
chapter indicates the impact of factionalism/regionalism/tribalism on state-building, 
the elections, and the distribution of resources. It covers the factors behind the civil 
war between the two military forces which had failed to integrate into one force. 
Chapter Five 
Chapter five deals with the post-war period. It develops the argument of how the 
unification progressed into a coercive type changing some basic constitutional 
aspects to end the legitimacy of the southern leadership in the unification as a 
partner. It explains how southern resources were used for the benefit of northerners 
and how the administration in the south was effectively run by northerners at all 
levels despite the presence of southerners. 
The Aim of the Thesis 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse, critically, the Yemeni unification: its objectives, 
process and progress. Such analysis can best come through objective academic 
research by a researcher who lived day-to-day the unification process and its progress 
and witnessed its political dynamics in the south and in the north. This will enable 
readers to review analytically the Yememi unification in respect of the new materials 
put forward in the thesis for the first time. 
Sources 
Most of the sources of this thesis are provided by original sources: actors who 
witnessed and played a part in the political dynamics of the Yemeni unification, of 
whom the researcher is one. 
Briefly, the researcher was bom in Aden from northern and southern parents. Her 
mother was a descendent of Imam Yahya Bin Hussain Al-Hadi - the founder of the 
Zaydi doctrine in Yemen in the tenth century. Her father was a Hadhrami from the 
Bamurrah clan. The researcher was brought up by maternal uncles who were more 
enlightened than her paternal family as they were residing in Aden colony. 
The researcher was politically active in the NLF in school and in Aden society. She 
was among the first female group in the political life in the south. She was in contact 
- formally and informally - with all the southern elites in the party and the 
government. Ismail, the Secretary-General of the PONF/YSP, for instance, asked her 
help to teach his eldest son and daughter in 1975. President Salem Rubaye'a Ali 
asked her to coordinate a Higher Planning Committee report on agriculture with his 
office before putting it to the Higher Planning Committee in order for this not to be 
used politically against him (he was the Chairman of the Political Committee for 
Agriculture and the researcher was the director of the agricultural sector in the 
Ministry of Planning). 
President Salem Rubaye'a Al i then moved the research to the Ministry of Agriculture 
in 1977 and appointed her as a deputy director general for the planning and statistics 
department. When she became deputy minister, the defence and the interior ministers 
(Ali Anter and Saleh Musleh) would mainly approach her for their needs from the 
ministry. She had also strong informal relations with many leaders' families in 
addition to her husbands in-laws of the Hadhrami factions (Al-Beidh and Al-Seyeili). 
CHAPTER 1 
Background and Methodology 
1.1 Geographical Background 
The following section addresses the physical geography of the ROY, 
particularly emphasising the diversity of the physical surroundings between 
the areas covered by the ex-PDRY and ex-YAR. This difference is most 
apparent with regard to the geomorphology and climate of the region. Firstly, 
the location of Yemen in relation to surrounding areas is addressed, followed 
by a brief description of the geomorphological and climatic characteristics. 
1.1.1 Location 
The Republic of Yemen (ROY) is located on the south west corner of the 
Arabia peninsula, between the latitudes of 12-20° north of the equator and 
longitudes 41-54° east of the Greenwich Meridian.' The total area is 555,000 
km^ excluding al-Rub'a al-Khali. The country is bordered by the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia in the north, the Red Sea to the west, the Arabian Sea to the 
sbuth and Oman to the east.'^  ROY has several islands, of which Mayoon at 
Bab al-Mandab and Socotra 510 km offshore the eastern coast are the most 
important.'^ On the Red Sea, several islands are under the sovereignity of the 
ROY of which Kamaran, Great Hunaish, Little Hunaish, Zaqar, Al-Zubair, A l -
Tair are the most important.'* 
1.1.2 Geomorphology and Natural Resources 
The physical geography of the ROY may be divided into five distinct 
geomorphological units: mountainous, plateaux, coastal, al-Rub'a al-Khali 
(desert) and islands. 
a. The Mountainous Region 
These are dominated by lava resulting from the fissure following the rifting of 
the Nubian and Arabian Plates which took place along the north-south axis of 
the Red Sea. This rift led to the formation of the Red Sea and the Gulf of 
Aden, and a mountainous region in the approximate form of an L-shape 
running along the north and west side of Yemen.^ 
Geologically, this mountainous region consists predominantly and most 
obviously of volcanic rocks that rise between 1000 and 3600 metres above sea 
level. The highest point in this region is Prophet Shuaib mountain that reaches 
3666 metres, and is the highest peak in both the Arabian Peninsula and Al -
Sham region, excluding the Kurdish areas. ^ 
Several major wadis exist in this region: Wadi Haradh, Wadi Moor and Wadi 
Zabid, all of which flow to the Red Sea on the west side, while Wadi Tuban 
and Wadi Bana flow to the Arabian Sea in the south. Wadi Khabb, Wadi AI-
Sadd, Wadi Adana and Wadi Al-Jawf flow in a north easterly direction. ^ 
The largest of the wadis in Yemen is the Wadi Hadhramout which stretches 
across the eastern half of the country. The wadi is surrounded by mountainous 
chains and flows into the Arabian Sea. 
b. The Plateaux Region 
This region is widespread over Yemen but is located mainly alongside the 
mountainous regions with a maximum altitude of 1200 metres. Most plateaux 
are located in the northern areas of Yemen such as around Saada, Hajja, Ibb, 
and the more northerly east areas of Shabwa, Hadhramout and Lahj 
Govemorates.^ 
Coastal Region 
This region includes the coastal areas along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the 
Arabian Sea, and stretch from the Omani border south-westerly towards Bab 
al-Mandab, and from here northward to the border of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia on the Red Sea.^  The length of the Yemeni coastline is approximately 
9 
2000 km."^ 
Al-Ruba'al-Khali 
This region is the infamous arid desert territory of Yemen. However, it still 
supports a variety of vegetation, especially in areas where oases have 
developed. This region is home to Yemeni bedouin nomads who establish 
seasonal habitats across the area.'' 
Islands 
There are over 100 Yemeni islands scattered in the territorial waters of Yemen 
in the Red Sea.'^  Kamaran is the largest and the most densely populated of 
these islands. Perim (Mayoon) is another large island located in the strait of 
Bab al-Mandab which connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The large 
island of Socotra is one of the few Yemeni islands to be found in the Gulf of 
Aden. The Socotra group of islands has unique animals, birds and plantations 
that recently attracted the interest of UNEP in preserving the endangered 
species of flora and fauna found there. 
1.1.2.1 Natural Resources 
The Republic of Yemen enjoys various natural resources. Oil and gas were 
struck in the 1980s, and oil production reached around 450,000 b/d in October 
1998.'^ '^  The country has large reserves of gas at around 30 trillion cm^. In the 
agricultural sector, the country has about 1 million acres of cultivable land, of 
which just under half is cultivated. Various crops of cereals, vegetables and 
fruits are cultivated throughout the year, owing to the diversified climate, as 
indicated in section 1.3. 
1.1.3 Climate 
The climate varies greatly throughout the country. It ranges between 15°C and 
10 
44''C in summer, and between 2°C to 32°C in the winter months.'^ Thus, the 
country enjoys different climates at any one time in different regions. 
Humidity along the coastal areas varies between 95% in summer to 65% in 
winter. Dry weather prevails throughout the highlands and the hinterlands. 
1.1.4 Commentary 
Yemen is therefore characterised by diverse geographic conditions, which 
roughly equate to the ex-YAR being a mountainous region, with sufficient 
rainfall though without an adequate water supply infrastructure. The ex-PDRY 
region is dominated by low-lying plateaux regions with low rainfall but a good 
water supply system from the utilisation of the extensive aquifer system. 
These immense regional differences in the geographic characteristics of 
Yemen are mirrored in the characteristics of the peoples who inhabit these 
areas. The manner in which the physical environment has been utilised by the 
variety of administrations to have governed Yemen is addressed mainly in 
Chapter 5 with the important issue of the water supply infrastructure. 
1.2 Administrative Divisions of the ROY 
In administrative terms, the Republic of Yemen is divided into 17 
govemorates and the capital city of Sanaa. These governorates are:''' 
In Northern Regions In Southern Regions 
The capital city of Sanaa Aden Govemorate 
Sanaa Governorate Lahj Govemorate 
Taiz Govemorate Abyan Governorate 
Al-Hudaidah Govemorate Shabwah Govemorate 
Ibb Govemorate Hadhramout Govemorate 
Dhamar Governorate Al-Mahara Govemorate 
Mareb Govemorate 
Al-Baidha Governorate 
Hajjah Governorate 
11 
Al-Mahweet Govemorate 
Sa'adah Governorate 
Al-Jawf Govemorate 
Each governorate, consisted of four or more districts governed by a Mayor 
who came under the jurisdiction of the concerned Governor. Governorates, 
particularly those of northern regions, had no conformity, neither 
geographically nor in terms of population. The southern governorates each had 
four districts apart from Hadhramout which had 8 districts due to its larger 
size in area.'^  
1.3 Tribal Groupings 
A central theme of the thesis is the impact of tribalism and tribal groupings on 
the unification process, indeed, much of the political history of Yemen is 
pivoted on the tribal political dynamic in the power-centre of the country. The 
major tribal groupings found in Yemen are illustrated in Maps 2 and 3. It is 
worth mentioning that the political structures of the mountainous regions of 
Yemen (mainly in the ex-YAR territory) are strongly influenced by tribal 
confederations, namely the Hashed and Bakeel confederations of the Zaydi 
sect. However, tribal clusters are not necessarily mutually exclusive, for 
example, the Medhaj tribe around the Dhamar region is mainly Zaydi, with a 
larger Shafai component to the south. The southern tribes of the ex-PDRY 
region (see Map 3) were structurally weakened during the period of Socialist-
rule. However, upon unification, tribal clusters are again gaining strength and 
becoming increasingly well-organised and could possibly resuft in the 
development of strong tribal structures. 
1.4 Population of the R O Y ' ^ 
The preliminary estimates of the population, according to the recent census of 
December 1994, are 14,587,807 persons inside the country and 1,243,950 
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Map 2:The Major Tribal Clusters of northern Yemen 
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persons outside the country. The total number of Yemenis inside and outside 
the country has been estimated at 15,831,757, of which 7,959,480 are males 
and 7,872,277are females with an average of 7 persons per nuclear family. 
The population growth rate according to the 1994 census, is 3.7%. However, 
previous estimates showed 3.1% for northern areas and 2.7% for southern 
areas as per the census of 1986 of the ex-YAR and census 1988 of the ex-
PDRY respectively.'^ The population ratios, by age, are as follows: 
0-14 years 52% 
15-64 years 45% 
65+ 3% 
Life expectancy at birth is around 48%) and the average life-span at birth is 47 
years. 
Tables 1 to 6c in the appendix indicate the distances between major urban 
areas (Table 1), some social indicators which both the ex-YAR and ex-PDRY 
had achieved throughout their developmental processes prior to the 
unification, including education (Tables 2a to 2c), health personnel (Table 3), 
employment statistics (Table 4), air transport (Table 5), and political events in 
Tables 6a to 6c. 
1.5 Methodology of Integration 
There are two concepts underlying this thesis. The first is the effective role of 
minorities in the two former Yemeni states, and the second is the concept of 
integration. Yemen unification reached its aspired objective - integration 
between the two former separate state entities, the Yemen Arab Republic and 
the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen - in May 1990. Historically, 
political integration has been undertaken between and among many countries 
in order to achieve sustainable political and developmental goals and growth, 
but not always with full success. Some countries have made steady progress in 
their plans for integration, as has occurred in the GCC and the UAE in 
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Table 1.1 ; Population of Voting age, by Governorate, 1993 
No. Election No. of 
Governorate Total Females Males Centre MPs 
Sana'a City 387,314 197,375 189,939 34 18 
Aden 223,161 113,723 109,438 73 11 
Taiz 894,258 455,714 438,544 227 43 
Laheg 263,012 134,031 128,981 100 12 
Ibb 803,724 409,578 394,146 227 38 
Abyan 166,732 84,967 81,765 88 8 
Al-Baida 200,918 102,388 98,530 79 10 
Shabwa 125,175 63,789 61,386 84 6 
Hadhramout 350,448 178,588 171,860 170 17 
Al-Mahrah 48,685 24,810 23,875 30 2 
Al-Hodeidah 703,371 358,438 344,933 175 34 
Dhamar 435,818 222,093 213,725 150 21 
Sana'a 745,312 379,811 365,501 227 36 
Al-Mahweet 168,953 91,194 77,759 47 8 
Hajjah 255,929 24,005 231,924 147 23 
Sa'adah 183,106 93,311 89,795 50 9 
Al-Jawf 46,195 23,541 22,654 24 2 
Mareb 63,828 32,527 31,301 39 J 
T O T A L 6,065,939 2,989,883 3,076,056 2,021 301 
Source: Election Committee, 1993 
the Arab world. Elsewhere, some attempts have failed such as that which 
sought to unify Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic. 
1.5.1 Minority Rule Theory 
With regard to minority rule, the former YAR and PDRY both witnessed 
minority rule. The YAR has mostly been mled by a Zaydi faction which was 
less substantial in number than the Shafai faction in the north and in the PDRY 
was ruled by a politically defined minority within a framework of a political 
organization made up of various southern factions in addition to a northern 
Shafai faction. Ironically, in the southem leadership, the smaller group, the 
northern Shafais, were the most influential mling group in the PDRY. 
Similarly, in the YAR, the Hashedis were a minor group in the Zaydi faction 
(compared to the Bakeel confederation), yet they were predominant in the 
power structure from 1978 until 1990, and from 1994 until now. 
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One of the most significant of the theoretical works on the minority rule is by 
Van Dam (1981). He argues that the Alawis, a minority group in Syria, 
obtained power through their presence in the military during the French 
occupation. The Alawis and other minorities had consolidated positions in the 
army and through this acquired control of political structures. Van Dam 
indicated several factors which helped the Alawis' rise to power. The most 
important one was the factions ability to act in a consolidated manner at all 
levels: geographically, professionally, and politically. 
The Syrian case could have some similarities with both north and south 
Yemen. In some aspects it resembles the former YAR where the Ottomans 
recruited more Zaydis in the armed forces than Shafais, and then handed the 
country over to a Zaydi faction, such that Zaydi rule became hereditary. 
The case of the PDRY was a little different in view of the identity of its 
nationals. The northern Shafais were not nationals within the Federation of 
South Arabia, and even when the PRSY and subsequently the PDRY were 
formed, the northern Shafais maintained dual nationality, holding both YAR 
and PDRY passports. This does not have parallels in Syria. The result in the 
PDRY was that the northern Shafai group could climb to the top of the power 
structures, but could not dominate the military, which the Alawis in Syria did 
so effectively. The northern Shafais had no alternative but to defend their 
position at the pinnacle of the power structure in the south in order to achieve 
their ultimate aim of power legitimacy in the north. 
Other literature which can be grouped under "Third World Politics" has shown 
how political power structures are shaped by political history, social concerns, 
political institutions, and the degree or influence of military involvement and 
external forces. Cammack, et. al., suggest that the history of foreign 
domination, the class system and the presence of minorities have much to do 
with reshaping the power structure in a developing country (Cammack, Pool 
and Tardoff, 1988). They stress the role of political institutions which 
minorities could play a relevant role in policies. 
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1.5.2 Integration Theory 
There is a large literature on integration written by Lindberg, Haas, Etzioni, 
Deusch, Nye, Weiner, Levy, Coleman, Roseburg, Claude, Hayward, Jacob, 
Tuscano, lonescu, Kavanagh, Coombe and many others. The researcher found 
these resources useful on regional and international integration despite their 
diversities. However, the researcher found very little literature on national 
integration which fits the Yemen integration case. 
Each of the above writers defined 'integration' in different forms, though with 
the same concept. It is therefore a helpful task to provide definitions of 
integration. The following are some of the definitions of the integration 
process put forward by the above writers: 
(a) Emst Haas defined integration as "the process of shifting loyalties from a 
national setting to a larger entity "^^ 
(b) K.W. Deusch said that integration was "the ability to ensure peaceful 
change over-time " 
(c) J. Nye looked at integration as "the establishment and maintenance of the 
political community " 
(d) A. Etzioni referred to the integration process as " the ability of a system to 
maintain itself in the face of internal and external challenges ".^^ 
(e) L. Lindberg defined integration as "the Process whereby a group of 
nations (or other political units) progressively takes on a collective capacity to 
make decisions which authoritatively allocates values for all their 
member s".^^ 
(f) Myron Weiner defined national integration as "referring to the generalised 
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problem of holding a system together " }^ 
(g) M . J. Levy suggests that "the analytic structure of integration in a society 
or other concrete structure consists of those structures the operations of which 
make for the co-functional adaptation of the members and/ or members-to-be 
of the structure to the structure concerned. " ^'^ 
(h) Coleman and Roseburg defined Political Integration as "progressive 
bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing 
an integrated political process and a participant political community ".^^ 
It is important to note that in all of the above definitions of integration, 
scholars hold a 'sense of coherence' as a common factor. This aspect shall be 
examined below in the light of the Yemeni experience in its unification 
process. 
Another remarkable point of these definitions is that most of them would be 
applicable to regional integration rather than national integration of two states, 
a case which does not suit Yemen. The researcher is more inclined to treat 
Yemen unification as a nationally integrated case rather than a regional. For 
this reason, the researcher will argue the Yemen case, mainly with regards to 
some integration literatures made by both Etzioni, Hayward and Normeman 
who had written on Middle East experiences and other developing countries in 
the world. 
Solid theoretical bases or paradigms were found in Etzioni's book. Political 
Unification, which could be useftil in illuminating the Yemeni experience. '^' 
Also, a useful classification of factors made by Nonneman in his article 
'Problems facing Co-operation and Integration Attempts in the Middle East' 
affecting the integration process is also important for the Yemeni case. 
The researcher shall review some of the integration literature throughout the 
forthcoming subsections with regard to the Yemen unification experience. 
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After that, the integration of the Yemen shall be critically analysed in other 
chapters of this thesis. 
While definitions of integration can be partly applied to the Yemeni case, the 
researcher likes to focus on basic aspects for the Yemeni unification 
experience below with regard to integration methodology. This will be made 
in consideration to the peculiarities of the two Yemeni states in terms of their 
distinguished power centres, political and social disparity policies, and their 
diversified resources in the region. The development of these ideas will be 
incorporated by the researcher with regard to Etzioni's configuration of 
national political unification and integration beside others.^' The researcher 
will add more illimunation to the political unification with regard to the 
Yemeni case through her own experience in the two Yemens in the political, 
functional and social spheres. 
In addition to the above references, the researcher found the work of Mufti 
Malek to have applications to the study of Yemen (Mufti, 1996, Sovereign 
Creations). In brief. Mufti argued the theory of "defensive unionism". The 
tenets of this theory state that the most frequent cause for alliances and union 
are external threats, and that non-systematic factors such as regime ideology 
played a minor role. Mufti argued that this was true or fruitful for old alliances 
in pre-1967 Egypt, post-1967 Israel, but failed to explain unity projects which 
eliminated inter-Arab relations in the following decades. Furthermore, he 
argued that pan-Arab unionism clearly had more to do with intemal stmggles 
and transnational penetration than with imbalances of power - or threat - in 
the international environment. 
Mufti turned to the optimistic theorists such as Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch 
who insisted on four crucial conditions without which political integration 
would be impossible . These were: 
1. A prolonged period of complex economic interaction to generate the 
interdependence; 
2. The existence of effective state institutions, capable of adapting to new 
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needs and demands; 
3. Political pluralism or broadening elites, and; 
4. Elite value complementability. 
Mufti claimed that only the last one of these conditions prevailed in the Arab 
world during the heyday of unification. Mufti agreed with Stephen David who 
argued that Third World leaders engaged in "omnibalancing" against both 
external and internal threats. The omnibalancing theory rests on the 
assumption that leaders are weak and illegitimate and the stakes in domestic 
politics are high. David's approach was relevant as he specified the ultimate 
goal of third world leaders was to protect himself even i f this was achieved at 
the expense of the state. Mufti, however, demonstrated how defensive 
unionism would come about when leaders failed to establish autonomy and 
legitimacy within their states. 
On unity projects. Mufti presented formally his argument under two 
categories: expansionist and defensive motives. He viewed that expansionist 
motivated unity attempts were rarely made. He argued that at least one partner 
in a unity agreement would behave defensively out of the following unity 
patterns or models: 
1. A vulnerable regime seeks to neutralize domestic opponents in a union 
with an expansionist partner, or; 
2. Both sides respond to domestic challenges by resorting to defensive 
unionism. The challenges in this case would likely be domestic. 
3. A regime facing a dangerous external threat may be obliged by an 
expansionist potential ally to a unification accord as a condition for its 
support. 
The unity pacts involving Syria and Iraq, according to Mufti, were explained 
by the first two models. The Yemeni unification can be explained by the 
second model. I f the northern Shafais in the southern leadership were regarded 
as exogenous factors to both the northern and southern leaderships, then the 
third model would also be applicable. The Yemeni unificafion shall be 
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analysed along these lines of arguments. 
In brief, however, the researcher would assert that the south agreed to the 
unity pact out of "defensive" motives with a high cost of ceding national 
sovereignty of southerners. This was made because the ruling party, the YSP, 
in 1989-1990 was substantially composed of northerners in the party and 
goveniment, and the southerners effectively lost political legitimacy. The 
Southern leaders did not even ask for a federation of confederation as argued 
by Mufti's models. Such an unstable regime accepted the unity project with 
the north at a high price to the south in general. 
1.6 The Configurational Aspects of the Two Yemeni States 
Yemen had a unique position in the Middle East region in terms of its socio-
political aspects. It was the only country in the region with two international 
identities, namely the YAR and PDRY. Yemen was like Korea and Vietnam 
both of which had been divided into north and south. Many observers believed 
that it was only a matter of time before the two Yemens would be integrated 
into one international identity. The two peoples had one origin and other 
common factors in terms of religion, language, social and traditional customs 
in addition to some blood relations between the two states. However, because 
of the political history of each state, the two Yemeni states did not enjoy the 
same degree of mutual socio-political norms. For instance, the social 
structures of tribes and their social impact on the power centres have been 
very different from each other as we shall envisage h in chapters 2, 3,4 and 5. 
An attempt will be made to apply some principles of integration in the Yemen 
unity case in respect of the variations and similarities of the common 
parameters between the two states in their integration process. Within the 
framework of this methodology, we shall critically analyse the Yemen 
unification process through the period 1970-1998. 
It is important, however, to underline that when Etzioni wrote his 
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integration/unification literature, he used the concept of union as a socio-
political one and not as a legal term, and this is important to be borne in mind 
throughout our analysis. 
1.6.1 The Main Principles of Integration 
It is assumed here that an integration process should be based on political 
compliance, co-operation and co-ordination out of which an integration 
process ensues. The parties/units concerned in an integration process would 
need to have/enjoy as many of these features as possible. We shall now look 
into the basic features and parameters for which a sound integration process 
would be meaningful i f these were critically taken into consideration. 
1.6.2 Basic Features For Integration 
Political scientists have developed various paradigms for the integration 
process. Many of these assert the traditional consensus that population norms, 
language or religion are decisive parameters for integration. While the 
researcher believes in those basic features of the integration process, she 
thinks that there are decisive factors which affect the ability of the two or more 
parties to reconcile their differences/variations in their units or previous 
systems before going into integration and to be aware of such basic rules and 
principles of national integration. 
There are many basic integration features drawn by Etzioni and others which 
though applicable to regional integration, the researcher would attempt to 
apply them to the national unification of the Yemeni case. 
1.6.2,1 The Unit/System Properties in the Pre-Unification State 
Etzioni argues that before going into the unification process, there needs to be 
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some required properties enjoyed by the unit/system seeking integration with 
other units/sy stems. The first of these properties is the integration of sub-units 
or sub-systems in each party?^ 
In the Yemeni case, this property, generally, had a low-level integration in 
each of the Yemeni states. The north has doctrinally been divided into two 
factions; Zaydi (Shi'ite) and Shafai (Sunni), and has mainly had a Zaydi 
power centre. The northern Shafais, though constituting the majority in terms 
of population, were not incorporated normally in the northern power centre. 
The south on the other hand, had in their former state, representations of 
different regions including northerners in their power centre but all these came 
from a minority of who were members of the ruling political party. Real 
integration of all groups in each unit was hardly in existence in either state. 
Nonneman pointed out in his above mentioned article several factors impede 
regional and national integration of which lack of integration within 
units/systems is one. Chapters 2 and 3 have details on this aspect. 
The second property Etzioni and Nonneman put forward is the homogeneity 
factor among sub-units and sub-systems in the preunification state. According 
to them, the homogeneity factor is, to a certain extent, decisive for a successful 
unification/integration process. Etzioni, in particular, claimed that the less 
homogeneous the group in the unification, the lower level the integration will 
be.'^ ^ The more the homogeneity factor is, the higher level the integration will 
be among the concerned groups. Yet, there are several countries which 
achieved integration without great homogeneity: the USA, the ex-USSR and 
Belgium stand out as such cases. Homogeneity is no doubt a contributory 
factor to the integration process, but it is not as decisive as previous literature 
suggests. However, through her experience, the researcher believes that this 
factor has its positive effect on the integration process for its impact in 
limiting resistance that might come up from some sub-units of some factions 
lacking homogeneity. 
Despite the common features of the two states in terms of language, religion 
and major social parametres, the heterogeneity factor characterised each state 
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in other different respects. There was a lack of homogeneity in terms of tribal 
identities, doctrinal factions and social stratifications. Politically, the north had 
its historic doctrinal problem heavily reflected in its power centre and military 
and security forces. The south, on the other hand, had the so-called "central 
democracy" within its 30,000 party members only and was forced, under 
marxist-leninist rules to bring all factions in the party system into its limited 
power centre for the rule of a state. Therefore, population-wise, there was no 
integration in either political structure in the two states. 
Etzioni has questioned whether homogeneity would be a prerequisite factor or 
an enhancing factor to political integration. The researcher believes that there 
should be a socially acceptable degree of homogeneity that ought to exist in 
each unit/system before unification takes place. 
The third property which fitted the Yemeni integration experience was the 
social property, which Etzioni talks about in terms of there being a common 
enemy. The researcher discussed this point in the previous concept of the 
minority rule above. In the yemeni case, poverty and the poor infrastructures 
in addition to global political changes were sufficient factors for both yemen 
to get integrated for a long run prosperity. Moreover, the southern leadership 
was not happy with the northern shafais attitudes and approaches in their 
performance as partners in the YSP leadership. On the other hand the zaydi 
leadership in the north did not want to see a political power for northern 
shafais in the south to grow further. The two leaderships had common 
'enemies' and 'challenges' in the political arena in the two states and these 
might have convinced each to go into a hasty unionism. 
It is important to note down here that the northern shafais were pressing hard 
and advocating the unification process but on different grounds. They were 
pressure group for the transformation of the yemeni society into revolutionary 
communities which must get rid of 'tribalism', 'revionism' and all old social 
traditions. This transformation was a pre-requisite for the unification of 
yemen. Only on these basis, the northern shafais could be legitimately 
recognised for power centre in a unified yemen. 
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The fourth property of the units/sy stems intending a unification process was 
the interdependence of the sub-units/sub-systems in the preunification phase. 
Etzioni argues that experience shows that interdependent sub-units at all levels 
- polifically, sectorally and socially - are likely to increase the level of 
integration after unification.^^ The higher the degree of interdependence 
among these sub-units in the preunifiaction phase, the higher the level of the 
integration process will be after unification. 
The researcher believes that the interdependence factor will only be positively 
effective in industrialised societies where a real free market economy has a 
strong force among the community members. Interdependence of the sub-units 
of developing countries, where the political leadership is free from democratic 
processes, is meaningless unless the top elite in power centres enjoy strong 
interdependence between/among them first. 
Finally, there is the factor of the scope of integration which should expand 
more and more as the level of integration gets higher and higher. Etzioni 
implies that the unification process would be working integratively within a 
unified system i f the scope of the unit members to the integration process is 
respectively high.''^ 
Yemeni integration has a short-lived experience and within which the scope 
could not expand further than its limits which were dictated by several 
negative factors of which the civil war of 1994 was the climax. Chapters 4 and 
5 have details of this aspect. 
1.6.2,2 The Properties of the Unified System 
Before we study the properties of the unified system, it might be better to 
distinguish the types of unified systems in the unification processes. Etzioni 
describes three types of unification compositions in terms of powers and 
assets. These are: the utilitarian, the coercive and the additive powers.^^ The 
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first property of a unified system is the idenfification of the typology of 
unification employed. The researcher believes that the Yemeni experience has 
aspects of all the above types. For example, at the outset of the unification 
process the two states asserted the additive composition as each state prepared 
its public for the Yemen unification to gain powerfiil identity in the region. 
Since the 1980's, the unification process was heading towards utilitarian 
power compositions with economic and social sectoral integration in both 
states. However, the development of political tensions between the two sides 
led to the use of force by which the unification power had a coercive 
composition. 
Etzioni has observed that the utilitarian power in the unification process 
enhances integration because of the linkages of interests of all units in the 
unified system. Under the assumption that each unit in the unified system has 
balanced interests in terms of resources, manpower, trade facilities etc, all 
units in the unified power centre would enhance/encourage the growth of 
integration to a higher level.''^ The imbalance in the units' interests, however, 
would create a disruptive power centre and might lead some units to 
monopolise the power centre for its own interests. This, in turn, might lead to 
a low or medium level of integration of the unified system. However, 
disruption in the unified power centre, he claims, might be resulted from the 
preception of one leading unit in the unified system, that other units sharing 
the power centre do not have equal interest weight and accordingly this 
leading unit would give itself the right to overrule other units in the integration 
process."*^  
In regard to this point, the experience of Yemeni unification had a disruptive 
unified power centre in its utilitarian composition. The two Yemeni states 
were fully complementary to each other. The north had a good agricultural 
base, though without water resources, strong manpower and good foreign 
policies. The south had fully diversified resources of water, land, oil and 
minerals. The unification of the two states accommodated the two power 
centres with a 50% share in the government but as this equal ratio lost ground 
in the parliamentary elections of 1993, the northern elite tended to think that 
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they should enjoy a larger share of power in the centre and in the government. 
This caused serious disruption between the two sides, and the southerners 
unsuccessfully sought deunification. This resulted in the use of force between 
the two sides with the southerners losing the war and the country. The unified 
system turned into a coercive composition in its power and assets and the 
former northern Yemeni rule came back alone at the head of the unified 
system. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 have full details and analyses of these events. 
Etzioni raises an interesting question, that is whether ceorcion, at any stage of 
integration, will be a determinant factor and necessarily impedes the long-
term success of the union.'''' The researcher believes that this is a valid 
quesfion with a positive answer particularly in an imbalanced situation 
between or among the units in the unified system. Chapter 3 in this thesis 
shows the degree of the additive and utilitarian unification process of Yemen 
over the period 1972 to 1993. Chapter 4 indicates the failure of the utilitarian 
power composition and its change to a coercive one in 1994. Chapter 5 
indicates the firm grip of the northern tribes in the power centre of all units in 
a coercive power composition. Many of Nonneman's obstacles to national 
integrafion are also discussed in these chapters. 
The second property for the unified system is the "effective distribution of 
power." Etzioni claims that two factors need to be considered: (a) the degree 
of elitism of one or few units in the unified system as against more or less 
equal distribution among the many, and (b) the nature of the unit(s) that have 
more power than others in the new system.''^  
This property of the unified system is very applicable to the Yemeni case. 
Yemeni integration suffered serious set-backs because of the 'imbalanced 
elitism'. In consideration of the Yemeni tribal communities, the unified power 
centre did not involve all Yemeni factions in its decision making structure and, 
after fours years of its cooperative integration, the power centre practically 
came under the monopoly of one minority faction of one tribe, the Hashed 
tribe of north Yemen. The tribal nature of their rule had a very narrow vision 
of state-building, as is shown in chapter 5 of this thesis. This, however, is 
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related to the first concept above in the methodology. 
1.6.2.3 The Role of Development in the Integration Process 
Etzioni asserts that one property of the unified system is to have integrated 
sectors which would enhance the process. For this reason, the researcher 
would like to discuss this point under a special heading. 
For the success of the utilitarian power of a unified system, the researcher 
believes that it is necessary for the units, in the preunificafion phase, to have a 
medium to high level of sectoral integration among units. This will contribute 
to the boost of the unification process in its early stages. Of course, this is vital 
for the national unification of an amalgamated nature. It may not be the case 
for regional or international integration. 
More importantly, this tendency will help to prepare relevant legislation in all 
other sectors: in the social, the judicial, the administrative and the financial 
sectors beside the economic one. In this preunification phase, unresolved 
issues between/among units will be easier to solve than they would be during 
the unification process itself because of the polifical sensitivities of the unified 
system. Furthermore, such prior arrangement will give fime and space to deal 
with strategic sectoral issues rather than going into irrelevant issues to be 
solved at top power structures. 
The Yemen experience had passed through several serious difficulfies due to 
insufficient preparations to solve unsolved issues. The southern leadership did 
not assess or forsee what the situation after unification would be like and how 
difficuh it would be to allow the other side to accept their views without 
compromising in terms of advanced legislation, financial arrangements for 
their regions and to keep the British-based administrafion system. In view of 
the variations in their sectoral policies, no appropriate sectoral integration took 
place during the pre-unification phase. This, however, incurred heavy costs to 
the southern units, as explained in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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Another feature of political integration was the increase in the coherence 
factor among the unified/integrated units so that the integration process could 
be cured of its 'ups' and 'downs' at minimal expense.''^  Integrafion may fall 
down even after hundreds of years of integrative processes, as could be the 
case in the UK. Hayward argued that i f the contact areas became limited 
(Welsh and English), then integration would tend to be low and might lead to 
deunification i f not fragmentation. He therefore emphasised that a given level 
of generalisation of adaptations and orientations should be provided for the 
political structure by actors as per his definition of integration. By adaptation, 
Hayward means the response of units/individuals to the directives of the 
political structure, i.e. whether they comply with the structure or not. By 
orientation, he refers to actors' identification with, and evaluation of, the 
political structure. Thus adaptation implies individuals' behaviours and 
orientation involves individuals'''^ attitudes. The power centre of the unified 
system to keep the system coherent and be committed to the integration would 
need to be committed to the political structure in its directives and to have the 
requisite attitudes for commitment. 
As the integration process cannot afford to give room to contradictory political 
platforms, Yemeni unification failed at its power centre because its lack of 
coherence during the transitory stage. The two units had completely variant 
attitudes and different visions to the state-building and, due to insufficient 
preparations for these issues, this resulted in using force for deunification from 
one side and imposition of unification by the other. 
The final property the unified system should aim to achieve is the response to 
the communication, upward and downward. The success of the unification 
process is equally levelled with the degree of its response to messages 
received from all factions in the community. This response should be 
peaceftally positive and dedicated to the national interest or to the reasons for 
which the unificafion was made.''^  
Yemen's experience in this respect was not positive to public needs and 
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national interest. The majority of the Yemeni public needed a change of power 
centres of both units after the 1993 elections, but the response was negative. 
Public demonstrations were made against the bad management of 
governments, and the elite's response was harsh. 
1.6.3 The Instruments for the Integration Process 
The researcher had experience in detecting major defects of the power centre 
in the south and the north and, in view of the scant resources on national 
integration literature, she came up with some conclusions with the above 
properties in mind. Below are the important points for the instruments of the 
integration process. 
To safeguard the integration process, a good administrative mechanism needs 
to be established under a good monitoring system. This can only be achieved 
by a strong legal mechanism capable of enforcing national laws and 
regulations at all levels, and both centrally and regionally. The power of the 
judiciary has to outstrip or to go beyond all political or tribal powers in the 
national system. Without this powerful instrument in the state, there will 
hardly be any effect or positive impact on the national policies or state 
integrity, administratively and financially. 
To support the enforcement of law in the national system, another supportive 
instrument needs to be initiated and fully sustained, and that is of 
accountability. An integration process may be subject to various errors, 
mistakes, duality, nepotism, etc. within its ftinctional framework. The 
remedies to these negative deeds can only be made by an accountability 
mechanism which would target these errors wherever and whenever they 
appear, from the Presidency to the lower hierarchy institutions. 
These instruments of national monitoring have to be within an autonomous 
body with a power exceeding that of the highest administrative structures such 
as a higher monitoring committee with a legal basis. The monitoring body, in 
order to be impartially influenced, must enjoy an independent power separate 
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from that of the Presidency, especially under a republican status. Its figures 
must be drawn out of all factions, and be highly selective. They should enjoy 
public and personnel integrity and i f they have a strong educational and an 
experienced background, that would be an asset. 
1.6.3.1 The Role of Democracy in the Integration Process 
While many observers may take up the factor of democracy as a required 
feature of the integration process, the researcher would like to take it as an 
instrument rather than a feature. The role of democracy as an instrument needs 
to be strengthened to eliminate the passiveness and corruption of the nafional 
power centre towards the violations of power groups such as tribes, merchants 
or politicians and their in-laws. As an instrument, democratic mechanism 
would create a strong legal stance against these groups and may force the 
power centre to act positively in the national interest or move it out. 
Democracy is traditionally taken as political pluralism in terms of political 
freedom, many parties with access to media, etc. This is what many identify as 
the backbone of democracy. Many democratic countries in the least developed 
of developing countries (LDCs) enjoy political pluralism but with a fragile 
democratic process. In India, for example, many votes in elections are 
achieved by material power - the distribution of money - during the election. 
The Yemeni experience was not far from this, in addition to the impact of 
tribal factionalism which makes it even more fragile.'*^ Furthermore, some 
governments in LDCs confine the role of democracy to the competition 
between political parties only, and let their security forces stand quash 
demonstrations, freedom of speech/thoughts, and they may violate human 
rights through such practices. 
It is, therefore, important to see democracy as an instrument in the integration 
process to adjust or rectify undemocratic practices in the national power 
centres and involving other influential factions and groups within society. 
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Finally, the integration process must be looked upon as a newly established 
political identity whereby all concerned parties need to forget their previous 
political roles in their previous establishments. It is important that the 
concerned parties recognise their 'new' roles in the integrated system rather 
than keep attached to their former identities and political systems. As the new 
politically integrated system is established, new targets, policies, roles, 
ftinctions and institutions need to be fully and rationally developed by all 
parties with a national view, national attitudes and national behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Development of the Political and Economic Structures 
in the YAR and PDRY (1968-1990) 
This chapter will deal with the background of the two Yemeni States in terms 
of their political and economic structures and also their political and economic 
developments during the period 1968 -1990. In analysing the development of 
the political and economic structures of Yemen, it is firstly necessary to 
provide a comprehensive description of the political and economic institutions 
which form the administrative structures of Yemen. Secondly, an analysis of 
how these institutions work in practice is provided, highlighting the often 
personal nature of Yemeni decision-making. Thirdly, the importance of key 
individuals in the power-centre has to be addressed as many aspects of the 
relationships between political structure and institutional practice can be traced 
to the impact of the power struggles which have damaged the process of 
Yemeni unification. These points are discussed within the context of the 
pohtical development in the two separate states before unification. 
In such a political environment as Yemen, this combination of institutional 
analysis, based on the precepts provided by the constitution of the state, 
combined with an assessment of the actions and attitudes of key characters 
within the power-centre, is a powerful method in understanding the often 
opaque political dynamics of Yemen, both pre- and post-unification. 
2.1 Political Structures in the Y A R and the PDRY 
The political structures in the two Yemeni States were, as is well known, very 
different from each other. These political structures wil l be described below 
within the context of the ideological background of each state over the stated 
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period. 
2.1.1 Political Structures in the YAR 
As the Northern regime did not have any national pohtical organisation until 
1982, in terms of political parties or a political front, the political structure of 
YAR was confined to formal state institutions, both at a central and regional 
level. At the central level, the main political structures in the YAR were the 
Presidential Office, the Military Revolutionary Council and the Cabinet, in 
addidon to the Shura Council.' At the regional level, political power rested 
jointly in the hands of the Military Commander and the Governor. ^ 
2.1.1.1 Central Political Structures 
At the top of the central political structure in the YAR were the Presidential 
Office, the Military Revolutionary Council, the Cabinet and the House of 
Representatives. 
The Presidential Office in the YAR represented the ultimate power in the 
country and was generally linked to one tribal/ religious faction, that of the 
Zaydis. ^ The President usually made decisions after consultations with a 
number of influential factions/figures and certain institutional bodies." 
The Military Revolutionary Council was the institution which interacted most 
closely with the President in political decisions. There was hardly any conflict 
between the President and the Military Revolutionary Council. This stemmed 
in part from the fact that a substantial number of the Council members 
originated fi-om the President's tribe. 
The Premier and the Cabinet were other formal channels helping the President 
with internal and external policies.' The cabinet constituted a key element in 
the executive authority in the state. While the Presidential power was 
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exclusively in Zaydi hands, the power of the Cabinet was shared among all 
northern factions, the Zaydis, the Shafais and other Shi'ite minorities.® 
The Shura Council represented the legislative authority, with representatives 
elected from different regions. This council was very traditional, set to fulfil 
the Islamic image of the country rather than actually to effect legislation or 
formulate policies.^ Most of the representatives of the Shura Council were old 
traditional figures, Chief Sheikhs and tribesmen, who sought personal 
ambitions more than national reforms of any kind. * In 1989, there were 159 
members in this council. 
In August 1982, the YAR established its national polifical organisation, the 
GPC, which promulgated mild and moderate policies. ' The GPC was 
established under the chairmanship of the President of the State. The 
ideology of the Northern state reflected the socio-economic values of the 
society at that fime. The GPC, however, failed to cope with the dynamic 
changes of Yemen and kept to its tradifion-based ideology and policies. The 
GPC had a recipient relationship with the formal political leadership in the 
state, without providing public feedback on government policies." 
As its emergence was closely connected to the political development of the 
YAR, the GPC shall be examined below in the YAR's political development 
section. 
2.1.1.2 The Regional Political Structures 
Due to the tribal nature of the North, the regional structure was made up of 
two administrafions, namely those of the Military Commander and the 
Governor. The Military Commander was intimately interlinked with tribal 
affairs. The activities of the Governor were restricted to formal state functions 
and other civil affairs. " 
Only a few regions in the YAR (namely Taiz, Ibb, Rada'a and Hudaidah) had 
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formal institutions responsible for major sectors such as agriculture, local 
administration, power plants, education and health services. In general, 
regional institutions had no administrative or financial autonomy due to the 
centralisation of the system. 
2.1.2 Political Structures in PDRY 
Unlike the YAR, the PDRY experienced a modem state administrative system 
under the former British administration over the period 1839-1967 when Aden 
was a British Colony. 
Political structures in the PDRY were organised and coherent, both centrally 
and regionally, although the political ideology (newly introduced into the area) 
caused disruptions to this coherence from time to time. 
2.1.2.1 The Political Structures in PDRY at Central Level 
As the PDRY achieved its independence through armed struggle between the 
British and an organised political structure, the NLF, the latter continued to 
have a political structure at the central level. The PONF (Political 
Organisation of the National Front) constituted a political structure in which 
political ideologies and perspectives were developed. These were to provide 
the basis for national policies. In addition to the PONF, there was also the 
political structure of the state administration. 
2.1.2.1.1 The Political Structure of the PONF/YSP 
Centrally, the polifical structure of the PONF (which turned in 1975 into the 
UPONF and in 1978 into the YSP) was made up of a General Command of 
11-15 members, and an Executive Committee of 29-51 members. The 
UPONF (Unified Political Organisation - the National Front) and the YSP 
were established under a similar structure but with larger capacities than the 
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PONF in terms of manpower and facilities. The polit-bureau consisted of 15-
25 elected members of the central committee (C.C.) which comprised 55-65 
members elected from all party members. " 
At the head of this structure was the Secretary-General of the General 
Command which turned later into a central committee (C.C.), in whose hands 
was vested the ultimate pohfical power of the country. Theoretically, the 
Secretary-General (a northern shafai until 1980) enjoyed more power than the 
President of the State did; foreign advisors especially from the Socialist Bloc 
also aided his political office. Practically, however, owing to the nature of 
persormel in the state leadership, the President, who was normally a 
Southerner, enjoyed more power in state affairs than the Secretary-General of 
the political party did. 
Until 1978, the second figure in this structure was the Chairman of the 
Political Organisation of the PONF/UPONF/YSP Secretariat. " The 
responsibilifies of the Chairman of the Secretariat included the supervision of 
the following government departments: Economy, Interior, Foreign Relations 
and the Civil Service. 
After the 1986 crisis, the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Secretariat 
were transferred to the new post of Assistant Secretary-General.'" 
2.1.2.1.2 The Structure of the State 
The central state structure of the PDRY comprised the Presidential Council 
which was composed of the General Secretary of the PONF, the President of 
the State and the Premier. The President, presided also the Higher Public 
Council. Effectively, however, the state was ran by the President and the 
Premier. The latter, had been on top of the cabinet structure. The Presidential 
Council, however, met from time to time to review the compliance of the state 
affairs with the PONF directives.^' 
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The top three posts had been incorporated into the Presidential Council until 
1978. During the period 1978-1980, the posts of the Secretary-General and the 
President of the State were held by one figure (Ismail).The Presidential 
Council, therefore, served little purpose especially after the three powers were 
concentrated in the hands of one figure, Ah Nasser, in 1980. " 
The Cabinet was the repository of central and regional authority and contained 
residual responsibility for executing policies affecting these areas and their 
associated sectors. The Cabinet was composed of 16-19 sectoral ministers. 
Governors were accountable to the Premier, but they were not included as 
members of the Cabinet." 
State policies were initiated by sectoral leaders in accordance with the 
PONFA'SP's organisational structure and direcfives. The power of the 
President, however, remained paramount with its foundation emanating from 
the organisational structure of the PONFA'SP. State ministries and parasatals 
were expected to follow the political guidelines/policies launched by the 
pohtical PONFA"SP structure. 
There was little harmony between the two structures. The state political 
structure was more established than the PONF/YSP structure in terms of 
skilled manpower, resource management, and understanding of public needs. 
On the other hand, the PONF/YSP's concern centred on complementing a 
socialist ideology with the national interest. This apparent dichotomy between 
the two structures led to conflicts among the top figures of the leadership in 
the PDRY. ^5 
2.1.2.2 Regional Political Structures in the PDRY 
In order to guarantee coherence between the centre and region, each region 
was allocated a representative. The PONF/YSP regional structure comprised a 
miniature secretariat of the PONF/YSP, which was responsible for regional 
Front/Party activities." The PONF/YSP regional offices embraced the popular 
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oeganisations activities at the regional levels, whilst monitoring the 
implementafion of national policies." 
The state political structure at the regional level was, on the other hand, 
represented by the executive office under the Chairmanship of the Governor. 
The executive office in the region resembled a miniature cabinet including 
sectoral representatives. The Governor held the ultimate source of regional 
power and all sectoral representatives were subordinate to him. 
To keep the relationship between the structures, at the regional level, in 
harmony, the two leading figures were given equal weight in seniority. Both 
the Governor and the PONF/YSP Secretary in the region held Central 
Committee, membership.^" More often than not, central problems were 
transposed into regional problems. 
2.2 Economic Structures in the Y A R and the PDRY 
Economic policies in each Yemeni state were shaped according to the 
prevalent political ideologies and perceived national interests. The YAR 
established economic structures concomitant to a market economy, whilst the 
PDRY created state-owned economic structures to fit a centrally planned 
economy. 
2.2.1 Economic Structures in the Y A R 
The framework for economic decision-making in the YAR was composed of 
three elements, and economic decisions and policies were formulated by the 
top political structures and specialised economic agencies. '^ The basic 
economic structures in the YAR were represented by: 
1. The Presidential Structure 
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The central focus of the decision-making structure was constitued by the 
interaction between the President and a variety of influential circles. The 
President of the State granted influential tribal Sheikhs and private investors 
access to the decision-making process directly and via effective Cabinet 
figures. They were invited to discuss economic policies and programmes.^ -
Economic priorities, principally, were laid down by key-members of the 
Cabinet and the President, according to the available national resources. 
2. The Cabinet and its Parasatals 
The second major economic structure in the YAR was be the Cabinet and its 
executing agencies. The Cabinet's executing agencies were represented in the 
sectoral ministries, such as those of Finance, Development and Planning, 
Agriculture and Trade. In addition to these ministries, there were 
infrastructural agencies such as those responsible for the provision of power, 
water, and roads. 
Economic structures in the regions were generally poor, apart from the city 
capital - Sanaa and in 4-5 major cities. Economic structures in the YAR 
were highly centralised with few regional parasatals. Taiz, Al-Hudaidah, 
Mareb and Ibb were the major cities to have some economic structures of their 
own. Moreover, economic services in the regions were poor, and very few 
towns enjoyed pubhc utility services. 
3. Mixed and Private Economic Structures 
Despite encouraging private investment, the YAR's major economic 
undertakings were state-owned enterprises.^ * There were some 'mixed' 
structures, partly owned by the private sector and partly by public sector, such 
as power plants, Al-Thowrah hospital and Al-Yemaneya airways." Some 
foreign investment was also present in these fields. 
The private sector, predominantly was in agriculture and trade. Few 
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merchants owned some fixed assets in the form of factories and workshops 
for the production of consumables, and real-estate agencies. 
Table 2.1: Investments by ownership and sector, YAR, 1974-1986 
1974/5 1982 1982-86 
Public Private Public Private Public Private 
% % % % % % 
agriculture and fisheries 22 78 61 39 75 25 
mining * 89 11 97 3 
Manufacturing 62 38 39 61 31 69 
electricity and water * 95 5 94 6 
Construction 0 100 0 100 0 100 
trade and hotels ** 11 89 
transport & 51 49 68 32 73 27 
communications 
financial institutions ** 35 65 68 32 66 33 
T O T A L 35 65 68 32 66 33 
* mining, power and water were included under manufacturing in 1975 
** trade, hotels, financial services included under services in 1975, 1982 
Between 1976 and 1981, the co-operative sector generated one third of investments in 
transport, 11% of investments in water supply, and 24% of investments in health and 
education (Carapico, "Pohtical Economy of Self-Help" table 8.10) 
Source: World Bank 1979 Yemen Arab Republic, Current Position and Prospects 
(co-operative sector counted as private) 
CPO. "Evaluation of the Second Five-Year Plan, April 1987," pp 33-37 (co-
operative sector counted as public). 
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2.2.2 Economic Structures in the PDRY 
The basic economic structures in the PDRY were represented by: 
1. The Political Organization (PONF/YSP) 
The decision-making process was headed by the Polit-Bureau (P.B.) and the 
Central Committee (C.C.) of the YSP/PONF, which brought together all key 
leaders of the political organisation and the state. The top three figures of the 
political structures, namely, the Secretary-General of the PONF/YSP, the 
President of the State and the Premier were members of the Political Bureau 
and formulated economic decisions. The Secretary-General always had the 
upper hand in shaping economic policies and was responsible for aligning 
policy with ideology, unless the majority voted against him which was very 
unlikely. 
2. The State Presidency and Premiership 
Prior to 1978, the posts of President and Premiership were distinct from the 
role of the General Secretariat of the PONF/YSP. Both offices were imbued 
with power to conduct and implement economic policies, in accordance with 
the national interest, through the auspices of setting committees outside the 
PONF/YSP influence. The President was mainly responsible to all economic 
decisions before the citizens and to the outside world. This was due to the fact 
that not all citizens involved in economic activities were part of the political 
organisation though they were all aware of its policies but when a situation 
was risen for a farmer, a senior industrial or agricultural employer who was 
not part of the political organisation, he/she would only go to the State 
President to solve his/her problem and therefore, the president would be 
responsible to take an econmic decision. Similarly, was the case with the 
Premier, who had to take up some economic decisions to do with any 
economic sectors in his cabinet. However, out of those who lasted long in the 
Presidential and the Premiership powers were Rubayea and Al i Nasser 
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respectively. 
3. The Cabinet and its Parasatals 
The Cabinet was responsible for both the national and regional economic 
programmes. Over 90% of the PDRY's economic activities were directed 
towards the public sector. Thus, the 16-19 sectoral ministries constituted the 
fi-amework through which the national economy was governed."" The 
ministries of Finance, Planning, Local Administration, Agriculture and 
Fisheries, for instance, utihsed their agencies, authorities, and regional 
representatives to meet the demands of the nation in terms of goods and 
services. 
4. Mixed and Private Economic Structures 
The PDRY pursued a 'mixed economy' which recognised a role for both 
private capital and public investment. The public sector was allocated a 
dominant role in the state's strategic industries, whilst the private sector was 
left to produce and market consumable i tems.The private sector was mainly 
confined to selling groceries, foodstuffs and basic consumption commodities 
which were bought mainly through state channels. ''^  
2.2.3 Commentary: The Administrations in Practice 
The institutions of the two states were different in terms of structure and 
ideology. Furthermore, in practice the day-to-day actions of the 
administrations were similarly diverse in terms of efficiency, national 
integration, corruptness, patronage, and the impact of sectarianism. It is 
therefore necessary to provide a brief appraisal of the operational activities of 
the administrative / political systems which existed in the pre-unification era. 
2.2.3.1 The Administration of the YAR 
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The YAR's power-centre was highly influenced by the tribal impact of the 
mountainous areas. The tribal system in north Yemen was characterised by 
one man-rule, and this had a strong impact on the centralisation of the 
administrative mechanism throughout the country. The tribal attitude and 
approach within and among all national institutions were overwhelming, with 
the mentality governing political actions being essentially tribal. 
Values developed in the tribal political sphere were effectively superimposed 
onto the administrative system of the state, resulting in many operational 
aspects of the state institutions being ignored. Such a situation did not allow 
for effective national integration among all northern factions in the northern 
power-centre. The daily routine work of national institutions was, mainly, 
governed by the tribal bonds rather than the constitiation of the state, giving a 
wider room for administrative and financial corruption within the 
administrative system as a whole. 
2.2.3.2 The Administration of the PDRY 
Unlike the north, the PDRY's administrative system was characterised by the 
political participation of all southern and northern-originated factions who 
were members of the dominant political party. While the power-centre was 
still occupied by party members, it also incorporated various other southern 
political factions, in addition to a northern Shafai grouping. Accordingly, the 
PDRY administrative institutions incorporated all of the political groupings in 
the country, with the highest levels of the bureaucracy being granted to party 
members. 
Unlike the YAR, the daily routine work of the national institutions in the south 
was mainly governed by the provisions of the constitution of the state until 
1986. Since then, the northern Shafais in positions of authority in the 
administration began to ignore many of the constitutional provisions with the 
result of weakening the administrative mechanisms of the southern 
institutions. 
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2.3 Political Developments in the YAR and the PDRY (1968-1990) 
Between 1968 and 1990, the YAR maintained a tribal approach to government 
with a non-ahgned foreign policy, while the PDRY continued its socialist 
oriented path. The political developments which took place in the two states 
widened the political gap between the two states in terms of both their attitude 
and approach. We shall examine these political developments and assess their 
impact upon the unification process in the following section. 
2.3.1 Political Developments in the YAR 
After the Northern Revolution of September 1962 which overthrew the 
Imam's rule, the YAR underwent a series of major political developments, 
though all under zaydi power centre only. The Political developments in the 
YAR shall be discussed below. 
2.3.1.1 The Presidency of Abdullah Al-Sallal (1962-1967) 
Marshall Abdulla Al-Sallal, who came to power in 1962"" was the first 
President of the YAR. He was removed from office in November 1965 when 
Qadi Abdul-Rahman Al-Iryani took over the Presidency. ''^  
2.3.1.2 The Presidency of Al-Qadi Al-Rahman Al-Iryani (1967-1974) 
Judge Al-Iryani took over power following a coup against President Al-Sallal 
and was among the first Arab presidents who recognised the newly established 
state of the PRSY (Peoples Republic of South Yemen) in November 1967. 
The creation of the PRSY and the Al-Iryani's recognition led to the emergence 
of two Yemeni identities. Moreover, both led to the loss of the opportunity of 
unification at an early stage. 
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There were many important problems in the internal arena of the YAR which 
forced the Northern regime to recognise the PRSY state. The YAR had to deal 
with the royal loyalist problem in addition to the organisation and 
administration of the new state. ""^  The Sanaa Siege (December 1967-February 
1968), when Sanaa was surrounded by the royalists, was one of the problems 
that faced Al-Iryani's rule. The Northern leadership was preoccupied with 
republican stability; President Judge Al-Iryani, therefore, thought that it was 
better to recognise the Southern Yemeni state to ensure that it would be busy 
with its own affairs. The royalists and loyalist problem came to an end when 
the North achieved reconciliation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1972. 
During Al-Iryani's period of rule, both Yemens had a military confrontation 
along their borders in September 1972. This wil l be covered in chapter 3. 
2.3.1.3 The Presidency of Ibrahim Al-Hamdy (1974-1977) 
An ex-Colonel in the army, Ibrahim Al-Hamdy (from the Bakeel tribe) 
assumed the office of President between 1974 and 1977. '^ Al-Hamdy was a 
pragmatic figure who wanted to transform the YAR. from a tribal into a 
modem urban society. In order to achieve this aim, he implemented grass roots 
reforms." 
These reforms included: 
• The establishment of Reform Committees in each sector to eliminate 
administrative and financial corruption in society." 
• Sending students for further studies abroad to transform the tribal 
communities. 
• Re-organising and re-equiping the Military and Security Forces for 
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modernisation. 
• Employing personnel from different factions on an equal footing. 
• Encouraging co-operatives in rural areas so as to promote economic growth 
by social co-operation." 
The position of the opponents to Al-Hamdy was based on a realisation that 
these social reforms threatened their interests. Sheikhs and Chief Sheikhs of 
tribes opposed the social transformation as it would not only endanger their 
tribal integrity, but also take away their prestige and material power. Social 
modernisation meant the breakdown of tribal ties, the ascendancy of social 
equality, and the adoption of new social values. 
In order to maintain a close link between the tribes and the political system, 
the opposition in the North eliminated the man behind the reforms. President 
Ibrahim Al-Hamdy was assassinated on 11 October 1977, the day before he 
was scheduled to attend the anniversary of the 14 October Revolution in the 
South. 
2.3.1.4 The Presidency of Ahmed Al-Ghashmi (1977-1978) 
Upon the death of Al-Hamdy, the ex-chief Commandant of the Armed Forces 
in the YAR, Colonel Ahmed Al-Ghashmi (from the Hashed tribe) assumed 
office." After eight months, Al-Ghashmi himself was assassinated in his office 
by a Southern envoy delivering a personal letter from the President of the 
South, Salem Rubayea Al i . The bomb, carried by the envoy, killed both Al -
Ghashmi and the messenger." 
Al-Ghashmi's assassination was reputed to be plotted by the Southern 
President in retaliation for Al-Hamdy's death. Salem Rubayea Al i had accused 
Al-Ghashmi of orchestrating Al-Hamdy's death on 24 June, 1978. 
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2.3.1.5 The Presidency of Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh (since 1978) 
The YAR's Presidency remained for 40 days without a candidate until Colonel 
Al i Abdulla Saleh marched from Taiz and accepted to be President on 17 July 
1978." 
On 17 July 1978, after serving in Taiz as a Regional Military Commander, 
Colonel A l i Abdulla Saleh took over the YAR Presidency." 
During the rule of President Saleh, the two most critical political 
developments for Yemenis future were the establishment of the GPC and 
Yemeni unification. 
2.3.1.5.1 The Establishment of the GPC 
After Al-Sallah's period in office, almost every president tried unsuccessfially 
to establish a national political organisation. Despite the numerous attempts 
to create such an organisation, only the GPC was successfully established 
under the auspices of Saleh, in August 1982. The organisation comprised 1000 
members at its first meeting in Sanaa." 
There were two main reasons for the establishment of the GPC, namely the 
absence of a national political organisation to fill the political gap in the North, 
and the need for a Northern political organisation to act as a counterpart to the 
Southern political organisation - the YSP in the process of unification. " 
Moreover, the establishment of the GPC gave political recognition, 
regionwide, to his power base. 
The political ideology of the GPC was very different from that of the Southern 
YSP. The GPC was based mainly on moderate Islamic lines in which tribal 
values easily fitted. ^ In contrast to the extreme left ideology of the YSP, the 
GPC was based on Arab nationalism and an Islamic methodology. The GPC 
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National Charter {Al-Mithaq al-Watani) was carefully drafted to attract the 
national citizen to this organisation. " Unfortunately, for over 20 years the 
GPC Charter has remained static and unchanged. The GPC leadership never 
tried to update it in order to adapt to recent changes in the national, regional 
and international environments. 
Although northern opposition parties already existed in the North and was 
strengthened in 1979, the impact of the GPC was immediate and detrimental to 
their groupings in the shafais area. ®* The YAR had many political parties 
working covertly in the 1970s. The major five parties were amalgamated in 
February 1976 under a single centralised party called the NDF which later 
incorporated other parties and became known as in 1979 "the Yemeni Peoples' 
Unity Party" (YPUP) - collequaly nicknamed as Hoshi™ was formed after 
addition of some other opposition parties. The NDFATUP was a 
revolutionary party inspired and supported by the YSP in the South. " The 
moderate ideology of the GPC was more realistic to northern tribal region in 
its southern part than that of the opposition. As the formal political vehicle of 
the state, the GPC enjoyed unprecedented access to economic, material and 
national media support. 
The opposition leadership, many of whom were residing/working in the 
PDRY, were not qualified enough to carry out the required political activities, 
particularly within tribal communities. Their exile in Aden undermined the 
revolutionary gestures by which they could have organised a powerfiil 
opposition front in the North. However, that made the GPC at an 
advantaged position to work among nationals in all regions effectively and 
within a short time it enjoyed more popularity in the opposition areas than 
expected. 
2.3,1.5.2 President Ali Saleh and the Unification Process 
The unification process was a necessary move to preserve the political stability 
of the YAR, in particular with respect to the Northern opposition working 
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against their regime from the neighbouring state. The estabhshment of the 
GPC was not sufficient for the Northern regime to attain pohtical peace with 
the Southern leadership. Although the YPUP had weak support in the YAR, 
especially in the upper-land and western regions, its support from outside did 
cause the Northern regime many problems. " The only solution was to revive 
the unification process which brought the threat of the YPUP's agenda to an 
end. The period 1988-1990, therefore, witnessed active unification 
programmes and activities drawing the two states together.Thus, President 
Saleh had to work on two fronts simultaneously, namely to build the GPC and 
to forward unification moves with the South. 
2.3.2 Political Developments in tlie PDRY 
The dramatic political developments that took place in the PDRY over the 
period 1968-1989 could be mainly attributed to two major factors. The first 
factor relates to the socialist and leftist policies of the PONF/YSP. The second 
factor lies in Ismail's mentality who was originally a northern shafai and felt 
the need to solve the northern. Shafai problem in order to attain political 
weight in the northern regime equivalent to that of their Zaydi brothers in the 
central political power structures of the YAR. 
Below, we shall examine critically the inter-relationship of these two factors, 
as well as other related issues in the two national administrations of both the 
political organisation and the state apparatuses. 
2.3.2.1 The Presidency of Qahtan Al-Sha'abi (1967-1969) 
President Qahtan Al-Sha'abi was the first President of South Yemen, which 
was then called the Peoples Republic of South Yemen (PRSY). He was an 
Egyptian-educated agriculture engineer. " He was the Chairman of the 
Executive Office of the NLF, representing the Nationalists faction (MAN). 
Prior to the independence of the South, he was advisor to President Al-Sallal 
on Southern affairs." 
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President Qahtan Al-Sha'abi was a member of the Arab National Movement, 
which explained his moderate views in the NF. He failed to exert influence 
on the NF to run along more moderate lines. As the NLF (the National 
Liberation Front) members who were struggling in the South for independence 
were dependent upon the Socialist Bloc for their munitions, many of them 
were understandably influenced by socialist policies.President Al Sha'abi 
made an attempt to cleanse the army of these left-wing figures in March 1968, 
but failed. °^ In June 1969 he was arrested and put in prison by the left-wing 
groupings. This coup became known as 'the Corrective Movement' - Al-
khatwah Al-tas 'hiheyah. ^ ' 
2.3.2.2 The Presidency of Salem Rubayye'a Ali (1969-1978) 
Following the 22nd June 1969 coup, the PONF elected Salem Rubayye'a Ali 
as President of the PDRY, while Abdul-Fattah Ismail was elected Secretary-
General for the Executive Office of the PONF. 
During the period 1969-1978 serious pohtical developments took place 
jeopardising not only local stability in the PDRY" but also the Yemeni 
unification process. The country experienced, at later stages, strong conflicts 
that marred the Southern leadership with bloody crises - as quoted by Ali 
Nasser Moh'd - an ex-PDRY President when he became in exile.However, 
this shall be examined later below in the following subsections. 
President Rubayye'a was executed following the assassination of President Al -
Ghashmi of the YAR. This event is explained in detail in Chapter Three. The 
removal of the moderate nationalists from the NF did not end disputes among 
the PDRY leadership. Below, I shall briefly discuss the factors that caused the 
instability in the Southern leadership. 
2.3.2.2.1 The Northern Shafais in the PONF/UPONF 
President Rubayye'a was noted to be a very pragmatic Southern statesman 
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who wanted to mobilise the Southern nation objectively and with stability, and 
protect the south from tensions with the North or with neighbouring states. 
He was dissatisfied with the extreme policies of the Secretary-General in 
internal affairs. As he lacked the support of the majority of the polit-bureau 
members, he had to employ extreme measures to show his militancy and 
dedication to the revolutionary measures as compared to his colleagues in the 
polit-bureau. Rubayye'a and some of his regional fellows in the polit-bureau 
such as 'Muqbel' adopted the Chinese methods as their model in the state's 
policies. He thus initiated the 7-days uprising against the feudal landowners 
(who were already out of the country) whereby Southern peasants took over 
the land for cultivation. Rubayye'a's aim was to give more benefits to 
Southerners in their regions before the Northern Shafais in the Southern 
leadership did so under the so called "left measures" for the enhancement of 
the Yemeni Revolution. The flow of Northern Shafais to the South was 
remarkable, and it was illegal to stop them. Rubayye'a forsaw the 
consolidation of Ismael's power in the South through them. He was 
dissatisfied with northerners' practices of recruiting more Northern Shafais in 
the PONF in order to gain control of the political organisations. He, therefore, 
found the Chinese model appealed to him whereby he could express 
revolutionary attitudes and gesture and putting the southerners' working class 
and peasants on advantageous positions on their own soils. Without such 
revolutionay measures, Rubayye'a would have been eliminated at much earlier 
time by Ismael and his Soviet fellows for the pohcy confrontations he used to 
show in the polit-bueau meetings. 
Furthermore, as the country was launching a serious investment programme. 
Northern Shafais, some of whom were in key positions in the Cabinet and in 
the PONF/UPONF, were heavily recruiting fellow immigrant Northern 
Shafais; thus increasing the political weight of their leaders in the capital and 
in sectors. '^ Rubaj^e'a took some measures to counter this phenomenon, and 
aimed to stabilise regional development across the country and give priorities 
of employment in the regions to their people. He initiated some 'Presidential 
Projects' under presidential supervision to push ordinary northerners in Aden 
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to go back home.^' 
At the political level, although the presence of northern Shafais in the capital 
Aden was historical, the presence of the northern radical elements in the 
political power in Aden was damaging to the Southern political profile, 
particularly because of their extreme left views. With Ismail as the head of the 
PONF/UPONF, North Yemen distrusted the Southern leadership. The 
adoption of extreme policies internally and externally caused many 
unnecessary conflicts with the North and other neighbouring states.Above 
all, the political recruitment of northern Shafais in the PONF and the polifical 
security sector, which was directed by a member from the Northern elite 
(Mohsen), gave more political power to Ismail at that period. " In practical 
terms, Mohsen was the most important Shafai figure and being groomed by 
the East German security experts for the Southern leadership. He was the 
ultimate manipulator for the northern Shafais interest politically and 
economically as he was having an upper hand on strategic sectors (except the 
military sector) through his political security organisation. 
On this Northern/Southern account, political fiictions arose between Ismael 
and Rubayye'a. Many writers wrongly identified the conflict as personal or 
ideological.'^ In fact, the conflict between the two leaders stemmed from the 
Northern Shafais' attempt to dominate the PDRY's policies. The researcher 
witnessed many of these conflicts in practical policies between the state's and 
party's leadership throughout the seventies and the eighties. 
The strong position of the Northern Shafais came about through a political 
development in the mid seventies, namely the amalgamation of two small 
local parties [the Syrian Baath and the Marxist parties (named Al-Talee'aah 
and Ittihad Al-Shabiba respectively)] with the PONF. This was pushed 
strongly by Ismail and his Northern faction and was not much favoured by 
Rubayye'a and some Southerners. Rubayye'a and his Southern faction soon 
realised Ismail's aim. The lafter wanted to consolidate his political power via 
the Northern Shafai elements in the leadership of these two parties, such as 
57 
Abdul-Ghani Abdu-Qader, Othman Abdul-Gabbar Rashed, Farooq Ali 
Ahmed, Abdul-Kasim Shamsan and others in lower herarchies. The 
membership of these parties contained many of the socialist and Arab 
countries' graduates. Ismail's faction did not find difficulty in bringing over 
to his side many of those of northern origin in these parties and other 
independent northern cadres in Aden. However, Ismail, found it very 
difficult to persuade some of northern/Adeni British graduates to be on his 
side. The majority of the British graduates of northern origin did not accept 
extreme leadership of any faction, though there were odd ones such as Dr 
Amin Nasher.'' 
The two local parties; Al-Talea'ah and Ittihad Al-Shabibah had gained some 
momentum in Aden city and most of their members were of northern origin. 
Rubayye'a and other southerners in the polit-bureau agreed to incorporate 
these two parties within the PONF but with a power-voting system 2:1:1 i.e. 2 
votes for PONF members and one vote for other party members in the political 
set-ups.In October 1975, the PONF became UPONF (The United Political 
Organisation of the National Front) with the amalgamation of these two 
parties. The Northern Shafais' recruitment via those parties had served the 
interest of Ismail as shall be explained later. 
2.3.2.2.2 The Impact of the Scientific Socialist Ideology on the State's Policies 
The PDRY adopted the ideology of scientific socialism for its state policies, 
which were strongly backed by the Soviet Union and the Socialist Bloc. 
The Soviet Union and the Socialist Bloc stood by the leftists who supported 
Ismail rather than supporting Rubayye'a.'^ Very few Southerners sided with 
Rubayye'a, despite him having a vested interest in national issues by virtue of 
being the President of the State. The Dale'a and Radfan bloc in the polit-
bureau were interior and defence personnel who had strong links with the 
Soviets and the East Germans. They resented his interventions in their sectors, 
particularly when he was in charge of political supervision on the military 
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sector. Rubayye'a's role as a Preseident of the State compelled him to adopt 
moderate attitudes to be able to fulf i l the funcfions of state. For example, 
various executive authorities such as those supervising power plants and 
agricultural machinery stations needed spare parts from western countries or 
Japan which was not approved by many polit-bureau members.'' Also, the 
polifical affairs of the state required the strengthening of polifical ties with the 
Gulf and other Arab states. Such matters were not favourably received by the 
leftists.'"" The President thus had to strive hard to obtain PONF/UPONF 
approval, otherwise he was accuse of being nothing more than an opportunist 
leftist i f he acted without consultation. 
The scientific socialist ideology, unfortunately, was very much used by the 
northern shafais not only to cripple the progress of the state and the 
President's integrity, but was also used to hinder the unification process from 
progressing smoothly."" Being turned into a common enemy to both states' 
leaderships, it was not in the interests of the Northern Shafais to achieve a 
unification for Yemen between the two leaderships: Southerners in the South 
and the Zaydis in the North, as this would effectively leave the Northern 
Shafais powerless. 
The Soviets and other experts in the security and defence institutions played a 
great role in making the Southern elite adhere to Soviet ideology in their 
functions. This rendered the unification process unfeasible as planned, and 
did not allow good diplomatic ties to develop with neighbouring states (See 
Chapter 3). 
2.3.2.2.3 Relations with the Y A R and other Arab Countries 
During Rubayye'a's Presidential term, the relations with the North and other 
Arab countries were generally cold. In compliance with its left views, the 
PONF/UPONF leadership changed the constitution and the name of the 
country from PRSY to PDRY.'"^ The 1970 Constitution emphasised the 
democratic national path of the state and described its alliance with the 
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Socialist Bloc as its destiny.'"" Therefore, the YAR leadership was suspicious 
because of these socialist lines. The result was a military confrontation in 
September 1972 along the borders of the two Yemeni states (see chapter 3). 
The relations with the north were not normal in view of the changing policies 
of the southern leadership which kept revlutionary measures and policies 
exacerbant internally and externally. Some critical incidents took place 
concommitant with the esclated left views of the PONF/UPONF. The 
bombing of an aircraft carrying 30 local ambassadors on a field visit to 
Socotra Island in April 1973 was one of the major incidents orchestrated by 
the leadership."" The ex-Premier, Mohamed Ali Haytham, fled and sought 
refiige in Egypt as he felt that he was targeted for his moderate views within 
the radical leadership.'"® Rubayye'a was blamed internally and externally as a 
head of the state for these incidents while the figure behind the so-called 
scientific socialist ideology, General Secretary Ismail, was away of criticism, 
though he was the prime cuase for the high tensions in the region for 
adherence to such ideology. 
Owing to these political problems, the unification process was almost stagnant 
apart from what followed from one visit made by Rubayye'a to the North in 
1977. This visit was made by the Southern President in an attempt to push 
forward a Unification programme. 
Rubayye'a gained Al-Hamdi's trust and both men developed a mutual 
understanding. They aimed to carry out the unification process within a short 
period of time and with a minimum of formalifies'"^ Furthermore the two 
leaders prepared a federal unity and were ready to announce it in October 
1977. '"^  However, two days before the announcement, Al-Hamdy was 
assassinated as will be explained in chapter 3. In retaliation for the latter's 
assassination, Rubayye'a arranged for the assassination of the Northern 
President - Al-Ghashmi - which led to his own execution within two days. 
The relations between the PDRY and other Arab and Islamic states were 
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characterised by coolness. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) was regarded 
as the most important neighbouring state because of the substantial presence 
of Yemeni emigrants there."" The Gulf states came a close second for the 
same reason, and then other Arab countries followed. Owing to its socialist 
policies, the PDRY did not have any diplomafic relations with its neighbours 
in the Gulf countries until 1976, when Rubayye'a challenged that situation and 
flew the KSA flag on PDRY soil at the opening of diplomatic relations with 
the KSA. The UPONF Secretary-General was dissatisfied with such fies 
particularly when they were extended to most other Gulf countries."" On the 
other hand, some Arab states - apart from those which sponsored radical Arab 
movements - including those with arab nafionalists policies such as Iraq and 
Egypt were unhappy with the PDRY's policies. Indeed, Rubayye'a 
contributed to the improvement of the PDRY profile as an Arab nationalist 
country. 
Similarly, Rubayye'a preserved the profile and integrity of Islam in the 
country before the world.'" The PDRY participated in all Islamic conferences 
and polifical events, and extended its ties with non-Arab Muslim countries. 
2.3.2.3 Abdul-Fattah Ismail 
It is important to separate Ismail's leadership as Secretary-General of the 
PONF/UPONF (1969-1978) from that of the period between 1978 and 1980 
when he held the two most important posts - the Secretary-General of the YSP 
and President of the State of PDRY- at the same time. This separation is 
necessary to assess his capacity in leading the Southern state, an area from 
which he did not originate. 
2.3.2.3.1 Abdul Fattah Ismail, as Secretary-General of PONF/UPONF 1969-78 
Throughout his career as the Secretary-General of the PONF and then of the 
UPONF, Abdul Fattah Ismail caused significant tensions both internally and 
externally. He caused tensions amongst the Southern leadership inside the 
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PDRY, and between the PDRY and its neighbours."' The reason for these 
tensions was his strong adherence to the 'Scientific Socialist Ideology' and his 
attempt to apply it to the conservative society of the Arabian Peninsula. 
Despite the approval of the overall Southern leadership to this leftist ideology, 
many elements in the Southern leadership still found it cumbersome in 
applicafion. The religious background of the people and the need for a 
constant supply of spare parts for equipment were difficult day-to-day aspects 
with which the newly laid down rigid ideology failed to cope with. The state 
leadership, Salem Rubayye'a and Al i Nasser, were often in disagreement with 
Ismail because of the hardships they faced in running the affairs of state. 
Bad relations with neighbouring states also resulted from the adoption of the 
ideology. Furthermore, the unification process was often handicapped by the 
escalation of the left ideology in the South which sponsored all opposition 
movements in the north and else in the region."'' 
There was, however, a strong underlying motive for Ismail's strong adherence 
of 'Scientific Socialist Ideology'. He believed that this was the means whereby 
Northern Shafais would come together and form a strong front, either to bring 
down the long-lasting Zaydi rule, or to form a third Yemeni republic for the 
northern shafais."' The perception was that the only way for the Northern 
Shafais, who consfituted the majority in Yemen, to gain political power was to 
adhere to this ideology while Ismail was in power in the South. The grouping 
around Ismail discussed the shape and the name of the new Yemeni Republic 
among themselves and the project was launched, but it did not achieve its 
aims.'"^ 
From Ismail's point of view, the unification process could not be achieved in 
the absence of the Northern Shafais as a third Yemeni power. The existing 
unification process was taking place between the leaderships of the two states: 
the Southerners in the South and the Zaydis in the North. The emphasis on 
scienfific socialism in Southern programmes was the instrument which would 
bring in the third dimension. Several PONF/UPONF programmes and writings 
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by the Secretary-General called for the completion of the 'Democratic 
Revolufion Stages in Yemen', by which he meant that the North had to reach 
the position that the Southern state had attained.'" Ismail emphasised that only 
when North Yemen had undergone this transformation could the unificafion of 
Yemen be undertaken on an equal political footing (see Chapter 3). 
2.3.2.3.2 Abdul Fattah Ismail as Secretary-General of the YSP and President of 
the PDRY 1978-80 
Following the execufion of President Rubayye'a in October 1978, Ismail 
became President of the PDRY, in addition to being Secretary-General of the 
UPONF, a ploy that was employed in order to diffuse the political tensions 
which arose from having different figures in the two posts. There had often 
been polifical disputes between the top two figures as explained above. 
Academic observers, such as Halliday and Kostiner had interpreted these 
disputes as being personal, tribal or ideological"'but the fundamental issue 
behind these disputes was the establishment of a base of political power for 
the Northern Shafais in the PDRY.'-" Ismail felt the need to pursue this 
objective at any cost while Rubayye'a thought of it as a long lasting problem 
which needed time to be solved, but not at the expense of the interest of 
Southerners and the polifical profile of the country. 
It was these unnecessary arguments in the political leadership which led Ismail 
and the Soviet advisers to reach an agreement that the two posts should be 
held by one figure.'^' Ismail, therefore, was the first figure to hold both of the 
top posts of the Southern leadership and he himself was from the North. This 
showed Southern flexibility and dedication to Yemeni integration, though this 
action was admittedly only under a Southern flag. 
As President of the State, Ismail had a negative impact on the effective 
running of the functions of the state. His private secretary - Mr Fahdl Mohsen 
(a Southern brother-in-law) - and his Northern staff at the Presidency could 
not do much to help him in placing the affairs of state on sound basis. This 
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resulted in delays in formulafing projects and fulfilling agreements, and caused 
stagnation in many other affairs of the state.'" It also created frustrations in 
many governmental departments and among the Southern elite. As a result of 
this, most of the functions of state were either diverted to the Premier to deal 
with or left unsolved.'-^ 
Obsessed with the Northern Shafais problem, Ismail sought to pressurise the 
Southern military and security forces to allow Northern Shafais to be 
integrated into their organizafions in high postions.'-'' This, however, was 
rejected by the military and security leaders, and Ismail became fioistrated at 
being unable to gain a military basis for his Northern Shafai faction. His 
inability to have full control over the military forces in the South weakened 
Ismail politically and led to the paralysis of virtually every other aspect of the 
state.'" 
Ismail had limited administrative experience or skill. He had had a short 
period of experience as Vice-Minister for the Ministry of Culture, but, 
when he was Secretary-General, he was mainly concerned with meeting 
delegations of socialist countries and representatives of Arab nationalist 
movements such as Nayef Hawatamah, George Habash and Fawaz 
Tarrabulsi.'-' He was never involved in the more practical affairs of the state 
which required YSP attention. He depended mainly on his colleagues from the 
Northern faction within the Cabinet such as A.Aziz Abdul-Wali ( Minister of 
Planning and of Industry), Mahmoud Ushaish (Minister of Communication) 
and his brother in law Fadhl Mohsen who was (Minister of Finance) and 
became his private secretary in the presidency. These individuals used to brief 
him mainly on Southerners' activities rather than on the practical problems of 
their sectors. The researcher had several meetings with Ismail in his office and 
his family residence and pointed out the dangerous acfions undertaken by his 
colleagues in their ministries but it was obvious that he was not looking for an 
informed voice on any matter other than the Shafai problem.'^ ^ The 
Northern/Southern problem that prevailed in Southern society may be 
attributed to Ismail's attitude, approach and work methodology. 
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The 1979 war on the Yemeni border against the YAR regime revealed Ismail's 
failing as a Northern leader of the Southern state. The YAR regime at that 
time had a new leadership under Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh of the Hashed 
tribe.'-' He was young and inexperienced in dealing with state responsibilities. 
At this time, the South had a well-established military force.'"" Ismail wanted 
to seize this opportunity to establish Shafai power in the North by using the 
Southern military forces. War broke out in February 1979 between the two 
states on all fronts following a minor incident in the Beidh-Mukairas borders 
among low-ranking soldiers of the two states'^ ' (see chapter 3 for details). The 
Southern forces occupied five Northern posifions inside the YAR but pulled 
out after regional protests and threats against the PDRY. 
The Northern Forces learned their lesson and would not again consider 
military harassment against Southern soldiers along the borders. According to 
Kostiner the Soviets too thought the same, and thought the incident was too 
minor to have a long-term impact-. But to Ismail, this was not the case. He had 
wanted the Southern forces to go as far as Dhamar and cut off the major road 
which connected the Zaydi areas from the Shafais'. It was this incident which 
caused the Southern military leadership not to provide fiirther support for 
Ismail in the polit-bureau for radical policies against the North.'^-
As it became clear to the military leadership in the South that Ismail might 
cause fiirther tensions between the two Yemeni regimes. Brigadier Ali Anter, 
Minister of Defence, put him under house arrest until he was moved to 
Moscow in June 1980 for "medical reasons".'^ ^ Ismail, was moved polifically 
out of his position by the central committee which voted for his removal out of 
his two posts. However, He returned in March 1985 and subsequently 
regained a leadership position: in the Third YSP Conference in (October 1985) 
he became a polit-bureau member. He was killed during the 1986 civil war by 
the marine forces which captured him from a military tank after being 
escaped from the massacre hall of the politi-bureau members on the 13th, 
January 1986. 
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2.3.2.4 Ali Nasser Mohammed, Secretary-General of the YSP, President of the 
PDRY and a Premier (1980-1985) 
Between 1980 and 1985, the polifical arena was beset with internal problems 
that owed their origins to two major causes, one domestic and one external. 
The first was the direct clash between Ali Nasser and other factional groups in 
the YSP. The second cause related to the impact of perestroika on South 
Yemen and the implications this held for the socialist orientation of the state. 
The clash between Al i Nasser and his opponents stemmed from Al i Nasser 
lacking a charismatic character which would enable him to bring all factions in 
the YSP together into a unified political platform. Instead, he became involved 
in clashes with many of the polifical and military factions. He had succeeded 
in his past position as Premier of State because President Rubayye'a set all the 
policies of the state which he only had to follow. Al i Nasser as President left 
matters to be run by members of his faction whom together he could not 
control. 
Below, we shall examine critically the political developments in the South 
during the Al i Nasser era, as briefly explained above. 
2.3.2.4.1 Divisions in the Political Leadership 
Political dynamics in this period were marked by divisions among the polifical 
elite. These divisions were both of an ideological and policy-related type 
which became concomitant to the political organisation, namely the YSP in 
the south. Although differences were often expressed in ideological terms, this 
did not mean that factional groupings did not have personnel differences and 
ambitions among the comerades. It is important to note that Ali Nasser 
adopted a practice which previous leaders had not used, namely the 
elimination of his opponents in the YSP. 
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The hard-liners in the party, however, did not support the moderate policies, 
which were often pursued without the YSP's consent. Impediments, therefore, 
started to be raised against state polices. Military figures in the party's 
leadership were always aligned with the hard line as they were closely in 
touch with military experts from the Socialist Bloc (Soviet, Cuban, and East 
German) in their daily work. The Northern faction in the party encouraged the 
differences between the left and right wings among the Southerners. Northern 
factions also continued, through all channels, to support the Northern 
opposifion, represented by the NDF organisation. The leftist alliance enabled 
the party to stand against the state administration. Despite his control of state 
affairs, Al i Nasser was weak in the party leadership because of his many 
differences with Southern groups in the party. We shall now consider the rival 
groups and the procession of events in his era. 
2.3.2.4.1.1 Rival Groups 
The principal groups that competed for power at the central committee and 
polit-bureau levels were regionally based as follows: 
a. The Modia-Lawder faction, headed by Al i Nasser.'^ " The most active 
political members in this factional group were: 
Mohamed Al i Ahmed member of the central 
Committee, Governor of 
Abyan. 
Mohamed S.Nasser member of the central 
committee and Minister 
of Agriculture 
Alawi Farhan member of the central 
committee, Vice-Minister 
of State Security. 
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Hadi A. Nasser member of the central 
committee. YSP Secretary 
of Aden region 
This group was characterised by its moderate views and for its involvement 
in pracfical affairs of state rather than purely ideological matters.'^ ^ 
b. The Dhale'a-Redfan factional group headed by Staff Colonel Ali 
Anter (ex-Minister of Defence minister - Vice-President in 1980-85).'^ * 
The basic political associates of this faction were: 
Staff-Colonel Saleh Musleh polit-bureau member and 
Defence Minister. 
Colonel A l i Shaye'a polit-bureau member and 
YSP secretary for defence 
affairs 
SaifMunasser member of the Central 
Committee and Secretary 
of YSP for Lahj region. 
This facfional group represented the rigid leftist views of the YSP. Due to 
their ideological disposition the members played a marginal role in the 
daily affairs of the state. 
c. The Yafe'a Group. This was distinguished for the following: firstly, 
the group contained the largest tribal faction in terms of population; 
secondly, its support was distributed over many areas, with a 
concentration in Lahj and Abyan, and not confined to one area, like the 
above-mentioned factions.'^* The Yafe'a faction in Hadhramout alone 
constituted between 25-30% of the Hadhrami population.'^' Some of 
this group sided with Ah Nasser, but the majority of the Yafe'a faction 
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opposed him. The most active members in the poht-bureau were: 
Salem Saleh Mohammed poUt-bureau member and 
YSP Secretary 
Saleh Munasser Al-SeyilH polit-bureau member and 
YSP Secretary 
Mohammed Saleh Mutee'a polit-bureau member and 
Foreign Minister 
While the former showed signs of moderation from time to time, the latter 
stuck firmly to his ideological pr inciples .The third, however, did not last 
long for he was executed by Al i Nasser, as shall be explained below. 
Other factional groups in the the central committee of the YSP such as the 
Hadhramis, the Adenese, the shabwanies and others were divided into 
supporters of factional group (a) the right/moderate views, or to factional 
group (b) - the left views. Other factions, especially of the two local parties 
within the YSP, the Hadhramis and the Adenese such as Al-Dali, Al-Attas, 
Badeeb, Anis and others were divided into supporters of right/moderate views 
(group a), or left views (group b). In the polit-bureau, Al i Salem Al-Beidh 
sided with (group b), and Colonel Ahmed Musaed, Minister of State for 
Security sided with (group a). Anis H.Yehya and Al i Badeeb both sided with 
(group a). Despite Al i Salem Al-Beidh originating from Hadhramout, very 
few Hadhramis in the YSP offered him support. Al-Attas, remained impartial, 
but deep inside he was with the left, group (b), who pushed his nomination to 
premiership at later stage. Colonel Ahmed Musaed of Shabwa was tribally 
minded but district-wise, his tribe was closer to modia region than Dale'a or 
Radfan regions. 
The absence of Ismail from office did not diminish the role of the Northern 
faction in the YSP. Fadhle Mohsen, the brother-in-law of Ismail, and 
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Mohammed Saeed Abdulla 'Mohsen' allied with the Dhale'a-Radfan group 
and sought rival intesity between the two major southern groups. 
2.3,2.4.1.2 The Procession of Events 
Ali Nasser committed his first serious mistake with the elimination of the 
Foreign Minister Mohammed Saleh Mutee'a."" Mutee'a was one of the oldest 
NLF members in the YSP, coming from a powerful Yafe'a tribe. He had been 
in the Foreign Ministry for nine years and was experienced figure in the 
foreign policy of the state as he was concomitant with all political 
developments of the country. The researcher believed that Mutee'a was 
highly intelligent figure in the southern leadership as he was manipulating all 
internal and external policies with the ex-southern president, Rubayye'a. 
Mutee'a, however, showed his direct ambition to take up the premiership from 
Al i Nasser when the later would take up the two top posts of the YSP and the 
state.'"^ This proposal was not welcomed by Al i Nasser.'"*^  The Northern 
faction sought to intensify differences between the two southern figures by 
disclosing the danger of Mutee'a's ambitions after becoming a premier. ' ' "Al i 
Nasser sought the earliest chance to move Mutee'a away and had him 
convicted for national treason while Al i Anter, the second on command in the 
state, was absent. 
After a visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in 1980, Mutee'a was 
accused of treason.The accusation was based on his absence for 2-3 hours 
from the delegation while it was in the Kingdom. Mutee'a was imprisoned for 
a few months and then sentenced to death in February 1981.'''* In an interview 
with the researcher, Al-Sayilli, Minister of State Security, confirmed that 
Mutee'a was innocent. He authorised Mutee'a's file to be passed to Al i Nasser 
in order to show the proof of his innocence. However, Al i Nasser opted for 
Mutee'a's execution when Al i Anter, who was second in command of the 
polit-bureau, was visiting India."'" Ali Anter was then holding the vice-
president post in the state and was a strong person to let personnal verdicts to 
override on such polit-bureau members. He was terribly upset by the 
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execution of Mutee'a in his absence. 
Al i Nasser also made another mistake within the Yafe'a faction when he 
imprisoned Hussein Qumatah, the chief of the Militia in the state. Following 
the imprisonment of Mutee'a, Qumatah was imprisoned in fear of commiting 
militarian assault on Al i Nasser for the tribal bonds that were implicated 
between the two. Qumatah was reported to have been found strangled in his 
cell in the prison in 1981. 
Al i Nasser's second major mistake was to gain the enmity of Ali Salem A l -
Beidh whom he dismissed from the YSP Central Committee because of a 
Family Law violation."*^ Mrs Al-Beidh (first wife) had complained to Al i 
Nasser about her husband's breach of the Family Law by a second marriage. 
As Secretary-General of the YSP, Al i Nasser dismissed Al-Beidh from the 
central committee in a special session in 1982. 
In the following year, Ali Nasser eliminated A.Aziz A.Wali from the polit-
bureau. Admittedly, A.Aziz A.Wali of Northern origin, was a troublesome and 
often impetuous decision-maker within the polit-bureau, especially throughout 
the 1970's.'^^ However, he was one of Ismail's political pillars. Between 1975 
and 1977, A.Aziz A.Wali held two ministries and was renovmed for 
formulating and implementing ad hoc decisions.'^" In the July, 1980's Al i 
Nasser removed him from office and despatched him to the GDR for 'studies'. 
In 1982 and early 1983, he was spotted visiting Mohamed Saeed Abdulla 
the ambassador to Bulgaria; both figures had maintained their contacts with 
Ismail in M o s c o w . I n June 1983, news was received that A.Aziz A.Wali had 
died of excessive drinking. It was later discovered that he had been poisoned 
by Yemeni security in co-ordination with GDR s e c u r i t y . A s the security 
apparatus was responsible solely to Al i Nasser, he was implicated in the death 
of A. Aziz A.Wah.''^ 
The above mistakes committed by Al i Nasser, had opened a wide opposition 
front in his face by these southern factions particularly that of Yafais and 
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Hadhramis beside the Dal'ees and the Redfanis. He practically started a new 
fragmentation era of southern leadership. The Northern Shafais, though had 
their share in the leadership fragmentation, they were not directly targeted as 
southerners within themselves. Regional groupings among southern 
leaderships could easily be detected in official insUtufions, streets, occassions 
and formal meetings at all levels. The Yafais, the Dalees and the Radfanees 
were constituting main opposition bloc against Al i Nasser. The Hadhramis 
were divided between the oppositions and Al i Nasser and the rest apart of the 
northern faction were with Al i Nasser. 
With the emergence of these opposition fronts, Al i Nasser was compelled to 
depend upon his own faction, thus occasionally involved turning a blind eye to 
their defects. The majority of the top positions within the central and regional 
governments were awarded to members of his faction or to their close 
supporters. '^ ^ However, in the southern system, no power centre can change 
the administrative step-up entirely into its favour, though it can partly 
influence its composition. For example, no premier or president can make all 
cabint posts of his facfion or region. There was bound to have cabinet posts 
from all factions and regions. However, there were no members of the 
Dhale'a-Redfan group in civilian cabinet posts or among regional governors as 
they were substantially predominant in the security and military force; but 
they feel that there was a need to be in the civil service as well. There were, 
however, 5 ministers of Northern origin in the cabinet posts who were like 
some southern oppositions were not on Al i Nasser side. This aspect of Ali 
Nasser's rule contributed to rising tensions between the Modia and Dhale'a-
Redfan factions. 
The major weakness of Al i Nasser's leadership came from his enduring, and at 
times blind, support of the Modia Lawder faction. One instance where he 
displayed this support was when Mohammed Al i Ahmed, the Govemor of 
Abyan, was engaging in illegal acfivifies without due accountability from the 
Secretary-General of the YSP. ' " Mohammed Al i Ahmed imported 
consumables without formal permission from the authorities concerned. '^ * His 
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aim was to create a Dubai city out of Abyan Govemorate. Furthermore, the 
Governor imported modem weaponry from the international market.'^^ This 
action increased the level of political tension between the rival factions. In 
general, the affairs of state were loosely monitored, whilst the absence of 
accountability allowed Al i Nasser's faction to earn political and material 
capital in terms of capital fortunes, political popularty and sound foreign 
policies. 
With the political developments on the seen, the Dhale'a-Redfan faction did 
not like the concentration and the misuse of all powers by Al i Nasser. They 
sought power deregulation to others. With the support of other polit-bureau 
members of other factions, they succeeded in depriving Ali Nasser from the 
Premiership and enacted to Haider Al-Attas in April 1985.'*" The later, who 
was only a member of the central committee, automatically became a polit-
bureau member and was regarded as part of the rivarly faction to Ali 
Nasser.'^' The faction, defeated Al i Nasser by the same political means, just as 
they had previously defeated Ismail. 
The Dhale'a-Redfan faction, however, failed to identify the difference 
between Ismail, who never enjoyed a military backing, and Al i Nasser who 
had at least one third of the military power on his side. 
The Third YSP Conference of 1985 further weakened Al i Nasser's position 
despite his control over some parts of the military and security apparatus. With 
the return of Ismail and Al-Beidh to the polit-bureau, Al i Nasser did not enjoy 
the majority of votes within the polit-bureau. The key military leaders 
belonged to the rival faction. While his critics attacked the lack of 
accountability within the government, Al i Nasser's faction reinforced these 
perceptions through their mild policies and negligence of formal 
responsibilities This provided an environment in which his critics intensified 
their grievances. 
In view of the majority of the rival faction in the polit-bureau, Al i Nasser was 
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reluctant to call for the first meeting for the polit-bureau to distribute the new 
tasks for the fresh period following the third YSP conference. Since October, 
1985, until the end of December, 1985, the polit-bureau did not have its 
weekly schedule in the fear that Al i Nasser might loose another post of his 
power. Under strong pressure of its members, Al i Nasser called for the 
meeting on the 2nd of January, 1986 and did not finish it until the 13th of 
January with the disanster of 1986 factional war among its party members. 
2.3.2.4.2 The Impact of Perestroika on PDRY Political Developments 
The restructuring of the political and economic system within the Soviet 
Union, known as perestroika, not only undermined the coherence of domestic 
policies in Southern Yemen, but also reinforced the political divisions within 
the YSP. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union sought to improve its political 
relations in the region after 1978 and 1980 party crises in Aden. It 
encouraged inter-arab relationships of the region and supported South Yemen 
relations with its neighbours. This relationship with the Soviet Union had 
been formahsed by the Treaty of Brotherhood of 1979."^ * By 1985, perestroika 
called for the liberalisation of political and economic policies in the Soviet 
Union and this had a positive impact on Yemeni policies. The private sector 
was encouraged to engage more actively in the national economy and fixed 
prices were removed from local production."'' 
The transformation of rigid policies into soft policies served to increase 
political tension within the YSP. Within the body of Soviet experts, those 
working within the military sphere appear to have been dissatisfied with the 
pace and scale of reform taking place within the Soviet Union. They laid 
emphasis'in the articles in the Treaty of 1979 which called for continuing the 
fight against imperialism from within the international political system. The 
Dhale'a-Redfan faction similarly placed its faith in the Treaty as a bulwark 
against the pohcies adopted by Al i Nasser, which included extending fies with 
the North and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. ™ 
74 
Ali Nasser later claimed that the Soviets had given him the green light to start 
the 1986 war against the 'radicals'. However, i f the Soviets wanted to 
eliminate radical groups in PDRY, it was surpring that they sent Ismail back 
and helped in rescuing him and Al-Beidh from the massacre on 13 January 
1986.'^ ^ It was this contradictory stance of the Soviets in Aden that gives the 
impression that there was conflicts within the Soviet leadership, which 
manifested themselves at the advisery level in the PDRY. 
2.3.2.5 The 1986 War 
With the increasing divisions within the YSP political elite in the early 1980s, 
open conflict could have occurred at any time. The political tensions 
between the Modia-Lowder and Dhale'a Redfan factions escalated through the 
eighties. By 1985, the political situation worsened as the Premiership was 
taken away from Al i Nasser. The political conditions were aggravated by 
the return of Ismail and Al-Beidh to the polit-bureau at the third conference of 
the YSP. Their return challenged Al i Nasser's role as Secretary-General and 
weakened his platform. 
As a result of this political tension, each grouping within the YSP was forced 
to side with the Modia-Lowder or the Dhale'a-Redfan factions. 
Faction Principal Bases of Support 
Modia-Lowder (Ali Nasser) Abyan: Modia-Lawder YSP members 
headed by Mohamed Al i Ahmed. Salem 
Rubaye'as grouping (Ali Saleh Obad, 
Abdulla Al-Bar) 
Shabwah: all YSP members headed by 
Ahmed Musaed 
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Aden: Aden Technocrats only, including 
those in the Popular Vanguard Party and 
Popular Democrat Union (Anis Yehya and 
Al i Badeeb) 
Lahj: Lower Lahj YSP members in Al-Hota 
and Saber area 
Dhale'a-Redfan (Ali Anter) Dhalea and Redfan: YSP members headed 
by Saleh Musleh and Al i Shayea Hadi 
Yafei facdon:the majority of Yafe'ai faction 
in the YSP headed by Salem Saleh Moh'd. 
Northern Facfion: majority of Northem-bom 
members in the YSP. 
Al i Salem Al-Beidh, Al-Seyeilli in addition 
to the majority of Hadhramis in the YSP. 
It is important to note that under these conditions there were effectively no 
"independent" figures. Dr Al-Dali and Haider Al-Attas tried to show an 
impartial attitude but deep iside they were on the side of the second faction 
agaist Al i Nasser. It was natural that Al-Attas to side with Al-Beidh, as both 
characters sharing Hashmite blood. ' " In his book Revolution and Foreign 
Policy, Halliday labelled both Dr Al-Dali and Al-Attas as neutral in the polit-
bureau during the climax of this e p i s o d e ' I n fact they were placed in their 
positions by their respective factions which expected their support in times of 
need. 
Frustration erupted into war at 09.40 on 13 January 1986, with a series of 
massacres taking place at all levels within the YSP and the state institutions of 
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Aden. ™ Between 2 and 12 January, the poht-bureau had held daily meetings 
in an attempt to resolve the crisis, but they were unable to find an acceptable 
solution. ™ On the morning of the 13th January, some polit-bureau members 
arrived at the meeting hall of the Central Committee secretariat at 9.30am. At 
9.40am, 5 polit-bureau members were in the hall, these were: 
Staff-Colonel Al i Anter Vice-President of the state 
Staff-Colonel Saleh Musleh Defence Minister 
Abdul Fattah Ismail YSP secretary at the YSP 
secretariat 
Al i Salem Al-Beidh Minister of Local Administration 
Colonel Ah Shayea Hadi YSP secretary - at the YSP 
secretariat 
Apart from Al-Attas and Al-Dali who were outside Aden, the rest were, by 
various means, prevented from reaching the hall at that time; 
Al i Nasser had remained in Abyan and instructed his Chief Guard to kill the 
top five figures in the meeting hall. Chief Guard Mobarak and two other 
guards, undertook the task, but failed to kil l Ismail and Al-Beidh as both 
pretended death for over ten hours and by the time they were leaving the site, 
Mobarak and other guards ran out of amunitions to kill them. 
Two Soviet tanks arrived in the evening to rescue Ismail and Al-Beidh. Each 
took a tank and few metres ahead they were shelled by Al i Nasser supporters 
at short distance. Al-Beidh stepped down from the tank and took a pegout car 
to Basuhaib hospital after being hit in the lower part of his body.'*'' Ismail 
continued his journey in the tank via a road strip leading to the port area where 
he was taken by the marine forces who cut off his road. In the marine 
headquarters no news was recieved on him; and was assumed that the marine 
forces who were in allegiance with Al i Nasser took his life. '^ ^ 
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Ali Nasser's supporters had been given instructions to eliminate members of 
the Dhale'a-Redfan facfion in all military and civil institutions. As they had 
no presence in the civilian posts, the Dhale'a-Redfan faction lost most of their 
experienced figures in the military and the security service, including Ali Kaid 
Muthana ( murdered in his bed at the Aden Refinery Hospital,) who had been 
a mayor in one of the Dhale'a districts. In all military units, several of the 
Dhaleis were killed, including those in the Air Force. ' " Within the first 2-3 
days of the civil was not less than 4,000 were killed. '^ * The majority of these 
were from the civilian population, who had come from the Dhale'a-Redfan 
areas to avenge the death of their leaders. '^' 
The ultimate outcome of the conflict may be attributed to Tank Commander 
Haitham Qassem Tahr from Dhale'a. His military strategy was believed to 
have had altered the final permutation of political power. At the breakout of 
war, Haitham Qassem sent several tanks one after the other to help his faction 
down the city centre of Aden by these tanks were successfully ambushed by 
Al i Nasser facfion 2 kilo metres away. Lieutenant Haithem then dispatched 
another two small tanks (side by side); one was destroyed, but the second tank 
counter-attacked the strategic area of his opponents. He managed to break 
through and head to the close of the airports, thus breaking international links 
for any forthcoming help to Al i Nasser. The new military leadership rolled 
into the city centre in tanks (with Al i Nasser posters attached to them to add 
confusion). '*^  These tactics brought Al i Nasser's power to an end. It was only 
then, that the Dhale'a-Redfan faction seized control, but it was won at a heavy 
price. '^ ^ 
As the scale of destruction, in material and human terms, was so great, it took 
over 3-4 months for the lives of people in Aden, Lahj and Abyan to return to 
any sense of normality. The military and security institufions had lost 
between 11,000-12,000 personnel.''' Corpses were left on streets for days and 
the country was verging towards an epidemic. The aftermath was even 
worse than that of the first week. Trials were carried out by the Dhale'a-
Redfan facfion against the Modia faction. In these trials, 6-8 people were 
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lined up simultaneously and asked one question: "Where were you on the 
morning of 13 January" "* Most likely, his ID card which would show where 
he came from and thus, which faction he belonged to, and this determined his 
fate.''" 
Even when the blood revenge was over, the new leadership, headed by Ali 
Salem Al-Beidh, did not attempt to embrace all political factions in pursuit of 
the national interest. Al l those belonging to the Modia-Lowder faction were 
removed from the civil service. In some cases even those officials who had 
been non-aligned, such as the researcher, (a deputy Minister), were removed 
from office by Al-Beidh's faction. Al-Beidh mixed personal revenge with 
political orientation and subjected the national interest to personal animosity. 
2.3.2.6 Ali Salem Al-Beidh (1986-1990) 
Before we proceed fiirther, it is necessar>' to provide some personal 
background of Al i Salem Al-Beidh. 
2.3.2.6.1 The Character of Al-Beidh 
Descending from a Hashemite family known for its polygamous lifestyle, Al -
Beidh grew up in Hadhramout. He was known to be shrewd and proud of his 
'blue blood'. Al-Beidh's grandfather married more than ten wives and could 
not recall all the names of his numerous children. Similarly, Al-Beidh's father 
married twenty-one wives who were scattered over many nomadic areas. '"^  
This familial pattern enabled Al-Beidh to seek shelter whenever he was 
engaged in troubles or wars. 
Al-Beidh went to Ghail Bawazeer Preparatory School and studied under the 
guidance of his uncle, Salem Hussain Al-Beidh. He finished his 'City 
Angels' certificate in Aden Colony and continued his education at Cairo 
University. However, he left the university during his second year in order to 
join the NLF in Aden.'"'* 
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Al-Beidh had a shrewd character, with a strong base in tradifional life. He 
enjoyed spending time with the Bedouin, who gave him the respect he felt he 
deserved as a descendent of the Hashemite tribe. "^^  Before his death, Al -
Beidh's father, who was well-known for his astrology, prophesied that his son 
would encounter bloodshed, but would die a natural death after surpassing 
such bloodshed. ™^ 
On a personal level, Al-Beidh was temperamental and moody and this made 
him vulnerable to political criticism. His self-centred attitude, mixed with a 
temperamental character, made him a difficult team-player. He found great 
difficulty expressing himself, and lacked a common understanding with his 
associates. As a result, he came into conflict with other political leaders, over a 
variety of issues 
a. Qahtan and Faisal Al-Sha'abi (ex-President and ex-Prime minester of 
the PRSY), on employing moderate policies in the affairs of state. 
b. Salem Rubaye'a Al i ( ex-President of the Presidenfia! Council of the 
PDRY), on the management of development plans. 
c. Al i Nasser (ex-General Secretary of the YSP, President of the PDRY 
and Premier), on open policies and Family Law violation. ^" 
d. Saleh Munasser Al-Seyilli, (ex-YSP Secretary for Hadhramout region), 
on tribal/factional attitude and policies of the region. '^^  
In general, Al-Beidh was never capable of working within a team or group 
unless he was dictafing policy in something resembling a king-slave 
relationship. ^" 
2.3.2.6.2 Al-Beidh's Policies 
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Ironically, in contrast to his earlier radical views, Al-Beidh adopted moderate 
policies after 1986, both internally and externally.'''' Neither the regional nor 
international arena in this period encouraged Al-Beidh to maintain his radical 
views while in power.^'^ Against the backdrop of perestroika, Al-Beidh had to 
rethink his strategy and introduce a process of change in accordance with the 
economic and political processes taking place in the Soviet Union, before it 
was too late. 
Within the rethinking of his strategy, Al-Beidh made three serious policy 
mistakes which without them he would not be in the assylem. '^^  There were 
three wrong policy aspects Al i Salem Al-Beidh made in his reign: recruitment 
of a weak Premier for that critical period, recruitment of weak cabinet figures 
predominantly of northern ministers and wrong proceedings towards the 
unification process. 
1. The character of the Premier, Dr N'oman 
Dr N'oman was described as the least efficient Premier in the PDRY history as 
he lacked leadership character and high technical capacity to lead the country 
forward in its worst political and economic conditions. Dr N'oman took the 
Premier's office in January 1986 at a time when the country was passing 
through its worst political and economic condirions.^'^ Despite his Egyptian 
and Bulgarian educational background, Dr N'oman did not have sufficient 
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practical experience from his previous careers. He was also unlucky in 
having the weakest government figures prodiminantly of northern Shafais 
whom had no experience in sectoral leadership neither in the north nor in the 
south. Worst of all, however, Dr N'oman was observed to be under the 
influence of a northern elite in the southern leadership, namely, Mohamed 
Abdulla Saeed, nicknamed as 'Muhsen' whom many of southerners disliked 
very much.^'^ Dr N'oman traded off many of southerners' rights for 
northerners freshly coming from northern areas and were given southerners' 
houses, particularly those of the Al i Nasser faction.^^° 
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2. The northern Shafai ministers in the cabinet (1986-1990) 
To keep loyal to the left facfion in the YSP, Al-Beidh recruited from Northern 
factions who generated unnecessary obstacles to the transformation and 
integrafion process for the two Yemens. He was under pressure to remain 
loyal to his leftist views and to sponsor left groups of the old system. To 
compensate the northerners for the loss of Ismail, Al-Beidh recruited 8 
ministers over four years and dispensed with the only independent southener, 
Dr Bin Ghanem, the Minister of Planning.^^' 
During this period, the government performance was bad and had a negative 
impact politically and economically on the state resources and the southern 
public.^^^ There were many reasons for this negative tendency. First, the 
northern ministers failed to keep up with the southern administration 
mechanisms.^ ^^ The replacement of southerners with northerners, for example, 
was intolerable.^ '^* On account of some employees being of Ali Nasser's 
faction, many southerners were driven from their posts (the researcher was 
one) and replaced by northerners from the north and of the Yemen Peoples' 
Union Party (YPUP).^^^ Ministers of Agriculture and Trade & Supply and the 
Chairman of the Central Statisfical Organisation in particular incurred serious 
damages in their sectors with their factional attitudes and behaviour towards 
southerners in their reg ions .Publ ic expenditures for the new northern elite 
for accommodation, cars, furniture etc., were beyond the capacity of the 
budget. Cars were taken back and given to newly recruited northemers.^ ^^ In 
response to factional behaviour, southern fhistration increased and so did the 
public pressure on the southern leadership to solve these problems. 
As national problems increased politically and economically, the two top 
figures, Al-Beidh and Al-Attas, with other members of the southern 
leadership, thought of the unificafion process among other things for an 
escape. The conditions in the PDRY were too bad to be left without 
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mtervenfion. 
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3. The uncalculated unification process 
As pressure confinued to mount, Al-Beidh risked the national interests of the 
South by engaging in an uncalculated unification process. The bad 
management of the state administration and the deterioration of economic 
conditions allowed the unification process to revive again against the will of 
many northerners in the party.^ ^^ It was the Southern leadership which 
facilitated the process of unificafion, though within the southerners there were 
few who objected to the manner by which the unificafion process was carried 
out.^^' 
There were two reasons, however, for the revival of the unification process: 
first, to provide cover for new bridging policies that were designed to assist 
the introduction of economic reform within the country, secondly, to dissipate 
public fi-ustration by promoting internal migration to the North, thus marking a 
prelude to unification. Both reasons represented factors of defensive 
unionism. However, after thorough discussions in the YSP, Al-Beidh took the 
initiative to continue the unificafion process where it ended in 1985 and sent 
Minister of Unification, Rashed Thabet to Sanaa for unification negitiations in 
1988. No doubt there were various forces playing their role in taking this 
decision apart than those above reasons, such as border confrontations around 
Shabwa and Al i Nasser faction activities in Sanaa through their radio stationed 
in the north, but these were minor compared to internal pressures of northemer 
elite behaviour in the strategic sectors and the global changes. 
The unificafion process could well have been studied with regard to the new 
economic and political parameters in the region. Al-Beidh failed to assess the 
magnitude of the parametres in terms of population, area, tribal concentration 
in the north, variational gaps in the administrative and legal structures and 
many other issues between the two states. He failed even to assess the capacity 
of his men and their mentality towards the process itself before and after the 
unification took place. Al l these shortcomings resulted in a southem 
catastrophe, particularly after the 1994 war. 
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2.4 Economic Developments in the Y A R and the PDRY 
Economic developments in both the YAR and PDRY were formulated 
according to each state's political ideology. While the YAR opted for the 
adoption of a market economy approach, the PDRY pursued a developmental 
plan with a highly centralised economy. A brief description of the major 
developmental issues of the two states is presented below. 
2.4.1 Economic Developments in the Y A R 
The YAR faced serious challenges in its socio-economic development as it 
inherited very little from the previous imamate dynasty. It had to create a 
basic infrastructure for its economy in terms of schools of all levels, medical 
units and roads in addifion to the establishment of the basic institutions which 
had to administer these infrastructures. In view of its scanty natural resources 
and limited manpower, this was a formidable challenge to the YAR. 
2.4.1.1 The Socio-Economic Plans 
The YAR's developmental policies and programmes commenced in 1972/3 
with the launch of the first (Triennial) Plan (1972/3,-75/6), followed by three 
five year plans. Starting from scratch, the YAR had been unable to collate 
sufficient raw data to launch a new plan before 1972/3. Internal instabilifies 
and lack of resources over the period 1962 -1972 did not allow the 
government to formulate an effective investment programme. The Triennial 
Plan was initially comprised of an investment programme that sought to build 
basic insfitutions in the following sectors: agriculture, trade, social services, 
and roads. Successive plans, all of which were set for the duration of five 
years, concentrated on roads, manpower training, communications, social 
services, and the development of industry and trade."'' 
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2.4.1,2 Developmental Strategies and Policies 
Several features were apparent in the YAR developmental process: 
1. The market-economy strategy on which the YAR's developmental process 
was based did make possible the expansion/transformation of the 
economy. Economic activities in the YAR expanded at a fast rate during 
the 1970's and early 1980's. GDP grew in real terms at an annual 
average rate of 8.7% between 1970 and 1977. Economic growth was 
strongest in the modem sectors of industry and services. Whilst the share 
of agriculture declined from 51% in 1970, 45% in 1977, to 22% in 1986, 
the share of industry and the services sectors increased [IFAD EB 
80/10/R.38 C Report No. 0106.YA of July, 1988]. Growth rates in the 
1980's, however, were much lower than those in the seventies with an 
average of 4-5% per annum."' 
2. The higher growth rates in the YAR, however, were not attributable to 
good positive economic performance or planning, but to the repatriation 
of capital from remittances and other official transfers from abroad."^ 
The trade accounts exhibited some of the characteristics of a relatively 
small under-developed country endowed with a narrow domestic resource 
base covering 2-3% of the YAR imports. With exports lagging behind the 
rapidly growing imports, the trade deficit exceeded US$ 700 million in 
1976/77 and increased to US$ 900 million in 1978 .The YAR's imports 
depended heavily and increasingly on private transfers (workers 
remittances), which increased from US$ 58 million in 1970 to US$ 948.9 
million in 1976/77. In addition to the remittances, official transfers and 
capital inflows, mostly received in grant and concessional loan form, 
increased. As a result, the balance of payments in the current account, 
which had been in deficit until 1974/75, recorded a surplus in the year of 
1975/76. The gross reserve of the YAR in the foreign exchange grew 
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rapidly to US$ 1,477 million at the end of 1978, which was equivalent to 
more than one year's imports. 
3. Despite the boom in investments in the 1970's and 1980's, the YAR 
remained within the category of least developed country. Two plans were 
launched in the 1970's, namely the Triennial Plan (1973-76) and the First 
Five-Year Plan (FFYP) (1977-1981) with the objective of supporting 
more infrastructural projects such as roads, communications and an array 
of social services. "^"^  For example, education was expanded at all levels, 
health services were supplied in urban areas and some rural 
developmental projects were established to encourage the private sector. 
The Second Five-Year Plan (SFYP) (1982-86) and the Third Five-Year 
Plan (TFYP) (1987-91) continued the development theme with a 
concentration on constructing major roads and developing human and 
natural resources. But, in spite of the commendable achievements with 
development, poverty was still prevalent throughout the state. The 
agricultural workforce which comprised the poorest of the population 
made up 75% of the residen national workforce. They lived mainly in 
villages and seldom enjoyed the benefits of electrification, potable water, 
adequate schooling, or the provision of health services. Income disparity 
between urban and rural areas widened. Only specific factions/groups 
benefited from development. '^"' 
4. Despite the encouragement of the private sector, public investment 
remained dominant in building the national economy, providing 
employment and social services. Investment data is far from complete 
because of poor data collection facilities especially for the 1970's, but it is 
evident that the Northern leadership had encouraged the private sector in 
terms of credit and other material privileges. While public investment 
was directed towards infrastructural projects such as communication, 
social services, and human resources, the private sector cared for real 
estate, trade and industry and sought to meet consumption demands. '^'^  
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The SFYP (1981-6) was the first formal plan linked to investments. The 
figures are given in the table below, and they indicate the ratio of public to 
private investment. 
Investments during the SFYP (1981-6) 
Y R Millions Actual 
Total 28,100 19,296 
Investments 
Public 18,433 11,832 
Private 9,667 7,464 
Investment in Agriculture 
Total 3,825 2,016 
Public 2,470 1,316 
Private 1,355 0,700 
Source: Ifad Report - EB 80/10/R.38 - 4/8/1980, Rome, September 1980 
The above table shows the modest nature of the YAR's investment policy. 
In the first instance, private investments made a modest contribution to the 
plan. Secondly, agriculture, which comprised 75-80% of population, 
attracted only modest investments in both the public and the private 
sectors, accounting for 10% of the total investment in 1978/9 and 9% in 
29^^246 general, this investment policy of the YAR, created a basic 
infrastructure with the added benefit of raising per capita income, and yet 
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it still fell short in generating self-sustaining economic development. 
5. In an effort to overcome its economic difficulties, the Northern leadership 
revised its fiscal policies. The leaderships' adapted poHcies did achieve 
nominal success, but this remained negligible as the necessary structural 
measures remained outside the economic prescription. During the 1980's, 
the YAR faced economic difficulties, in particular with its balance of 
payments and budget deficits. The overall deficit in the balance of 
payments widened, which led to a decline in the country's foreign 
exchange reserves.^ ''^  Also, as official budgetary support from oil rich 
Arab states declined, the government resorted to implementing drastic 
cuts in fiinding development. Therefore, imports and foreign exchange 
rates were revised. The national currency was devalued and imports were 
restricted. This led to a substantial decline in imports and improvements in 
the current accounts, but did not produce a structural improvement in the 
overall balance of payments, let alone the rates of infladon. 
The fiscal posifion, however, reflected the development of the external 
sector. As customs duties had been the most important source of revenue, 
the sharp rise in imports boosted government income. Unfortunately, 
public expenditure increased at more than double the pace of domestic 
revenues and the overall budgetary position was marked by a widening 
deficit, reaching 33% of the GDP in 1982, but declining to 20% in 
1985.^ ^^ By 1988 the increase in public expenditure, which had risen to 
65% of the GDP compared to the previous year (1987), was covered by 
oil revenues rather than taxation resources. 
2.4.2 Economic Developments in the PDRY 
Unlike its sister state, the PDRY was compelled by its own polifical ideology 
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to adopt a socially-orientated economy. When South Yemen gained 
independence from the British after a four year struggle, it only received 
support from socialist countries. The Soviet Union, China, East Germany, 
Cuba, and Poland recognised the PRDY immediately, and offered military, 
political and economic assistance. It was, therefore, important for the newly 
established state to maintain its socialist orientation."° 
2.4.2.1 Socio-Economic Plans 
Since proclaiming its centrally planned economy, the PDRY development 
policies and programmes followed a Triennial Plan (1970-73) and three 
successive Five-Year Plans. Al l plans were committed to public investment 
programmes with the aim of building a sound infrastructure in the productive 
sectors and the social services with priorities given to the rural areas.' , 251 
2.4.2.2 Developmental Strategies and Policies 
Several features can be identified from the development process in the 
PDRY."^ 
1. Whist the YAR started its development from scratch, the PDRY was more 
fortunate in that its capital city, the former British Colony of Aden, 
contained administrative infrastructures, namely Aden Port, the British 
Petroleum Refinery, banks, and the administration of law. Apart from 
Aden, however. South Yemen had little infrastructure capable of coping 
with the projects of development. 
As the problems facing the country were substantial, the government 
adopted a policy of state production investment to cope with the depressed 
economy and introduced austerity measures in pubic expenditure. The 
PDRY adopted a balanced socialistic strategy throughout the country. It 
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provided a social infrastructure in education and health without regional 
or factional discriminafion. The state leadership provided a link between 
areas which were scattered over 333,000 km through a network of roads 
and other communication facilities. Such challenges were beyond the 
resources of the state and itself which made it dependent upon external 
aid. Internal austerity measures in fiscal and monetary terms were adopted 
to circumvent corruption. The Triennial Plan was devoted mainly to roads, 
communications and the social services sectors. Later on, the state 
leadership gave priority to production-oriented investment in the First 
Five-Year Plan, (1974-1978) and onwards. These poUcies resulted in 
substantial achievements both with regards to economic and social 
development. In the wake of planning efforts, total investment 
expenditure increased from 3% of the GNP in 1972 to 29% in 1978. 
2. The comprehensive economic and social plan enabled the country to 
strengthen its economic infrastructure which provided an important base 
for further economic growth. The PDRY made considerable socio-
economic progress through its successive development plans. Real GDP 
was estimated to have risen at an average rate of 7% annually during 
1974-78, compared to 2% in 1970-73. Sectorally speaking, fisheries 
comprised 10% of GDP, industry 8% (increasing at 15%p.a.) and 
agriculture only comprised 12% in 1977, but increased to 16% (including 
fisheries) in 1988. 40% of the populafion were engaged in agriculture. The 
rest would be accounted for other sectors. 
There is ample evidence of improvement in the standard of food 
consumption, which was achieved mainly through higher imports. Formal 
education expanded rapidly to all provinces and areas (see annexes). 
3. In spite of the high investment efforts and spectacular improvement in 
social indicators, the PDRY remained essentially poor and structurally one 
of the least developed countries. Until 1978, development plans were 
balanced between the producfion-oriented and service-oriented 
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programmes, whereby basic infrastructures (in roads, education and 
health) were laid down for further developmental plans. After that, 
investment plans were mainly diverted to the production sectors with 
agriculture receiving the lion's share. Owing to the successive wars during 
1978-1986, it was common to revise development plans. Such 
interruptions left a negative impact upon national growth. 
4. Although economic growth in the PDRY was primarily attributed to 
government services and its comprehensive planning and control, the 
inflow of remittances and external aid played a substantial role. 
Development activity in the PDRY was based on comprehensive 
economic and social planning which became an integral part of the 
political framework. In view of the shortages of skilled manpower and 
natural resources, the leadership did its utmost to mobilise its available 
resources. Also, in view of the high dependency on imports for food, 
consumption items, and for support of development efforts, the inflow of 
remittances and external aid was important for the developing the country. 
Exports, excluding petroleum products processed at Aden refineries, were 
but a fraction of the total imports resulting in a high and widening trade 
deficit, which was offset by external aid and cash remittances from 
nationals aboard. Remittances peaked in 1984 at US$ 480 million and by 
1986 had fallen to US$ 282 million. External aid also declined, and in 
response to this situation, import restrictions were introduced in 1986 and 
these helped to cut the deficit from US$ 261 million in 1984 to US$ 191 
milHon in 1986. 
5. Despite the coherent fiscal policies and instruments utilised by the PDRY, 
fiscal deficits were maintained in order to achieve development beyond 
the national resources of the country. Unlike many Arab countries. South 
Yemen continued to maintain British financial methods. The treasury was 
an independent body that functioned away from the Ministry of Finance. 
The Central Bank of Yemen in the South only regulated monetary 
policies, and implemented no other functions. Pubhc finance, however, 
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was only linked to development activities in the external sector. 
Customs, used as an instrument of fiscal policies, was the most important 
form of taxation, and therefore the sharp rise in imports boosted 
government revenue during the early 1980s. 
Apart from a few years, however, the overall budgetary position was 
marked by a wide deficit which continued to expand as the growth in 
revenue slowed down and expenditure continued to rise particularly after 
1986. The deficits in 1985 and 1986, were US$ 386 million and US$ 392 
million respectively.^^' The larger part of the deficit was financed through 
external aid and borrowing. The local currency was then over-valued, but 
no attempt was made to devalue it (DYD 1 = 2.98 US$). 
No doubt the PDRY engaged in a development programme beyond its limited 
natural resources. However, its limited population allowed it to achieve major 
part of its infrastructural programmes within a relatively short time. 
2.5 Assessment and conclusion of the political and economic developments in 
the two former Yemeni states 
There is no doubt that there were inter-relations between the ex-YAR and the 
ex-PDRY political structure and development, though many of these came 
about in reaction to each-other's policies. The political developments in the 
ex-YAR in the 1970's were very conservative and of a highly tribal nature. 
The YAR leadership - apart from that of the Al-Hamdi period - looked 
suspiciously at PDRY policies internally and externally. The southern policies 
were manoeuvred to address the historic zaydi/shafai problem - by the 
Northern shafai faction in the southern leadership. This, indirectly, resulted 
in a political rift among the southern leadership in both the party and the state 
administrative framework. The southerners worked for the southern interest, 
using socialist policies as instruments; and the northern faction in the party 
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were looking for political power for the northern shafais in the north by using 
social instruments to bring down the Zaydi rule in the north. It was this 
mental attitudes of tribalism and factionalism in the two states which made the 
political developments of the two states inter-related. 
Natural forces, no doubt, helped in enabling tribal and factional mentalities to 
develop at the expense of national interests. There were social and economic 
factors which led Zaydi rule to operate tribally. The republican regime in 
1962 came to power in a country with a raw tribal background and no 
infrastructure in its regions to support an effective change in its mentality and 
attitudes in the rule. President Al-Hamdi tried hard to bring about an effective 
change in the northern community, but the tribal background of the whole 
community was much stronger than the impact of his reforms. 
The southern leadership, which was much more cohesive though with more 
tribal/factional groups than the north, witnessed some tribal and factional 
clusters in its power centre. In the military set-up, for example, tribal clusters 
existed in the higher hierarchies, which were dominated by mountain 
habitants, namely the Dhale'a, Radfan, and Yafe'a. Also, for over half of the 
period of the ex-PDRY, the presidency was in the hands of Abyanis 
(Rubayye'a and Nasser). Because of the presidential figures, some Abyanis 
gained seniour posts in the military set-up. The left party policies were 
effectively maintained by the northern faction in the policy-making power 
under a southern flag. So, there was an ad hoc political mixture in the 
southern political system. The researcher discussed with the leadership the 
absence of Dhalees and Radfanis in the civil system. She deduced that these 
factions preferred to have the key posts in the military sector than to have 
irrelevant posts in the civil administrafion. In the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Reform, for example, there was only one person from Dhale'a in the 
main office out of 450 personnel. 90%) of the agriculture staff in the main 
offices of agriculture in Aden came from Abyan and Hota (of Lahj) areas. 
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On the economic front, the two states incorporated economic policies that 
fitted their political ideologies. The north adopted a free market policies in 
tribal form. There were no appropriate economic instruments to regulate 
effectively the free market policies and therefore, economic developments ran 
with minimum intervenfion of the leadership policy-wise. However, despite 
the open market policy, the government was compelled to take up the 
responsibility of building basic infrastructure in its poorest form. The PDRY, 
on the other hand, had a centrally planned economy with major committment 
to basic social infrastrcture and thus had large public activities in its economy. 
The private sector had no room to participate in the nafional development in 
the PDRY and thus the cost for public infrastructure for the small populated 
state was costly. 
It is important to note that the high degree of tribal elitism in the north had a 
strong impact on the policies of Ismail and his faction in the PDRY. Ismail 
concentrated his party programme, especially after 1976, on the penetration of 
the tribal communities in the north by radical socialist policies incorporated 
within the NDF's political agenda. His main target was to foster all 
'sociahsm pioneers' in the whole Yemeni arena in the hope that the Zaydi rule 
would be eliminated and could be replaced by a socially progressive regime 
where the northern shafais could be partners in. Ismail forgot that the Zaydi 
rule had also its own political agenda and was more effective than he could 
forsee. Ismail was lucky enough to be in a civic society as existed in the south 
where tribalism was much more refined than anywhere else, and, thus, his 
socialist programmes were tolerable but not taken as seriously as he might 
have thought. 
In conclusion, it was obvious that neither state achieved strong integration 
within its system, a property of a unit to which a political unification wil l be 
successfully feasible. The lack of integration in units in the preunification 
period does not give high level degree for the scope of future integration. 
94 
95 
ENDNOTES 
1. The YAR constitution of 1964. Several talks with Premier Abdul-Aziz 
Abdul-Ghani, Premier of YAR (1978-1990). 
2. Ibid. 
3. All Presidents in YAR have been so far Zaydis from Al-Sallah to Ali 
Saleh. 
Meetings with YAR key figures; Hussein Al-Maqdani - ex minister of 
Health (1974), Colonel A. Al-Ra'ai (Advisor at Presidential Office) and 
others (1992, 1993 and 1994), as colleagues at the Presidential Office. 
Ibid 
Ibid 
7. Meeting with Jamal Al-Qashshar - Director General at the Parliament 
(1992, 1993, 1994). 
8. The researcher had talks with Qadi Ali Al-Anesi, Qadi Yaha Qadi - both 
senior staff at Presidential Office, on this issue, 1992, 1993 and 1994. 
9. Mane'a, I. - The Parties and Political Organisation in Yemen (1984-1993) 
analytical study - p ISObyllham Mane'a-Sanaa 1994 (p 186). 
10. Ibid. 
11. Cabinet figures were appointed in the permanent and higher committees of the GPC. 
Thus, they feed the GPC with policy making rather than the other way around. 
12. The Y A R Constitution of 1970. 
13. Meeting with ex-Govemor of Ibb - Saleh Obad Al-Kholani - Govemor of 
Hadhramout in (1992, 1993, 1994, 1997) in the Presidential Office and Mukalla. 
14. Wenner, M. - An article "South Yemen since Independence: An Arab Political 
Maverick". 
96 
15. PRSY Constitution of 1970-Item 7. 
16. The NF structure as explained by Muqbel to a Cuban delegation in 
1972. (See also, F Halliday - "Revolution and Foreign Policy - the 
Case of South Yemen 1967-1987) p 22. 
17. The Organisational Structure of the YSP - October Press 1978. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid 
20. That was Salem Saleh Mohammed -(1986-1994). 
21. Aden Gazette, November 1972. 
22. The P.C. became of three members. (Refer to PDRY Constitution of 
1972). 
23. The PDRY Constitution of 1972. 
24. The majority of Cabinet members were C.C. members. 
25. Refer to Rubayye'a and Ismail sections of this chapter. 
26. The Organisational Structure of the PONF - 1972 and UPONF - 1975. 
27. The Programmes of the PONF: "Al-Baramej Al-Tandhimeyyah lil-
jabaha Al-Queumiyyah - 1972". 
28. Dustoor Jumhoreyyah Al-Yaman ayyah Al-Demoqratiyyah Al-Sha'abiyyah • 
1972. (PDRY Constitution, 1970). 
29. Ibid. 
30. Political decision by the Polit-bureau in October, 1975 (not for public 
announcement) but within polit-bureau members. Source from Ali 
Shaye'a Hadi - Director of Political Dept, in Ministry of Defence. 
31. Discussions with Colonel Abdulla Al-Ra'ai and Mr H. Maqdami in 1992-
1994. 
97 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Dustoor Jumhoreyyah Al-Arabeyyah Al-Yamanenia - bab Al-
Hukoomah - 1972. (The YAR Constittition - section - The Government). 
35. Interviews with C.S.O. officers in 1991 & 1991 - Farooq Ali, 
Bamasood and others, on regional offices for sectors in the ROY. 
36. Table 2.6 Investment by ownership and sector - YAR 1974-1986 "Civil 
Society in Yemen" by Carapico, S. - Cambridge Middle East Studies, p 47. 
37. Ibid. Also refer to the Financial Statement of the Budget of 1980. 
38. Dustoor Jumhoreyyah Al-Yaman Al-Dimoqrateyyah Al-Sha'a biyyah • 
1972. (The PDRY Constihition, 1972). 
40. Rubayye'a - 1969-1978, Ali Nasser - as a Premier from (1972 to 1985). 
The researcher's memos. Also "Civil Society in Yemen", by S. Caparico, p 
37. 
41 Annual Reports of the Higher Planning Committee "Allajnah Al-U'lya lil-Takhtit" 
1976, 1977. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
44. O'Ballance, E. "The War in the Yemen" Op Cit p 66-67. 
45. Dr A. Al-Ghafari: "The Yemen Unity: Reality and Futtire" - (Al-Wahda 
Al-Yamenenia: Al-Waqe'a wal-Mustaqbal) - Sanaa 1997, p 96. 
46. Ibid p 97. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
98 
50. F Halliday; "Revolution and Foreign Policy" - The Case of South 
Yemen 1967-1987. p 114. Cambridge Middle East Library: 21. 
51. Kostiner, J. - "South Yemen's Revolution Strategy, 1970-1985" p 67. Westview 
Press, Jerusalem. 
52. Wysiwyg.7/right.s/http://www.al-bad.com/unity/saif3.htm An MA 
dissertation on Yemeni Unification, 1990 by A.A.K. Saif - University of 
Exeter - September, 1997. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Halliday,F.-Op.Citp 110. 
57. Ibid, p 123. 
58. Dr A.A. Al-Ghafari - Op. Cit p 117. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Interviews with some Presidential figures in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 
1997, such as Ali Al-Maghrabi, Al-Kulabi, Al-Rai'ai and Al-Maqdami. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Mane 'a, I. - Op. Cit. p 177-180. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid, p 181. 
67. Ibid, p 182. 
99 
68. The researcher's observation through her political experience at the 
Presidential Office. (1991-1998). 
69. Dustoor Al-Jumhooriyah Al-Arabiyyah Al-Yamaneyah - The YAR Constitution Item 
37. "All forms of parties are bannedl". 
70. IlhamMane'a Op. Citp 198. 
71. Ibid. 
72. The insurgencies carried out in the north by the opposition parties were 
sporadic and not fully sustained in strategic areas. 
73. Interviews with the P.S.O. men who did not want their names to be disclosed. 
(Hamza Al-Kibsi and Sadr-Uddin Al-Qashshar) in 1992. 
74. Kitab AI-Yaman al-Wahed - Sanaa - Ministry of Culture p 175-291. 
75. 26th September Newspaper: bibliography of Q. Al-Shaiabi. Also, F. 
HallidayOp. Cit. p 12. 
76. Shaker Al-Johari: "Al-Sira'a fi Adan" - The Struggle in Aden - Cairo 
1992. p 143. Als IlhamMane'a. Op. Cit. p 98. 
77. Discussion of the researcher with Presidential Officials (Mr A. Al-Faqih and 
Mr A.M. Al-Halali) Sanaa, April 1998. 
78. Halliday,F.- Op. Citp 11-12 
79. The vmter's memorial agenda - she was a member of the NLF. 
80. IlhamMane'a: Op. Cit. p 162-163. 
81. Ibid, p 164-165. 
82. Dr A. Al-Ghafari: Op. Cit. p 158. 
83. Al-Wasat magazine: Issue (183) of 31.7.1995, p 30, 
84. The researcher's memorial agenda. The researcher was a closed technocrat 
to the President in meetings of the agricultural sector and of the Higher 
Planning Committee in the said period. 
100 
85. Ibid. 
86. To counter his rival policy-maker whom the USSR backed, Rubayye'a was forced to 
be in strong allegiance with China for power balance in the country. 
87. The researcher together with other southern observers in the elite had to 
accommodate some of these - the NDF figures in sectorial ministries. Mr A l -
Masoodi, who was employed in the Planning of Stats, dept, in agriculture when the 
researcher was his director in 1976/7, became the Chairman of the C.S.O. with 
political assignment in Aden in 1986/9. 
President Rubayye'a was also the Chairman of some sectorial committees, 
particularly of infra-structural nature such as the "Higher Agricultural Committee for 
Agriculture" and one for "Education" and through committees, he gave 'directives' 
through planning Ministry - to expand investments in regions and rural areas. The 
researcher was Deputy, and therefore had direct experience of this. 
89. President Rubayye'a initiated a building contracting body called 'Al-Mashary' with 
purely southerners' employees, to take over many projects in agriculture. He also 
had a local public transport company called 'Al-Dabaq' in Aden, to compete with 
local taxi drivers whom many were northerner Shafais and some were involved in 
security of 'Muhsen Shargabi'. This had some impact and drove northern Shafais 
laymen to go back to the north. 
90. Dr A. Al-Ghafari: Op Cit p 132. 
91. Op. Cit. (87) 
92. Kostimer, J. - "South Yemen's Revolutionary Strategy, 1970-
1985". Westview Press, Jerusalem, p 24-25. 
93. Dr A. Al-Ghafari: Op. Cit. p 159. 
94. These were some of the key figures in the two parties amalgamated with the PONF. 
95. Aden-bom figures who were of northern origin and educated in UK such as Judge 
Naheels Shamiry and Dr A. A, Wali, were, indeed, rational elite in the southern 
leadership. 
96. Mr Anis H Yahya and A Ba-deeb - Chairmen of the two parties that joined the PONF 
- were Aden bom and could gather their elite mainly from the capital Aden. 
97. "Mu'atamar Al-Tandhim Al-Siyyasi Al-Muwahhad - A l Jabaha Al-Kawmiyyah" 
(theUPONF Conference) 11-13 October, 1975. 
98. Kostiner, J: Op. Cit. 
101 
99. The researcher faced these problems in her functions as deputy Minister in 
Agriculture. (1982-1988). 
100. Many projects faced slow progress because of not getting policy clearance for them 
from the polit-bureau or CC in the seventies. 
101. Dr a. Al-Ghafari: Op. Cit. p 159. 
102. Kostiner, J. Op. Cit. p 22-25 
103. Halliday, F. - Op. Cit. p 23 and 102. 
104. Ibid. 
105. A meeting with Mr A l i Moh'd Saleh Dhalai - a cousin of Saif Al-Dhalai - Foreign 
Minister ofPDRY. 
106. Halliday, F - Op. Cit. p 24. 
107. Contacts between Al-Hamdi and Rubayye'a were made by the southern foreign 
minister - M.S. Mutee'a from abroad. 
108. Several interviews were made by researcher with Mr N Yassin - a legal figure who 
was a closed associate to President Rubayye'a. 
109. There were over half a million of southerners residing in the KSA as nationals/ 
emigrants according to 1973 census estimates of PDRY. 
110. Ismail expressed his dissatisfaction to Rubayye'a policies in seeking ties with 
'revisionists' forces to the researcher who was his children's' teacher in 1976. 
111. The researcher had several talks with President Rubayye'a and Mutee'a the Foreign 
Minister, both showed concern on not having strong ties with Arab and Islamic 
nations. 
112. His conflicts with Rubayye'a up to 1978, then with the north in the 1979 war, then 
with southern leadership in 1980. 
113. Ibid. 
114. Halliday, F. Op Cit. p 98-139. 
115. Diplomat source in South Yemen, Mr S. Al-Go'ari - ex YSP member. 
102 
116. Ibid. 
117. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. 
118. Aden Gazette: issue October, 1978. 
119. Kostiner, J. Op. Cit. p 22-25. 
120. The Researcher talks with her closed comrades A l i Anter, Ministry of Defence 
(1975-76) and A l i Shaye'a, Minister of Interior (1978-1980) in many occasions. 
121. The southerners were against centralisation of power in one figure, but failed to 
convince the Soviets in this respect. Source: Mohammed S Nasser, ex-Minister of 
Agriculture. 
122. The researcher was Deputy Director-General in 1979-80 and had experienced this is 
the agricultural sector. 
123. Ibid. 
124. In order to have harmonious relationships with the north, southern military forces 
integrated northern military factions in the force, but at lower hierarchies. Colonel A. 
Wahed A. Hafedh had a battalion of 2,000 force but he was not in the military 
decision making structure. 
125. Ibid. 
126. A bibliography on Ismail on a TV programme on 20th January 1986, on Aden media. 
127. The researcher was a close friend to Ismail family and a part-time teacher to his elder 
son and daughter. She knew his schedule from several meetings with him. 
128. Ibid. 
129. Informed sources at the Presidential office who were too close to the President. 
130. Kostiner, J. Op. Cit. p 83-85. 
131. Ibid. p71 . 
132. The researcher talks with her colleague in the Ministry of Agriculture - Awadh 
Nasser (brother of ex-President A l i Nasser) in April 1980. 
103 
133. Ibid. 
134. He was holding the three top key-posts: the General Secretary of the YSP, President 
of the State and Premier. 
135. As their functions were stated in the state administration. 
136. Aden Gazette, April issue, 1980. 
137. Many of them from the military faction with headline ideological discipline. 
138. The administrative division for distticts - Local Administration Ministry, 1980 • 
PDRY. 
139. The major part of Hadhramout was under the Qu'aiti Sultanate which was ruled by 
Yafe'ai faction, and thus had Yafai army and tribes particularly on the coastal areas. 
140. Al-Sayilli was known of his attachment to socialistic views and firm principles in 
them. The researcher's in-laws were closely associated with Al-Seyilli's family as 
they fell within the same faction. 
141. Halliday,F. Op. Cit. p 45-46. 
142. In April 1980, the polit-bureau meeting discussed this subject which was put forward 
by Colonel A l i Anter - the research was informed by Comrade Al i Shaye'a - a polit-
bureau member. 
143. Ibid. 
144. The Redfan-Dhale'a faction was watching the other side of the northerners on Al i 
Nasser's side: A. Ghani A. Qader, Al-Dali, A.K. Shamsan and others who were also 
pushed by Muhsin & Ismail to take this role of splitting the southem block to a large 
extent. 
145. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. p 36. 
146. Ibid. p45. 
147. Ibid. The research had a close co-operation at Governmental level, with Al-Seyyilh 
and he told her that Mutee'a was illegally executed. However, it is important that 
both Mutee'a and Al-Seyyilli fall within one faction, namely, the Yafe'a faction. 
148. Mohamed A l i Ahmed - Governor of the third Govemorate - mentioned this to the 
researcher, who was a Deputy Minister in Ministry of Agriculture. The researcher 
104 
then, got it confirmed by Al-Beidh's wife (Sahna). The researcher's in-laws and Al -
Beidh's family are related. 
149. Halliday, F. - Op. Cit. p 46-47. 
150. He was giving projects contracts to Arab countries without referring to general state 
rules and sometimes i f technocrats gave different views on technical matters that did 
not go with his wish, he would move these technocrats to other posts. This happened 
with some southern technocrats, of whom the researcher was one. 
151. This was made when A l i Nasser took over the Presidency. He got rid of all Ismail 
close circle figures. Muhsin was appointed as an ambassador and Wali was sent to E. 
Germany to study. 
153. Dr A.A. Wali was the researcher friend and he went to E. Germany to receive the 
body of his brother. As a medical specialist - he knew the facts but did not want to 
release this news publicly. 
154. Aden TV, programmes on January 1986, following the 1986 war. A documentary 
film on A l i Nasser's evil activities while in leadership; Akadeeb Takshefreha 
Haqa'eq. 
155. The Minister of Agriculture was his cousin, the Govemor of Abyan was from his 
district. The Minisfries of Security, Justice, Industry and Oil were given to his 
supporters. 
156. Ushaish, M Saeed Abdulla, Rashed, A. Sallam, Al-Dali, A.G.A.Qader and others. 
157. The third conference report of the Party. 
158. The researcher was Deputy Minister in the MAAR and had several talks with the 
Govemor, who made it bluntly that he would change the Abyan Govemorate to look 
like Dubai. 
159. Post-war reports on the TV programme "Akadeeb Takshefiiha Haqa'eq". 
160. Aden Gazette of April 1985. 
161. The NLF Charter, 1965 - the researcher was a member also in the NLF, UPONF and 
the YSP until 1986. 
162. It was made and taken implicitly that the key posts in the Cabinet were polit-bureau 
members. The Premier was one of the key members in the polit-bureau. 
163. Abyan Govemorate came second in population after Hadhramout and beside other 
105 
factors, it had substantial presence in the military and security forces. 
164. Colonels Al i Anter, Al i Shaye'a Saleh Musleh and others were forming one group 
with Ismail and Al-Beidh against Al i Nasser. 
165. The researcher was defending Al i Nasser in her talks/discussions with his citizens, 
especially with Anter, Sheye'a and Seyilh but they would react that 'her' friend (i.e. 
Nasser) had many loopholes in his functions to render him in weak position; and that 
was very true. 
166. Five days before the massacre took place, the researcher, with many leading figures 
of the NLF went to Aden Cemetery to bury a female pioneer in politics and went to 
Sheye'a's house where she held an informal discussion on the political tension 
prevailing in the country. The latter gave a gloomy picture on the polit-bureau 
agenda which meant to take off power from Nasser. 
167. Kostimer, J. Op. Cit. p i 09. 
168. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. - Article 11 p 244. 
169. Mrs S. M . Amber, "Al-Taqreer Al-Sanawi lil-Qita'a Al-Zira'ai 1984" (The annual 
report of the Agricultural sector, 1984). 
170. The third Conference Report of the YSP - 1985. 
171. Party discussion in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Minister - M.S. Nasser, 
explained to party member (the researcher was, then, a member) that the Soviet 
headed to soft policies in South Yemen. 
172. Ibid. 
173. The tension reflected on the administrative set-ups publicly, and was felt by the 
layman, though was not publicly disclosed. 
174. The Premiership was taken from A l i Nasser by heavy criticism from his rivalries in 
retaliation to Mute'a's execution and on the basis of misuse of power. 
175. With two abstentions (Attas and Dali) there were seven members with voting power 
against A l i Nasser and his group who were 5 only in the polit-bureau sufficient to 
pass any decree against his power. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. p 42. 
176. Factions and supporters were deduced from the then current affairs in the party. 
177. The Minister of Agriculttare, M.S. Nasser - repeatedly commented so. Halliday, F. 
Op. Cit. p 42-45. 
106 
178. ME/8167/A/1-7, 27 January 1986. 
179. refer to note 166. 
180. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. p 42-44. 
181. Ibid. 
182. Aden TV programme on 27th January "Akadeeb Takshefliha Haqa'eq" (lies 
disclosed by facts). 
183. Ibid. 
184. Aden TV programme on 3rd Febmary 1986. A speech given by the General 
Secretary of the party - A l i Salem Al-Beidh. 
185. Ibid. 
186. Aden TV programme - Op. Cit. 
187. Ibid. Airforce Bakil Ghaleb and his colleague were killed by cutting off their facial 
parts (ears, noses, etc.) an eye witness reported on the TV programme. 
188. Ibid. Halliday, F. - Op. Cit. p42. 
189. Ibid. 
190. Ibid. Also, eyewitnesses from the military force explained to researchers by A. Bakr 
Hussain - Lieutenant in the force. 
191. Ibid. 
192. Ibid. 
193. Ibid. 
194. The researcher lived that period in Aden. 
195. The YSP Report in its extra-ordinary conference in June, 1987. Also, refer to 
ME/8371/A/13, 23 September '88. 
107 
196. The researcher had to walk over some death corpses to go back home two weeks 
after the start of the war. 
197. Military tt-ials continued on daily basis for at least one month and an ad hoc decision, 
they were executing people by I.D.s. 
198. Ibid. 
199. Ibid. 
200. While in ministerial power, the researcher was instructed to dispose 24 employees -
many of them from Dathina (Modin and Lowder) by the new northem minister (Dr 
A.A. Muqbel) but she refused. 
201. I was granted two months compulsory vacation as a result of being outspoken. 
202. The researcher's in-laws and Al-Beidh's family are relations. Also, A. Salem A l -
Beidh was the Planning Minister in 1974/75, when the researcher was serving as 
Director of the Agricultural Department in the Ministty. 
203. Close relations with Al-Beidh's family enabled the researcher to understand all 
versions of his life and surroundings. 
204. Ibid. 
205. His father's name was Saleh and his elderly sister is nicknamed with her father's 
name as "Salheyyah" - a traditional custom that the first daughter to be nicknamed by 
her father's name. Close acquaintance with the researcher as both families live in 
Hadhramout. 
206. Ibid. Also, several discussions between the researcher and Al-Beidh on formal and 
informal issues through their careers in South Yemen. 
207. Highly self-cenft-ed, Al-Beidh finds himself in such rural atmosphere. 
208. In-Iaw's talks and reported by Um-Fawzi Bin Humam. 
209. Assessments were made by A.S. Obad, Al-Bar, Salem Saleh and many others 
including the researcher. 
210. Ibid. 
211. Ibid. 
108 
212. Ibid (Al-Seyyilli was of tribal origin and always a land-liver, while Al-Beidh was 
Hashemite and would sound soft policy-maker among Hashemites and the 
conservatives as the Hadhramies but would also sound a hard-liner on the 
party/political circles. 
213. Ibid. 
214. The researcher experienced this contradictory gesture of Al-Beidh when she was in 
the Planning Ministry and also through her interactions with the party figures in the 
South (1973-1988). 
215. This was due to global changes in terms of the perestroika in particular. 
216. Al-Beidh has resided in Oman Sultanate since the 1994 civil war in which southern 
forces lost the battle for southern deunification. 
217. Aden Gazette, January, 1986 
218. The researcher knew Dr N'oman and family very well from neighbourhood. 
219. Muhsen was the key man for northern shafais, he was more important than Ismail for 
he was intellegently maneouvering northern shafais policies within the southern 
policies and protected their interests at all cost on southern soil, though this was 
enmity attitudes to southemers. 
220. Most agricultural housing blocks were transferred from southemers to northerners by 
the Premier's instructions. Dr N'oman, however, showed strong favourisn to the 
northem faction. 
221. Some of these northem ministers were newly graduates with no experience on 
sectorial leadership such as Mohammed Othman of frade and supply and Ahmed Al i 
Muqbel of agriculture. Bin Ghanem failed to cope with the new premiership and was 
asked to stay at home until was recmited as an ambassador to the UN after sometime. 
222. Public resources was drained mainly because of high expenditures to northerners and 
the new southern military elite accommodation. At the same time the public 
fmsfration was high due to the factional attitudes and behaviours of the northerners 
towards southem employees. 
223. Due to their inexperience in the southem british-based administrative mechanism, 
northemers were violating the administrative mles. 
224. The Premier didn't work under the british system either and failed to assess the 
damage his cabinet caused to some southem technocrats. Tribal/factional attitudes 
were ranning the southem state in that period. 
109 
225. The replacement policy was very high in the agriculture as 90% of this sector were of 
Al i Nasser faction and by 1987, the mojority of central staff were northems of 
northem origin. 
226. These sectors happened to be worst effected sectors suffering of factional problems 
between northerners, the leaders and southerners, employees. It indicates the weak 
character of the Premier. 
227. Within southem law, elites (Presidents to deputy ministers) should not be affected in 
their abscense, leave or death. The northemers irrisponsibly, took away, the disposed 
priveleges and had them tt-ansferred to their possessions. 
228. In view of the fact that public enterprises were large and multi for the benefit of the 
public in the PDRY, the newly recraited managers and directors on these public 
institutions caused serious frictions with the southem public. 
229. As matters ran loose in the society, the conflicts came again to the YSP leadership. It 
took southem/northem factional form. Only the Premier who was sided with the 
northemers. 
230. In general, northemers did not want to proceed with the unification process with the 
north for the reasons explained in this chapter. 
231. Colonels Saleh Al-Seyeilli and Saeed Saleh, both polit-bureau members and 
contemporary National Liberation Front leaders were objecting on the manner the 
unification process was carried out. 
232. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) - Report N 0 O I O 6 - Y A -
July 1988 p 8-9 Rome. RESTRICTED Dist. 
233. Ibid. 
234. Ibid, p 10-11. 
235. Ibid, p 3-7 
236. IF AD - Report No EB 84/22/R.44 - 27th July, 1984 p 2 - Disft-. RESTRICTED, 
Rome, 1984. 
237. IFAD - Op. Cit. 
238. Ibid, p 4. 
239. Ibid. P4-7. 
110 
240. IFAD - EB 80/10/R.38 - 4/8/1980 p 3. Rome, September 1980. 
241. Ibid. 
242. Ibid. 
243. Ibid. 
244. Ibid. 
245. Ibid. p4-5 
246. IFAD Report of 1980. Op. Cit. p4-5. 
247. Ibid, p 9, table 1-3, p 6. 
248. A l l facts in this and following paragraphs are from the IFAD report in 1980 of the 
special programming mission to Yemen. 
249. Halliday, F. Op. Cit. pp 22-23. 
250. IFAD report No EB/88/34/R.47/Rev./ on Proposed loan to the PDRY - Rome, 
September 1988 - page 1. 
251. IFAD Report EB/82/16/R.37 - July 192, Rome on a propsed loan to the PDRY • 
RESTRICTED distribution, p3. 
252. The following facts are in the IFAD reports on proposed loans to projects in the 
PDRY. They are resfricted reports in distribution. However, the researcher was a 
director of agricultur department in the Ministry of Planning (1973-1977) and then in 
several posts in the Planning and MAAR until she became Deputy Minister for 
MAAR in 1982-1988 in the PDRY. She therefore, was a key figure in the national 
development process in PDRY. 
I l l 
CHAPTER 3 
THE STEPS TOWARDS UNIFICATION TAKEN BY 
THE TWO YEMENI STATES 
3.1 The Issue of Unification of Yemen: 
The principle of unification between the Northem and Southem parts of 
Yemen formed part of the political strategies pursued by the regimes in each 
of the two former states, the YAR and the PDRY.' Despite this aspiration, the 
practical political and economic policies pursued by the two republics were 
very different. The North adopted a non-aligned international strategy with a 
liberal economic approach,^  while the South adopted a close relationship with 
socialist countries with a central planning economic approach.' 
The unification process, over the period 1969-1989, was affected by the 
character of the political developments within the two states: the consequences 
of these development undermined the momentum of the unification process. 
Local and foreign commentaries on Yemen, have interpreted the problems 
confronting unification in terms of the two regimes' differences in ideology, 
policies and legal structures. Although there is an element of tmth in this, it 
wi l l be contended here that the central issue of contention between the Yemeni 
states was the problem of the Northem Shafais, who constituted a majority of 
the Northem population but had very limited representation in the central 
authority structures of the North.This issue was never openly recognised as 
'the cause' behind all Southern/Northern problems but in fact it was cmcial for 
being a central problem behind the differences between the two yemeni states. 
The ideological differences were simply instmments used in the stmggle. 
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Ironically, the Northem Shafais, despite their minority presence in Southem 
regions, enjoyed substantial authoritative power in the South. The political 
organisation during the period 1969-1980 was chaired by Ismail, who was a 
Northem Shafai.' The Presidency of the State was also held by Ismail between 
1978 and 1980).* Al l Southem cabinets included Northem Shafais and Zaydi 
elements.' 
The Northem Shafai leadership in the South, both in the political organisation 
Of the PONF/YSP and in the Cabinet, sought with determination to strengthen 
the position of Shafais in the north. Their objective was to achieve full 
integration of Northem Shafais into the Northem central authorities or to 
create an independent third Yemeni republic based on the Shafais areas of the 
north.* For this reason, the political organisation chaired by Ismail, supported 
by substantial numbers of Northem Shafais, exacerbated tensions between the 
two states using 'scientific socialism' as an instmment to foster leftist 
movements and radical associations in the Northem region. Ismail seized all 
opportunities, especially by promoting left/socialist measures, to keep the two 
Northem and Southem leaderships apart, until a third Yemeni power could 
come into being. While the ultimate political aim may have been valid, the 
impact on the South was harmful. 
Below, the political developments related to the unification process will be 
followed through the period between 1969 and 1989. The interacfion between 
the central issue of the unification and the development stages in the history of 
the two states wil l be analysed. 
3.1.1. Factors affecting the Unification Issue over the period 1967 to 1972 
During the period 1967-1972, no steps were taken towards the Unification of 
the two Yemeni states for three different reasons. The first and most important 
reason was the ideological difference between the two former 
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Yemeni states. ' As mentioned above, the YAR had adopted a non-aligned 
political stance with a market-oriented economy, while the PDRY was fiilly 
committed to a socialistic ideology with a strong centrally planned economy. 
As time passed, the political stances of the two states parted further. 
The second reason for the absence of any unification moves between the two 
Yemeni states stemmed from the role of Egypt in the region.'" The YAR's 
repubhcan regime was backed by Egypt both politically and militarily. " 
Though Egypt was the first Arab nation to attempt to foster the Southem 
liberation movement, it had failed to achieve this. Due to various political 
developments in the region such as the defeat of June 1967, and the closure of 
the Suez Canal, the left faction in the M A N regrouped themselves and formed 
a counter-weight to the Egyptian-supported faction..'^ To counter the left's 
influence, Egypt had forced a merger between the NLF and the OLOS, 
essentially the Adeni bourgeoisie, into what became known as FLOSY on 13 
January 1966. FLOSY served to maintain Egyptian influence over the Yemeni 
region. " The NLF, however, broke away from the merger in December 1966 
and continued its stmggle against the British and the Sultans by self-reliance.''' 
The NLF ultimately defeated FLOSY and gained absolute power on all the 
protectorates and Aden Colony. " In power, the left faction within the NLF 
became stronger across all political spheres. This pushed the ideas of 
unification out of scope. " The NLF came to power with the scope of 
integration with the north in its tentative programme. 
The third reason for the absence of unifying moves, was the instability of local 
affairs. With the establishment of the republican regime in the YAR, loyalist 
riots, backed by tribes favouring the Imamate, produced a period of intemal 
instability. " Attacks were also directed against the regime owing to its 
Egyptian flavour. The KSA sponsored the Imam's loyaHsts, inside the country 
in order to counter the new regime and the presence of Egyptian forces. '* The 
climax of this instability was the Sanaa Siege, in December-Febmary 1968, for 
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70 days." Similarly, in the South there was instability. Two coups were carried 
through: on 30 March 1968, when the left wing was eliminated fi-om key 
military posts," and in June 1969, when the left wing eliminated the majority 
of the right wing faction fi-om the civil and military establishments. '^ The 
Southem leadership proclaimed more 'democratic' policies in its newly 
drafted constitution of 1970." This constituted a formal step widening the gap 
with the Northem leadership. The two states began hosting each other's hostile 
factions. The YAR incorporated key hostile figures, such as Abdulla Al-Asnaj, 
Mohammed Salem Basindowah and Husain Ashshal, in its formal 
administration and formal establishments. The PDRY hosted Northem 
opposition movements, such as Sultan Omer chairman of the National 
Democratic Front and many hostile figures to the YAR's administration. The 
accommodation of such 'guests' contributed to the build-up of mistmst 
between the two states, and this, in tum, prevented either side fi-om making 
any movement towards unification. 
3.2 The Commencement of the Unification Process 
The issue of unification became more apparent in both states from 1972 with 
meetings taking place and agreements being signed between the two Yemeni 
states. However, commensurate with this diplomatic advancement, there was 
also a development of political and military tension. 
However, while these agreements were being signed, the political elites were 
pursuing more parochial political aims. As the problem of the Northem 
Shafais was guiding the hidden agenda of Ismail and his facUon in the 
PONF/UPONF, neither side was fully dedicated to serious unificafion steps. 
There remained, moreover, the differences in policies, stmctures, laws and all 
formal establishments between the two states." 
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In this section, the moves relating to unification will be covered in 
chronological order. The unification measures involved several steps that 
started with the Cairo Agreement and on which all other later steps and 
agreements were founded. Ironically, throughout the political developments of 
the two states, unification steps would only come active after political and 
military tensions were difftised by southerners in the southem leadership and 
Zaydi northemers in the northem leadership, leaving the northem shafais in 
the southem leadership as enemies to the unification process. For this reason, 
the researcher was careful to illuminate more on political developments which 
took place between each unification step throughout the period 1972-1990. 
Several agreements were made between the two states to enhance the 
unification process despite the variations apparent in their political systems. In 
the proceeding section, these agreements shall be critically analysed with 
reference to the political developments which occurred between the two states. 
3.2.1 The Outbreak ofthe 1972 War 
Ironically, the move towards unification came about as a result of the 
conflictual relationship between the two Yemeni states." Political and military 
clashes between the two states often occurred due to the presence of figures 
settled in each state which were hostile to the other." 
Due to the escalation of political confrontation between the two Yemeni states, 
the 1972 war was waged along the Qaatabah-Dhale'a borders between 12 and 
14 September 1972." This was initiated by some FLOSY facfions residing in 
the YAR, led by Colonel Al-Ashshal, occupying some southem villages in 
Dhale'a area." The Southem troops, however, expelled them from the area." 
In early September 1972, the YAR sent a top-level delegation to some Arab 
countries complaining of Southem sponsorship of insurgency 
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in the North. The Northern Premier, Mohsen Al-Ainy , led a five member 
cabinet delegation to several Arab countries asking for their mediation to settle 
political differences with the PDRY. °^ The South, similarly, sent a delegation, 
to other Arab countries. This consisted o f one man: Mohammed Saleh 
Mutee'a a member o f the Central Committee, Secretary o f the Central 
Committee, and Secretary o f the foreign department o f the PONF secretariat.^' 
The Southern leadership in the PDRY believed that the response to the 
political and military incursions along their borders should be limited and 
short-term. However, Ismail's faction argued that the PDRY had to adopt a 
long-range strategy whereby Northern society had to be changed 
fundamentally a revolutionary one i f unity was to be considered." This was at 
the heart o f disputes between Northern and Southern factions in the 
PONF/UPONF and later YSP leadership." 
3.2.2 The Unification Steps 1972-1974 
The unification steps over the period 1972-1974 were dramatic in terms of 
serious involvement o f both leadership figures and important regional 
characters. The Cairo Agreement, and other subsequent agreements in this 
period, were relevant as they paved a recognised practical platform for 
unification between the two states. The impact o f the Cairo Agreement, the 
Tripoli Announcement, and other events o f relevance to the unification 
process are addressed in the following section, which together form an 
analysis o f this founding period o f Yemeni unification. 
3.2.2.1 The Cairo Agreement - 28th October 1972 
The Cairo Agreement established an ambitious unification programme 
comprising 15 items.'" The southern Premier, A h Nasser, left for Cairo when 
he was contacted by a number o f Arab countries to make an 
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agreement with the northern premier on uniting the two Yemeni parts together. 
The northern Premiers, Muhsen Al -Ainy was in Cairo and both Premiers 
launched the Cairo Agreement. It laid down the cornerstone for a unity 
between the two Yemeni states.^ * It envisaged the brotherhood of the two 
nations and their collective struggle against imperialism and Zionism. It 
stressed that Yemeni unity was the ultimate destiny o f the people in the two 
states, and that a unified Yemeni state would create a national economy built 
on strong integral grounds. The Cairo Agreement contained, among others, the 
fol lowing articles:'* 
Article 1: 
Unity shall be set up between the two states of the Yemen Arab Republic and 
the Peoples Democratic of Yemen in which shall be dissolved the statal 
personality of each one into one single state personality, and the formation of 
a single Yemeni State. 
Article 2: The new state shall have: 
(i) one flag and one motto; 
(ii) one capital; 
(Hi) one presidency 
(iv) one legislative executive and judicial system 
Article 3: 
(i) The governmental system of the new state shall be a 
democratic, national republican system ... 
The Cairo Agreement was launched in Cairo and signed by the two Premiers 
Mohsin Al -Ainy o f the North and A l i Nasser o f the South, on 28 October 
1972. The agreement was also signed by an Arab mediation committee in the 
Arab League." The Cairo Agreement envisaged 8 technical 
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sectorial committees to f u l l f i l unification preparation between the two states. 
From the content o f the Cairo Agreement, one can detect various loop-holes 
in it which made it unrealistic. First, it incorporated over-ambitious unification 
programmes within a limited period o f 12 months: 
Article 7: " A period o f not more than a year shall be defined for the 
completion o f tasks entrusted to these committees 
Secondly, the agreement did not recognise the character o f the problems 
between the two states, in terms o f variant policies, structures, laws, etc. 
Thirdly, it completely ignored the problem of hostile 'guests' in and did not 
attempt to find a feasible solution for this. Finally, the agreement was 
concluded betweenthe Presidents o f the two states as i f they held equal power. 
This, however, was not reaUstic: while the Northern President held ultimate 
power, the Southern President was second in command (at most) and ultimate 
power rested with the General Command of the PONF (later the polit-bureau 
o f the UPONF") over that period. 
3.2.2.2 The Tripoli Accord, November 1972 
In respect to Article 4 o f the Cairo Agreement which called the two Presidents 
to hold a summit meeting to examine unification measures"". President Judge 
A.R. Al-Eryani o f the North and President Salem Rubaye'a A l i o f the South 
met in Tripoli in the presence o f the Libyan President Mu'amer Al-Qaddafi on 
28 November, 1972."' 
The Tripoli Accord consisted o f 10 Articles, most o f which were based on the 
Cairo Agreement. "^  There were, however, three articles (1-3) which made the 
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earlier proposals more specific and one new article (9) Articles 1 -3 read: 
Article 1: The Arab people in Yemen will establish a single state called the 
Republic of Yemen. 
Article 2: The Yemeni flag will have 3 colours; red, white and black. 
Article 3: Sanaa is the capital. 
The accord recognised the absence of any participatory organisation in the 
Northern system, and sought to create a unified political structure for the state: 
Article 9: A political organisation is to be established gathering all population 
factions with national interest for national production and 
revolution against backwardness. Imam heritage, foreign 
colonisation and Zionism. 
The Arab League, in co-ordination with Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Iraq 
established a regional committee to safeguard the unification process and 
monitor its completion. This committee, which consisted mainly o f diplomatic 
personnel o f respective embassies in the two states, attended most o f the local 
committees' meetings. 
3.2.2.3 The Summit Meeting in Algeria on September, 1973 
The functional committees created to f u l f i l the measures of unification within 
a year did not accomplish their job and the period had to be extended. The 
two Presidents, Judge Al-Eryani and Rubaye'a, met in Algeria and extended 
the agreement to another year in the presence of Hawari Boumedienne.Both 
Presidents signed a meeting protocol, on 4 September 1973, which guaranteed 
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a 12 month extension o f the Cairo Agreement. 
3.2.3.4 The Hudaidah Meeting on November, 1973 
The two Presidents met in Hudaidah on 10-11 November 1973 to review the 
progress o f the joint committees on unification measures.'" They expressed 
their satisfaction on the progress reports made by the assigned committees. '° 
This meeting marked the first Presidential visit made by a Southern President 
to the North. ' ' 
The eight technical committees incorporated in Article 8 o f the Cairo 
Agreement compromised 4-5 members each from each side. " Having 
examined the figures involved in these committees (tribally-minded 
individuals on the Northern side versus the militant-minded left on the 
Southern side), were not well-suited to drafting objective unification measures 
couched in compromising language. The key FLOSY figure, Abdullah A l -
Asnaj, was on one on these committees o f the Northern side, whilst Sultan 
Naj i and other Northern Shafais were in committees on the Southern side. " 
The committees would not have worked without a healthy environment away 
devoid o f the tension among their members. 
3.3 The Unification Measures (1974-1977) 
The unification programme was slow and limited during the period 1974-77. 
It was affected by the internal development in each o f the Yemeni states. ^ 
Internal political changes in the North, and conflicting policies in the South 
between the state and the political organisation, limited the possibility for 
developing the unification programme. 
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In the North, there was rivalry for power between the President and the tribal 
sheikhs, who opposed any progressive measures towards popular participation, 
public associations or corrective movements'' In the South, there was rivalry 
for power between Northern Shafais in the Southern leadership, who opposed 
rapid unification measures with the Northern regime, and the Southern 
leadership, who did not want the country led into military confi-ontations with 
the North.'* 
The following subsection w i l l shed fiirther light on the political developments 
in the two Yemeni States which led to the limitation o f the unification 
measures over this period. 
3.3.1 The Political Reforms Period in the Y A R 
After his ascent to power. President Ibrahim Al-Hamdy managed to carry out 
grass root reforms in the North, despite facing strong opposition. " He had 
come to power on 13 June 1974 and was fi'om Bakeel tribe, the largest Zaydi 
confederation in the North." During his period in power, 13 June 1974 - 11 
October 1977, the country experienced significant reform programmes. These 
reforms included programmes to combat corruption, tribalism and the 
estabhshment o f the local development councils. " 'Corrective Committees' 
were established in every sector to remove tribal favouritism and financial 
corruption from the formal administration institutions. Many students, from 
all the national factions, were sent abroad for education and training. He 
removed corrupt military and security officers and provided equal 
opportunities for non-Zaydis factions. Had he been allowed to live longer, 
Al-Hamdy could have reduced the impact o f tribal values on Yemen's political 
and social life. 
As Al-Hamdy's reform programmes became more effective, opposition from 
the Yemeni tribal community became stronger, and the threat to his 
122 
l ife increased. The Hashed tribe and other interest groups did not want "the 
reforming leader and his changes" to continue." The improvement of 
education, for instance, was seen as threatening to bring tribalism to an end. 
Public political awareness would intensify and thus threaten the material and 
spiritual interests o f the sheikhs. Another threat was Al-Hamdy's 
reconciliation with the opposition, bringing together all the Northern political 
groupings and the N D F . " This gesture included giving the latter ministerial 
posts in his cabinet. His opposition to traditional tribal values endangered the 
tribal way o f life and forced the public to cut their tribal ties. This led the 
traditional tribal figures, led by the Hashed tribe, to plot the assassination o f 
President Al-Hamdy and his brother. He was invited for a lunch in Sanaa, a 
day before leaving for Aden to attend the national day o f the South, (the 
anniversary o f the 14 October Revolution) and was assassinated.*^ 
Observers close to the Southern President have told the researcher that, at the 
14th October Festival o f 1977, the Presidents would have announced the 
unification o f the two Yemeni states. Referred observers said that the 
Presidents had secretly come to the agreement that Aden and Sanaa would 
alternate as capitals o f the unified federal Yemen, each for a 5-year period. 
The leadership o f the country would also alternate between a Southern and 
Northern president for each o f these periods. In other words, when the 
Presidency was held by the Southern president, the capital would be Sanaa and 
vice versa. Federal unity would strengthen sectoral unification for the benefit 
o f the two parts o f Yemen. 
3.3.2 Political Differences in the South 
As explained in the introduction o f this chapter, the key issue in Southern 
leadership disputes related to the absence of a political position for the 
Northern Shafais in the central Northern power authority. The Northern 
Shafais in the Southern leadership wanted either to cause the downfall o f the 
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Northern tribal regime and replace it by a socialist entities, or to build up a 
third Yemeni state out o f the Shafai regions in the North. 
Ismail sought to pursue his objectives by using the PDRY state as an 
instrument. This, however, ran counter to the interests o f Southerners. The 
President o f the State, Salem Rubayye'a, and his many Southern supporters 
were trying to pursue unification policies in harmony with the Y A R . " 
Although this issue was acknowledged by everyone working in the central 
authorities in the PDRY, it was never raised publicly or in the media. Ismail 
and his faction adopted radical measures primarily so as to cripple the 
unification process. 
Below is an account o f policies developments between Northerners and 
Southerners in the PDRY political leadership during this period. This wi l l 
display the impact o f these developments on the unification process. 
3.3.2.1 The Competition for Political Power within P D R Y Leadership 
There was a severe competition for national political power at all levels 
between the PONF's Secretary-General (Ismail) and the State President 
(Rubayye'a). " The latter was a pragmatic statesman, taking seriously his 
national responsibihties: visiting projects in all regions, talking to peasants 
about their needs, advocating mild policies, etc." The Secretary-General of the 
PONF hardly moved out o f his office or residence in Aden. He absorbed 
himself in meetings with foreign experts, or with his faction in the office, to 
promote the Northern Shafais' struggle in the Y A R by deepening left views in 
the arena and insurgencies in the Northern Shafais areas in the North. " 
Rubayye'a gained wide support among the public in all Southern regions 
while Ismail's support was confined to his Northern Shafais faction who 
constituted a minority in the South - although concentrated in the 
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vicinity o f Aden. The only significant Southern element which sided with 
Ismail was the militay faction originally based on the Redfan and Dale'a 
region. There were two reasons for this. First, there was a geographical 
sensitivity factor as this area was bordering the North (adjacent to Qaatabah in 
the Y A R ) . There were many tribal/military frictions between the two states 
across this border back in history. Secondly, there were personal problems 
between the leading figures o f this area and the President Rubayye'a. A l i 
Anter, the Minister o f Defence, was in disagreement with the President over 
many Soviet deliveries in the military sector without the latter's consent and 
was sent to the Soviet Union for 4 years to study at the Military Academy' . 
When he came back, the minister was hardly in good terms with the President. 
A l i Shaye'a, the director o f the political department in the Ministry o f Defence 
was from the same region and had also suffered f rom what he regarded as a 
discriminatory treatment by the President." There were many cases which 
seemed to show that the President did not favour the Redfan and Dale'a 
figures in the leadership because o f their political/radical stance against the 
national interest. 
Ismail pursued two strategies to gain more supporters, for his leftist 
programmes, inside the PONF. The first strategy was to form a coalition 
between two other local parties and the PONF. These two parties were: the 
Peoples' Vanguard Party (PVP), which was a Ba'ath party (Syrians faction), 
and the Peoples' Democratic Union (PDU), which was a Marxist-based party." 
After some hesitation the Southern leadership in the PONF - particularly the 
military personnel - the latter agreed to the coalition based on a 2: 1: 1 ratio in 
voting. Ismail's aim was to stregthen the role o f Northern Shafais in the 
political leadership. Both parties had many Northern Shafai elements in their 
In his Absence, the President, acting as General Secretary Assistant for the PONF, took 
in-charge of pohtical supervision of the military forces. 
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leadership and the two Secretary-Generals (although they were Adenis of 
southern origin ) supported Ismail's programmes and provided him with 
strong moral support in the UPONF when it was formed in October 1975." 
Ismail's second strategy was the completion o f his programme termed as " the 
functions o f the National Democratic Stage" by which he would enhance 
more radical measures for the NDF in the north and left policies in the south. 
This programme was incorporated in the new UPONF programme which reads 
as fo l lows :" 
Article 1: The UPONF constitutes the political vanguard for the PDRY and 
includes progressive labourers, peasants, revolutionary cadres, 
soldiers and small bourgeoisie. 
Article 2: The UPONF is guided by 'Scientific Socialism'. With it alone, the 
UPONF finds the translation to social progress. The UPONF 
rejects all forms of contra-theories to Scientific Socialism. 
The content o f Ismail's programme was very radical and fu l l o f revolutionary 
expressions which contradicted Rubayye'a's mi ld policies internally and 
externally. The milder the policies adopted by Rubayye'a, the harder the 
poHcy measures taken by Ismail and his faction. 
3.3.2.2 The Impact of the Political Programme of the U P O N F on the Unification 
Process 
Despite the recognition o f the political programme of the UPONF by all CC 
members, the Secretary-General (Ismail) and the President o f the State 
(Rubayye'a) adopted divergent policies and towards the unification process in 
particular. In the mid-1970s, President Rubayye'a adopted moderate foreign 
policies, extending ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
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l imit ing support for guerrilla struggles Oman only (excluding the United Arab 
Emirates and others) and strengthening ties with the reforming Northern 
President, Al-Hamdy. Such moderate policies were not appreciated by Ismail 
and his Northern faction." To the contrary, the Secretary-General of the 
UPONF continued to rely on revolutionary measures to eliminate revesionists 
and feudalists in neighbouring countries. He called for the promotion of the 
PDRY's social principles regionally and internationally with the so called 
Hizb M i n Taraz Jachid. Ismail used these radical policies to gain both time 
and effective support for his Northern Shafai power base. 
Ismail was never enthusiastic about progressing the unification process." 
While President Rubayye'a was fu l ly dedicated to unity wi th the North, Ismail 
was implementing measures to cripple the project. Rubayye'a managed to 
build a bridge o f trust between himself and President Al-Hamdy in the North. 
'° There were no open meetings between the two Presidents for over three 
years, but secret contacts were f l i l ly maintained through the Southern Minister 
o f Foreign Affairs.*' Ismail meanwhile enhanced the integration o f the left 
movements in the Y A R through promoting one strong movement: the National 
Democratic Front (NDF). " The two Presidents, nonetheless, blessed this 
integration o f 5 left movements in the Y A R and hoped that the NDF would 
pursue a democratic approach in its work. 
3.3.3 The Qaatabah Meeting ( February 1977) 
Despite the political conflicts between the two states, a top-level effective 
meeting may be held in Qaatabah, between President Ibrahim Al-Hamdy of 
the North and President Salem Rubayea A l i o f the South, on 15 February 
2977 83 jYiis meeting mat be regarded as the most effective meeting held so 
far between the two states. There were three reasons for this. 
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First, the two Presidents were genuine in their concern for unification. Second 
the meeting took an important practical step toward unification: the 
establishment o f a higher council (HCY) for unification. ^ Third, the meeting 
brought together leading figures in each sector o f state activity: foreign affairs, 
interior, defence, planning, economy and trade. *' This meeting was the first 
meeting since November, 1973 and without previously secret contacts between 
the two President, it would not have been achieved at such level and with such 
supportive degree to the unification process. 
It is worth noting that the ministers o f the basic sectors who joined the meeting 
were 5 Southerners and 1 Northerner on the Southern side, and all Northerners 
on the Northern side. 
A memo o f understanding was signed at this meeting which stated: 
"The two Presidents and their companions discussed in this 
meeting, major issues in the unification process. The most 
important of these concerned economic and commercial matters 
and the co-ordination in industrial and agricultural development 
which serves the high Yemeni interest. The two sides agreed the 
establishment of the Higher Yemen Council. 
3.3.4 Al-Hamdy's Death 
After the Qaatabah Meeting, there were positive aspects to the relationship 
between the two states while internally within each state there were conflicts 
and opposition, leading in North Yemen to the assassination o f Al-Hamdy on 
11 October 1977.*' The two Presidents had worked together closely in 
fostering co-operative understanding. For example, A l -
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Hamdy helped to establish links between the PDRY and Saudi Arabia. There 
was initially no substantive development in the movement towards 
unification,*' but with the realisation on the strong opposition they had in their 
respective regimes, the two leaders decided to announce a federal unification 
between the two Yemeni states. This was to take place in October 1977, but it 
did not happen due to Al-Hamdy's death. Southern confidants o f President 
Rubayye'a, hinted that opposition in the North had learnt that unification was 
to take place on the occasion o f the October Festival in Aden, and this caused 
Al-Hamdy's assassination one day before his departure from Sanaa for Aden. 
As explained in Chapter 2, the unity proposed was to be o f a federal character, 
where each President would assume Presidency for five years ahematively, 
wi th the capital located in the other state, i.e. Rubayye'a in Sanaa and A l -
Hamdy in Aden. Sectoral unification, between the two states, would move 
forward slowly and administration decentralisaion would be a major feature o f 
the new unified state. 
3.3.5 The Funeral of Al-Hamdy 
The Southern President was determined to pay his respects to the assassinated 
Northern President, but his arrival to Sanaa was not welcomed by the Northern 
leadership." Salem Rubaye'a A l i accompanied by 150 soldiers and attended 
the funeral o f his counterpart." It was reported by an eyewitness that the 
Southern President swore on Al-Hamdy's grave, in the presence of many 
Northern leaders, that he would take revenge on his assassins." The 
forthcoming events proved that the Southern President kept his pledge and 
carried out a vendetta for his counterpart, though at a heavy cost." 
129 
3.4 Unification Measures - 1977 - 1978 
3.4.1 The Ascent of Al-Ghashmy 
A t a time of great political tension between the two Yemeni states, Ahmed A l -
Ghashmy - Commander-in-Chief o f the Armed Forces - assumed Presidential 
Office in the North. '" 
Many o f Al-Hamdy's supporters from the North sought refuge in the South." 
Among them was a Northern paratroop commander, Colonel Abdullah Abdul 
Al -Alem who in January/February 1978 led some o f his troops across the 
border." Many Northern graduates fled to Aden after Al-Hamdy's death and 
were accommodated as nationals in the South." Despite the meagre resources, 
the Southern leadership provided help to these Northern factions at the 
expense o f the Southerners. 
3.4.2 Al-Ghashmi's Assassination 
This drif t o f Northerners, from all fields, to the South accelerated political 
tensions between the two states. This led up to the death o f Al-Ghashmi by a 
Southern bomb-suicider. The escape o f Colonel AbduUa Al-Alem and his 
troops to the South was o f substantial concern to the North. " To smooth 
bilateral relationships between the two states. Southern President-Salem 
Rubayea A l i expressed his willingness to mediate between the Northern 
regime and the forces which had escaped to the South. " Rubayye'a's target, 
however, was to take revenge for the assassination o f his close Northern 
counterpart, Al-Hamdy. Al-Ghashmi believed that Rubayye'a's offer was 
genuine and that it was stimulated by Rubayye'a wanting to weaken Ismail's 
power position by removing elements who supported him. It was arranged that 
a private message was to go to Al-Ghashmi from the Southern President. Haj 
Saleh Tafaresh, a special envoy o f the Southern President, 
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arrived in Sanaa on 24th June 1978, to deliver the message. Once he opened 
his briefcase in front o f the Northern President, a bomb exploded, kil l ing the 
envoy and the Northern President. 
3.4.3 The Execution of Salem Rubaye'a Ali 
The bomb incident had an international impact, particularly in the Middle East. 
The Northern leadership announced, through their media, an open war with the 
S o u t h . T h e Y A R demanded that the Southern leadership pay a price for its 
crime. The Southern leadership was put in an embarrassing situation and all 
Central Committee members were called together to consider the matter. On 
24 June, the Central Committee held a meeting at night and decided to execute 
the President to avoid war between the two states.'"^ This decision had been 
approved by the Soviet Union and by Ismail (Secretary-General of the 
UPONF) before the meeting started.'"' The President and a few of his close 
associates did not attend the meeting. On 25-26 June 1978, Soviet pilots 
shelled the Presidential residence heavily.'"" On 27 June, the media announced 
that Salem Rubaye'a A l i - the "left opportunist" - was sentenced to death for 
his crime against the Northern President.'"^ 
3.5 The Ascent of Ismail to Political and State Leadership in the P D R Y (1978 
-1980) 
I t is important to note that many o f the political development addressed in 
Chapter 2 are referred to in this section in order to illuminate the necessity o f 
the unification steps in this period. Chapter 2 material is also important in 
terms o f understanding the interaction o f political developments with 
unification steps taken during this period. 
Following the execution o f President Rubayye'a in the South, the country 
adopted a new administrative structure, whereby the two major 
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administrative powers rested in one person. Ismail became the new President 
o f the South, while at the same time retaining his former post as Secretary-
General o f the UPONF."" This was intended to eliminate power conflicts 
between the UPONF and the State leadership. 
Ismail's taking over o f both positions perturbed the Y A R leadership."" Ismail 
was seen as a leading figure by the Northern Shafias, and the Zaydi regime 
was strongly averse to him wielding absolute power in the South. At a time 
when the Northern regime had just come out o f turmoil (the assassination o f 
Al-Ghaashmi, a failed Nasserite Coup and the new established presidency 
under A l i Abdallah Saleh) moreover, Ismail came up with a political new 
project - the formation o f the Yemen Socialist Party (Al-Hizb Al-Ishteraki Al-
Yamani).'"' 
The establishment o f the YSP had a negative impact on the unification 
process. It called on all the Yemeni proletariat, working class and 
farmers/peasants, to jo in the party to be. as one against all forms o f 
backwardness, exploitation and humihation. In other words, the YSP was to be 
the spark for revolutionary change against the "Zaydi" tribal regime in the 
North."" 
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2.3.2 (p. 64), Ismail had hoped, in view of the 
pohtical power in his hand, to dominate the military and security forces o f the 
South but found this very difficult."° The Southern military forces, however, 
uhimately reached a compromise with Ismail. The Ministry o f Defence 
established two Northern units o f around 1200 force each in Abyan and 
Hadhramout. These were independent military forces, but were under the 
Southern military command, and they were not to adopt military actions 
without permission from central military administration. Colonel Qaid Abdul-
Hafidh, a Northern Shafai, was in charge o f the units. 
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Below we shall explain the impact of Ismail's policies on the unification 
process. 
3.5.1 The Impact of Ismail's policies on the Unification Process 
During his time in power, Ismail brought the Soviet Union very close to 
PDRY."^ He needed their support i f he was to have an effective revolutionary 
impact in Northern regions. Arms shipment grew."^ Top Soviet military 
personnel visited the PDRY and a military agreement for 15 years was 
concluded. Furthermore, Ismail invited the Soviets to use naval bases and 
airfields for monitoring, storage and communications, in return for provision 
of tanks, MiG planes and other equipment.' 115 
Ismail supported revolutionary elements in the North, especially the NDF, so 
as to mobilise the Shafai part of the YAR's population. 
In 1978, a war was waged between the two states.'" The war broke out as a 
result of military frictions in the Beidha-Mukairas border region but extended 
later to all Yemeni border areas. YAR army units had captured two Southern 
villages in July 1978, and in 1979"^ Ismail countered this attack by sending 
regular PDRY forces backed by NDF elements into the YAR. The Southern 
forces captured a few Northern villages but retreated upon Arab countries 
mediation.'" 
It is important to note that Ismail and the main Southern-bom PDRY leaders 
had different perspectives of this war. Ismail and his faction wanted the 
Southern troops to take over major part of the YAR. The main Southern bom 
leaders did not share this objective, they wanted only to hit the Northem 
troops hard as they had started this war. The Soviets too were not really 
interested in allowing the PDRY leadership to become entangled in a long 
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range war over a minor incident. 
3.5.2 The unification process during Ismail's Presidency 
The unification process did not make much progress during Ismail's 
presidency, due to the high tension between the two states. Ismail, was in 
principle, against all unification moves with the Northern Zaydi regime. 
Nonetheless, because of the 1979 war, he was compelled, by the regional 
community, to conclude a unification agreement with the YAR. The Northern 
regime, on the other hand, was also reluctant to enter into a unification move 
with the "communist regime" in the South, particularly in view of Ismail's 
character, ideology and objectives.'" 
Below is an account of the unification process following the 1979 war between 
the YAR and the PDRY. 
3.5.2.1 The Kuwait Agreement, March 1979 
The resumption of talks on the programme of unification occurred when Jaber 
Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait, invited the two Yemeni Presidents to 
attend a meeting in Kuwait. The two Presidents, Ali Abdullah Saleh of the 
North and Abdul-Fattah Ismail of the South, met in Kuwait on 4-6 March 
1979. They signed an agreement, the Kuwait Unification Accord, on SO"" 
March 1979. This agreement emphasised the legality of all previous 
agreements between the two Yemeni states and agreed that the unification 
programme incorporated in the Cairo Agreement should be carried out. 
1. The constitutional committee was to launch the constitution of the unified 
state within 4 months. 
2. The Presidents of the two states would approve the constitution 
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and call the two representatives' houses to approve this constitution in 
their respective countries. 
3. The two Presidents would form a ministerial committee to supervise the 
general poll on the constitution within six months from the creation of a 
unified legislative authority. 
4. The two Presidents would be combined by the Cairo Agreement and 
Tripoli Announcement in their contexts and rules. 
5. The two Presidents would be responsible for the supervision of the 
progress of the legislative authority and other committees. 
3.5.2.2 The Bi-Annual Meeting of the HCY, October 1979 
Following the last meeting in 1977, the next bi-annual meeting of the HCY 
between the two states was commenced on 4 October 1979. President Ai i 
Abdulla Saleh of the North and Premier Al i Nasser Mohammed of the South 
met in Sanaa, on 4 October 1979, to assess and review the unification 
programme carried out so far between the two "brotherly States of Yemen."'-' 
Abdul-Fattah Ismail, who was supposed to attend the meeting, failed to do so 
as he was reluctant to enhance any unification programme at that stage. 
In this meeting, however, the two sides agreed on only one basic principle, 
namely the non-interference of either side in the internal affairs of the other. 
This principle was vital for the YAR given that the Northern opposition had 
been actively supported by the PDRY. 
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3.6 The Ascent of Ali Nasser Mohamed and the Unification Measures, 1980-
1985 
By 1980, the management of the state had fallen on the Premier, Ali Nasser 
Mohamed.'^ * Many top tasks, such as the conclusion of bilateral agreements 
for development projects (which needed the President's signature/approval) 
had been left unattended until the Premier dealt with them.'" Meetings at 
bilateral and international levels were increasingly attended only by the 
Premier."" Most of the national ceremonies were also attended by the Premier 
or a lower official, while President Ismail would never be on the scene.'^ 'In 
general, most of the important state functions were paralysed.'" In Chapter 2, 
the removal of Ismail, the main enemy of the unification process, was 
discussed and analysed.'" It is in this political environment which we shall 
now chart the ascension of Al i Abdallah Salih. 
3.6.1 The Sana'a Meeting of June 1980''^  
A general agreement was signed between Ali Abdullah Saleh of the North and 
Ah Nasser Mohamed of the South on 13* June 1980 in Sanaa.'" While 
previous unification discussion had been concemed only with the broad 
programme of unification, the unification measures discussed in this meeting 
were practical and specific. Economic and political agreements were signed at 
sectoral levels by the respective ministers.'" Each state nominated a minister 
for unification affairs (Abdullah Homran in the North and Abdullah Al-
Khamri in the South).'^ ^ A migration agreement was signed, on 12* June 
1980, between the Interior Ministers of the two states, allowing citizen's 
mobility between the two parts of Yemen. 
Within the economic context, three agreements were made:"'° 
a. A joint tourism company was created between the two states, 
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under an agreement signed by the Ministers of Tourism on 12* June 1980. 
b. Joint companies were created for transport (land and sea), under an 
agreement signed by Transport Ministers on 12* June 1980. 
c. A project for natural resources in the Shabwah-Marib area was drafted by 
the Oil Ministers of the two states. The Janna Area Project had to be 
reviewed and approved by higher authorities and came into force in 1985. 
3.6.2 The Taiz Meeting September, 1981 
In continuation of the unification programme between the two Yemeni states, 
a meeting was held between President Al i Abdulla Saleh and President Ali 
Nasser Mohamed of the North and the South respectively, on 14-15 September 
1981, to review the unification measures accomplished so far. '^ ' The two 
Presidents signed the Document of the Higher Yemeni Council (HYC) to give 
the HYC legal status. The latter was implemented on 6* December 1984 when 
fully-staffed formal unification offices were established in the two states.'"-
3.6.3 The Taiz Meeting in May 1982 
In keeping with the biannual schedule, a second meeting was held between the 
two Presidents in May 1982. '"^  This meeting emphasised that each state would 
mind its own internal affairs, and that non-interference in the other's affairs 
should characterise the unification programme:''"' 
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Article 1: Non-interference to be made on others' affairs; and avoidance of 
struggles in the relationship of the two Yemen states. Problems to 
be solved peacefully. 
This meeting expressed the Northem leadership's anger because of the 
involvement of the Southern leadership in support given to the NDF which 
accelerated the insurgency in the Shafai areas against the regime over this 
period. 
3.6.4 Political Changes in each State and their Impact on Unification, 1982-
1985 
Since the last meeting in May 1982, the two Yemeni states had undergone a 
series of political developments, separately but significantly, among which the 
unification programme stood stagnant. The major political development in the 
North was the establishment of the General Peoples' Congress (GPC) in 
August 1981, which gave a popular boost to the Northern President and 
leadership. '"* The political boost was combined with an economic boost with 
developments in agricultural production, oil explorations and basic 
infi-astructures."" 
While economic and political developments were taking place positively in the 
North, political fiictions and complications were developing in the South 
causing serious party fi-agmentations."" The moderate line in the Southern 
leadership had influenced, positively, the country's profile internally and 
externally."" The private sector was encouraged to grow in production sectors. 
Extension of diplomatic ties, especially with neighbouring countries, was 
promoted; and more flexible policies were introduced at all levels by the new 
Southem leadership headed by Al i Nasser Mohamed. 
As a result of political frictions and differences in the 
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Southern leadership, Ali Nasser failed to push the unification programme 
further than the meeting in 1984 and 1985. In early 1986, he left office for 
good as a result of the January war.' 153 
3.6.5 Aden-Taiz Meeting of January 1985 
While economic and political changes were taking place, smoothly in the 
North and with problems in the South, the two Presidents called for a meeting 
of the two states to promote the unification programme. On 19* January 1985, 
President Al i Abdulla Saleh of the North arrived in Aden, where a meeting 
was held between him and Al i Nasser of the South in the presence of the HCY 
members.'" On 20* January 1985, the two Presidents travelled by land to Taiz 
to continue their meeting until 2r' January 1985.'^ * This meeting was meant to 
indicate the strong co-operation between the two Presidents on the unification 
programme, although one enjoyed a stronger platform in his internal national 
affairs than the other. President Al i Abdulla Saleh had all types of institutions 
under his hand, while Al i Nasser did not have the military under his control. 
The two Presidents reviewed all past unification agreements and passed 
necessary regulations. 
3.7 The Stagnation of the Unification Process 1986-1988 
There was, over this period, a complete deadlock in the unification programme 
due to the 'civil war' in the South between the leftist and rightist party factions 
in January 1986.'" Until April 1988, the unification programme between the 
two states was essentially moribund. 
3.7.1 The War of 1986 
The Civil War of 13 January 1986, was the worst civil war in the PDRY's 
history, with a severe impact on the unification programme and 
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bilateral relations with the North."' As indicated earlier in Chapter 2, over 
12,000 of military people were killed and several thousands injured, in 
addition to material losses incurred in buildings, weaponry, and other 
equipment. 159 
Among the reasons for the high tension between the hard-line left and the 
moderate policy makers that led to the war, was the unification issue. Abdul-
Fattah Ismail - who came back to power in the third conference with Southem 
leftists (October, 1985) - Al-Beidh, Al i Anter, Saleh Mosleh, Al-Seyeili and 
others; did not approve of the high speed of the unification process. 
Principally, they were for unification, but they did not see it as a feasible 
option while the Northem regime was tribally-based. They were looking for a 
revolutionary regime in the North, through which the unification between the 
two states would be meaningful, based on similar political platforms. This 
would mean waiting a long time until such a political base was developed in 
the North. 
3.8 Unification Measures 1988-1990 
3.8.1 The Revival of the Unification Programme 
As a substantial portion of the faction of the ex-Southem President faction left 
the country to the North in 1986 with Al i Nasser himself, the unification 
programme remained stagnant until 1988.'*' Although Ali Nasser's faction had 
no official authority in the North, their presence did not encourage an 
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atmosphere of trust during talks discussing unification. Furthermore, with the 
death of 27 top leftist-leaders of the party, it was not easy for the leftist 
successors to overcome the impact of the 1988 war. 
The revival of the unification programme, in effect, came about as a result of 
some negative political and economic developments in the two Yemeni states 
as shall be explained below. 
3.8.2 Political and Economic Developments (1986-1988) 
A number of pohtical developments during the period 1986-1988 contributed 
to the revival of the unification programme in 1988 in both states. In the south, 
Perestroika in the former Soviet Union had an impact on PDRY policies. The 
new leadership of the YSP wanted to pursue the same leftist policies in both 
the state and the party as had been established under an extreme leftist power 
centre.'" However, the Soviet advisers advised them to encourage the gradual 
transformation of the centrally-planned economy into a market-oriented one.'" 
They also advised the PDRY leadership to establish strong diplomatic ties 
with neighbouring countries, and with the YAR in particular. Such 
recommendations were difficult for the northern factions within the YSP to 
accept. Their presence in the state administration during this period was more 
substantial than ever,'" much to the annoyance of the power-centre of southern 
origin. These southern elites therefore forced the revival of the unification 
programme in order to ensure that the northern factions did not obtain 
unrivalled power.'" 
On the other hand, the YAR was very much involved politically in both the 
Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) and the Iraq-Iran war.'^' Internal sources 
revealed that Northern leadership had much opposition fi"om fiindamentalists 
against sending troops to Iraq to fight against the Iranians. This proved to be 
true when the war was over in 1988, but the real problem to Ah 
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Abdulla Saleh, during this period was the substantial presence of Northem 
Shafais in the Southem leadership in the party and the state administration. His 
overriding fear was that they would build up a strong Northem Shafai army in 
the PDRY with the aim of attacking the YAR. To prevent this goal fi"om being 
achieved, he had to revive the unification programme at any cost. 
Economically speaking, the Southem economy started to lose some ground 
after the 1986 war for many reasons. First, the restructure of the military and 
civilian institutions after the war of 1986 imposed a burden on the annual 
budgets of 1986, 1987 and 1988.'" Secondly, as most of current equipments of 
workshops, factories and others were from socialist countries, prices of spare 
parts (of pumps, bulldozers, fish factories, etc.) were extremely high. Thirdly, 
current political expenditures - particularly to the new leadership and the large 
Northem faction who came to the South after the war - were made of highly 
inflated budgets (7-8 new Northem ministers in the government, in addition to 
over 50 party elite members fi-om, the North residing in Aden)."' The northern 
faction was composed of groups opposed to the GPC and the administration of 
Al i Abdallah Salih. The budgetary burdens created by this influx of people 
(which numbered several thousand) contributed to the acute economic 
problems in the South. 
On the other hand, despite its oil production which began in 1986, the North 
also faced economic difficulties. With an open market economy, demand 
exceeded the supply of local production. A substantial portion of the North's 
agricultural production was marketed in neighbouring countries, the KSA in 
particular, and prices rose mainly because of the high proportion of imported 
goods."' The dollar rose slightly to 4.5 riyals and was artificially maintained at 
this level. 
3.8.3 The Taiz Meeting of April 1988 
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As the unification programme was the only feasible outlet for the political and 
economic problems of the two states, the two leaderships agreed to revive it on 
a mutual acceptable basis. This what was referred by Malek Mufti as a 
"defensive Unionism" whereby the two parties were eager to protect their 
power interest through such integrative mechanism. The first move was started 
by the southern leadership which sent the Minister for Unification Affairs, 
Rashed Thabet, to the North, to sign with his counterpart Hussein Al-Arashi, 
an agreement on the revival of the unification programme."" Accordingly, the 
two Interior Ministers signed an agreement allowing citizens of the two states 
to move between the North and the South with their personal identity cards 
only.'"The Oil Agreement between the two states, to cover cooperation in the 
common Jannah area (between Marib and Shabwa), was renewed. 
3.8.4 The Impact of the Revival of the Unification Process on the Public 
Opinion in the Two States. 1988-1990. 
As political and economic developments in the two states were not favourable 
to a high portion of the two leaderships, the unification programme was highly 
welcomed by the public in the two states.'" The Southern population, 
including the technocrats, had been disappointed by their immature Southern 
leadership. They were hurt and humiliated by the Northern leaders in the 
South, who never respected Southerners. The Northern Shafais and those 
Zaydis outside Hashed tribe, moreover, looked forward to the Southerners 
helping to set up a unified Yemeni political system, with a law and order 
mechanism similar to that in the South. The Northerners were fed up with the 
Hashidis and their tribal rule. Public opinion was, therefore, asking for a 
change through the unification programme. 
3.8.5 The Aden Meeting, November 1989 
As 30 November of each year marked the Independence Day 
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Anniversary in the PDRY, President Ali Abdulla Saleh made a significant 
move by arriving in Aden, at the head of a large group delegation fi-om the 
North, on 30* November 1989. He delivered a unification speech, asking the 
Southem leadership to expedite the unification programme at the earliest 
stage.'" 
Al i Salem Al-Beidh - the Secretary-General of the YSP since the 1986 war -
delivered the party speech where he indicated certain obstacles (in 
constitutional laws, financial and administrative systems, etc.) standing against 
the formalisation of the unification programme. It was obvious that the two 
leaders did not have a common language for the unification programme."' 
In due course of the programme of that day, the two Presidents had a closed 
session of six hours talks. They came out of the closed meeting approving the 
finalisation of the unification programme within six months only. 
3.8.6 The Practical Steps for the finalisation of the Unification Process 
As the two leaders agreed on the finalisation of the unification process within 
six months starting in November 1989, practical steps had started to take place 
between the two states. Sectoral committees were established to arrange for 
new financial, legal, monetary and administrative systems. Files of leadership 
at all levels were moved between Aden and Sanaa, arranging for their 
transfer."" 
Other regional powers (Iraq, UAE and Libya) helped in the accommodation of 
Southerners in Sanaa and blessed the unification process. 
On 22"'' May 1990 the two leaderships signed the Unification treaty in Aden 
and a new flag was put up on the former Southem Presidential site, marking 
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the first day of the newly established State, 'The Republic of Yemen'.'^' 
3.8.7 Assessment of the Unification Process by the Two Yemeni Constituent 
States 
It was obvious that the differing internal and foreign policies pursued by the 
two states had an adverse impact on the unification process. The unification 
principle had been genuinely adopted by the two sides since the eve of their 
independence. Ironically, however, each side pursued policies which prevented 
the unification process fi-om making progress due to the impact of these 
policies on the other state. In other words, each side wanted to impose its 
ideology on the other in the unification process. The northern leadership, 
within its setup did not want to proceed with the unification process i f this led 
to the spread of socialist power not only in the south but in the northern Shafai 
parts also. The southern leadership, with Ismail playing the leading role, did 
not want to proceed with the unification process i f this involved 100% Zaydi 
control on the northern side. These attitudes: fi-om each side, destructed the 
unification process in several intervals and culminated in two inter-states wars 
in the 1972 and 1979. 
Consequently, the mechanics of the unification process were complimented by 
covert objectives fi-om the beginning, and were not pursued seriously. The 
agreements of Cairo and other successive unification pacts were not 
manipulated logically and rationally in terms of policy variations, 
developmental processes, leadership compositions, the impact of law and 
order in the two states, the social variations between Sanaa and Aden, the role 
of women in the two societies and many other social norms and values. 
Two major factors influenced the hazardous path of Yemeni unification in the 
seventees and the eighties, namely the tribalism in the north and the radicalism 
of the southern policies. The north had had Zaydi rule since 
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centuries and continued to have this under the republican status of the YAR, 
thus preventing the Shafais fi-om participating in the power centre i.e. in the 
presidential authority. This problem had a great impact in the south as the 
policy-making body in the poUtical organisation of the south was primarily in 
northem Shafais' hands (Ismail and his faction). Under the influence of Ismail, 
the south adopted radical political policies which primarily targeted the north 
and its Zaydi power centre through the insurgencies of the northem Shafais 
supported by the south. The radical views of the political organisation in the 
south created fi-agmentation among the southem leadership that led to some 
alliances forming between the southerners and the Zaydis in both leaderships 
(Rubayye'a and Al-Hamdi, & Al i Nasser and Al i Saleh) against the other 
factions in the south. Political friction rose to the extent that the unification 
process was often subject to fireezing and defreezing modes. 
With Ismail's death in the 1986 civil war in the south, northem opposition 
parties continued to work, ineffectively, in the south. The unification at the 
end was finalised between the southemers and the Zaydis in the two 
leadership, leaving the northem Shafais outside presidential power in the 
north. 
Many Yemeni writers wrote about the unification process between the two 
Yemeni states without addressing the tribal/factional problem as an underlying 
cause behind all the pohtical instabilities between the two states. No doubt the 
precarious conditions would not allow any Yemeni to address it as such. 
However, the researcher, who had the privilege to work with both leaderships 
and had been informed by her contacts from the two sides, is hereby 
addressing the problem which need to be addressed for further forthcoming 
research and study. The researcher thinks that unless this problem is nationally 
addressed and recognised as the pivot for all Yemeni problems, political 
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stability will hardly be achieved and thus the prosperity of Yemen will 
continue be without reach. 
3.9 Conclusions 
It is clear that the work and platform for Yemeni unification was not sound. It 
resulted in an ad hoc unity which led to many complications both in the north 
and in the south. Eventually, the unity moved from a willingly entered 
unification, at least fi-om the southern side, into an imposed one, as shall be 
examined in the next chapters. 
The two former states did not attempt to undertake studies on the form and 
pattern of the unification between the two variant states' administrations 
during the pre-unity period. This resulted in severe political confi-ontations 
between the two parties and had a highly negative impact on both nations. 
The doctrinal/tribalism factor was, no doubt, the prime cause for the 
unification process dislocations in both its pre-unity period and later. The 
unification process in the pre-unity period ignored many parameters of which 
the political one by itself needed to be thoroughly studied before incorporating 
those agreements and accords. The preparation mechanism for the unification 
went into discreet maneuoverings which were not in favour of a healthy unity 
between the two Yemeni states. 
The socio-economic parameters were far different fi-om those of the 1972 
period, on which the unity of the two parties was based. The national 
institutions of the south were more sound than those of the north. The law and 
order machinery was more effective and highly respected in the south than in 
the north. The influence of tribal power was too strong in the north and 
outweighed the power of the state. The status of women was better in the south 
than in the north. None of these parameters were taken care of 
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in the Cairo Agreement and other successive accords. 
The regional authorities' roles, namely that of the Arab League and some other 
states in the region, were too weak in understanding the requirements of the 
unity process. The Arab League did not take account of the variations between 
the two systems in terms of the socio-political parameters, and therefore 
contributed to the ad hoc unity arrangement which was based on weak 
planning. The Arab League and other Arab states did not realise the 
tribalism/factionalism problems that plagued both Yemeni states. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Progress of the Integration of the State (1990-1994) 
This chapter wil l deal with the progress of the integration process between 
May 1990 and May 1994. It will show the achievements obtained by the two 
leaderships and the problems that they encountered in the integration process. 
It wi l l also deal with certain problematic issues which surrounded the 
integration process during this period and over which the two leaderships in 
the coalition intensified their disagreements resulting in a political crisis. 
There will be a sub-section on the military problems between the southem and 
northern forces in the integration process as well as a critical review on the 
civil war of 1994 at the end of the chapter. 
4.1 Basic Issues in the Unification Agreement to form the Republic of Yemen 
from the former Y A R and PDRY 
Several unification moves/meetings were undertaken during the period 1988-
1989 between the two former Yemeni states, as explained in the preceding 
chapter. 
The Aden summit meeting between President Colonel Al i Abdulla Saleh and 
Al i Salem Al-Beidh, President of the YAR and General Secretary of the YSP 
respectively, on 30th November 1989 was the most significant one for the 
establishment of the ROY.' In this meeting, the two leading figures approved 
the Constitution document project which was to be approved by the public 
after the integration was made as according to the second article of the Kuwait 
agreement. ^  They asked the authorities concemed to follow up and finalise all 
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the requirements of the Cairo agreements as referred to in articles 9, 10, 11, 12 
and 13.' 
The second important summit meeting was held between the 24* and 26* of 
December 1989 in which the two leaderships gave instructions to the 
authorities concerned to ful f i l the requirements of the unification process 
within 6 months (December 1989 to May 1990)." Accordingly, all ministerial 
committees and executive agencies in the both states had 6 months in which to 
prepare for the unification process.^  
4,1.1 The Announcement of the Establishment of the ROY and the 
Organisation of the Transitional Period (May 1990 to April 1993) 
The Unification announcement establishing the Republic of Yemen (ROY) 
and the organisation of the transitional period was signed on 22"'' April 1990 
by Colonel Al i Abdulla Saleh and Al i Salem Al-Beidh. 
The announcement document had 10 articles which read as follows:* 
Article 1 
On the 22nd May 1990, a fully integrated confederation/unification is to be 
established between the two Yemeni states, YAR and PDRY, whereby the 
international identity of each state is to be eliminated and both to be replaced 
by a new international identity called the Republic of Yemen (ROY). The 
latter will have Islamic legislative and executive authorities. 
Article 2 
On the validity of this agreement, a Presidential Council will be formed for the 
transitional period made of five members, of whom a President and a Vice-
President will be elected. 
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The formation of the Presidential Council will be made upon an election made 
by the Shawra Council of YAR and the Higher Peoples' Council of PDRY. 
The Presidential Council will give their authority before their first mutual 
meeting. 
The Presidential Council will perform immediately its function in respect of its 
duties as per the constitution of the country. 
Article 3 
A transition period of 2 years and 6 months only, to be defined starting from 
the validity of this agreement/announcement. 
A representative council (Parliament) is to be established out of all members 
of ATShowrah council (of former YAR) and the higher presidential council (of 
former PDRY) in addition to 31 members to be appointed by the Presidential 
Council. 
The representative council is to perform all constitutional authority in its 
respect except Presidential Council election and constitutional changes. 
Article 4 
In its first meeting, the Presidential Council (P.C.) is to issue a decree for the 
formation of a Consultative Council (CC.) made of 45 members (from the 
two former states). 
Article 5 
The P.C. is to form the Government of ROY with functions set in the 
constitution. 
Article 6 
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In its first meeting, the P. C. entrusts a technical committee for reviewing the 
country's administrative divisions whereby old country's partitions are 
dissolved. 
Article 7 
The P. C. is entrusted in decrees' issuance with legal power for country's flag, 
national anthem, etc. 
The P.C., also in its first meeting, is to take a decision for inviting the 
representative council (Parliamentary) to make a session for the following: 
a. the approval of the Presidential decrees by laws. 
b. to grant the government the parliamentary trust/confidence on its 
programmes 
c. to instruct the P.C. to put the constitution for Public approval for it 
before 30th November J990. 
d. to validate basic laws forwarded to it by the P. C. 
Article 8 
This agreement/announcement to be valid together with the new constitution 
which should be approved by the Al-Showra's and Higher Peoples' Councils. 
Article 9 
The agreement/announcement is regarded a regulatory instrument for the 
whole transitional period. The constitution - after being approved - as per the 
above item will be valid in a form that it does not contradict these rules of this 
agreement/announcement 
Article 10 
The approval of this agreement/announcement and of the ROY constituted by 
the Showra and HP councils invalidates the constitutions of both former states 
YAR andPDRY. 
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Two initial points can be made with regard to the shortcomings of the basic 
unification agreements o f Cairo and Tripoli upon which the unification in 
1990 was based (see Chapter 3 for the importance o f the Cairo and Tripoli 
Agreements to the unification process).' 
The first point was that the basic agreements, on which other successive 
unification steps rested, were not updated in view of the dramatic changes that 
took place in the two states. The Cairo and Tripoli Agreements kept to the 
same original foundation for all actions o f unification despite the changes in 
policies o f the two states, political and economic developments, and the 
divergent attitudes o f each state towards the other. 
The second point was that the basic problem behind the unification problems 
in the past was never recognised.^ Specifically speaking, the integration o f the 
northern Shafais as a third Yemeni power block was never openly recognised 
or addressed in these basic agreements. 
On the contrary, oppositions to the two power centres, the northern Shafais in 
the south and the A l i Nasser faction in the north, were left out o f the 
integration process at the administrative organisations both centrally and 
regionally. The 'defensive' gesture o f both power centres did not allow their 
integration into the unified system. I t was, therefore, the yemeni integration 
could be regarded as a 'defensive unionism' in the region. 
Below, the progress o f integration shall be analysed choronologically in 
respect o f different power authorities: the Presidential Council, the Parliament 
and the cabinet. 
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4.2 The Progress of Integration in the Political/Administrative field during 
the period May 1990 - April 1993 
This section w i l l look into the progress o f integration between the former 
Yemeni states within the newly established state the ROY during the 
transitional period, which was extended from IVt years to 3 years. 
Below, the creation and operation o f the three central authorities w i l l be 
discussed, namely the Presidential Council (with a supervisory executive role), 
the Council o f Ministers (and its administrative structure) and the 
Parliamentary institution. For each of these structures, an analysis w i l l be 
carried out on the progress o f integration o f the two former administrative 
structures during the transitional stage. 
4.2.1 The Progress of Integration at the Presidential Structure 
The progress o f integration o f the presidential structures w i l l cover the 
following areas: 
1. The composition o f the Presidential Council 
2. The differences in the approach to Integration and the struggle 
for power between the two leaderships. This section would 
include the followings: 
a) The causes o f the union from each power perspectives. 
b) The impact o f the predominance o f northerners in Central 
Administration. 
c) The Political Struggle over the Southern Public Sectors. 
d) - The Split o f the Decision-Making between the two leaderships. 
e) Saleh's Advantages at the Presidential Council and Al-Beidh's 
Reactions. 
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The centre o f the interaction between the two leadership factions was the 
Presidential Council (P.C.). It was this key institution where critical decisions 
over integration were made and where the struggle for power and influence 
was focused.' This section w i l l begin, therefore, with a description o f the 
Presidential Council. It w i l l then explain and analyse the issues which existed 
between the two rival leaderships as per above items. 
4.2.1.1 The Composition of the Presidential Council and the Implementation of 
the Unification Agreement 
The Presidential Council in the ROY was integrated with a five member's 
entity fi-om the two former Yemeni states. The five members were: 
Colonel Ali Abdulla Saleh, President of the ROY (GPC) 
Ali Salem Al-Beidh, Vice President of the ROY (YSP) 
Abdul Aziz A. Al-Ghani, Member of the P.C. (GPC) 
Salem Saleh Moh'd Member of the P.C. (YSP) 
Al-Qadi Abdul Karim Al-Arashi, Member of the P. C. (GPC) 
A n examination o f the individuals in the Presidential Council reveals that the 
ex-YAR members constituted a stronger and more effective grouping than the 
ex-PDRY members within it. Colonel A l i Abdullah Saleh was a military man, 
Abdul-Aziz A , Al-Ghani was an economist (USA Graduate) and Al-Qadi A l -
Arashi was an experienced judicial man. On the other hand, both A l i Salem 
Al-Beidh and Salem Saleh Mohamed were politicians with no academic 
background. They both had long political experience, but ones characterised 
with political disputes and military confi-ontations rather than political 
stability." 
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The Presidential Council ful f i l led all the requirements o f the unification 
agreement signed on 22"'' Apr i l 1990. Both parties/leaderships in the P.C. 
ful f i l led the following as items o f the unificafion agreement: 
1. The establishment o f the Presidenfial Council 
2. The establishment o f Council o f Ministers 
3. The choice o f the new national flag for ROY and the nafional 
anthem 
4. The amalgamafion o f sectors, manpower and embassies o f the 
two former states the Y A R and the PDRY 
5. The establishment o f the Consultafion Council 
6. The country unitary laws 
The Presidential Council also agreed upon an objective arrangement for all 
national power in Sana'a (the administrative capital) and Aden (the economic 
capital and other major cities." Material accommodations were made for 
southerners moving to Sanaa and other northern cities and for those 
northerners moving to southern regions for official governmental functions. 
While the southern leadership provided formal accommodation for northern 
elements in its leaderships out o f its ration, the northern leadership did not 
accommodate southerners from the A l i Nasser faction out o f its ration 
formally at executive levels.'" 
4.2.1.2 Differences in the Approach to Integration and the struggle for Power 
between the leadership 
The fol lowing subsections w i l l illuminate how defensive unionism did not 
work well between two different power centres. The power-sharing attitude 
was hardly existing due to the tribal background and individualistic mentality 
which the researcher asserted in the methodology in chapter one. The yemeni 
case witnessed various differences between the two leaderships while the 
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integration process was in its infancy. Major issues o f differences between the 
two leaderships at the Presidential Council level w i l l be explained below. 
4.2.1.2.1 The Causes of Union from the perspectives of each Power Centre 
The two political leaderships entered the integration process with an adverse 
attitude and approach for a fu l ly integrative process. On account o f having 
high numbers o f members fi-om the northern Shafai areas, the YSP thought 
that it would be able to gain political control o f the national political arena in 
the near fiiture.'* On the other hand, the GPC thought it would control the 
southern part on account o f its large membership and its large military and 
security force." Again, on political policies, the YSP thought that northerners 
would favour mass-involvement policies rather than tribal bond policies. The 
GPC leadership, however, thought that tribal bond policies - even in southern 
areas - would have more impact in their favour than the YSP's. Each one's 
political ideology, therefore, was strengthened under the unification auspices 
without consideration to the Yemeni unity requirements o f political stability 
and economic prosperity in real terms. 
Similarly, the judicial mechanisms o f the two former states rivalled against 
each other for predominance. The YSP leadership thought that its judicial 
system was a modem one and ought to supersede the northern system. The 
GPC leadership thought its judicial system was very much more Islamic based 
and ought to dominate the unsuitably ex-communist judicial mechanism." 
4.2.1.2.2 The Predominance of the north in Central Administration 
The predominance o f the ex-YAR administrative system in the central 
administration o f the ROY was the key area o f dispute between the two 
leaderships in the ROY at the Presidential Council level as it led to the ability 
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o f the northern elite to manage, with flexibility, their affairs at the expense of 
southerners' rights and merits.^° The Premier - a southerner - often expressed 
frustration (within his closed circle) at the frequent intervention o f the 
President in cabinet affairs and the executing authorities without prior 
consultafion.^' The northern elite, at all levels, would respond to each other 
without giving consideration to the legality o f the administrafion in the formal 
establishments. The YSP leadership, however, instead o f objecfing to such 
administrative violations followed suit but in southern affairs and regions." 
As the central administration o f the ROY continued to operate an ex-YAR 
administration, the President's impact was much greater than the Vice-
President within the central authorities. Reports, files, and all relevant 
information in the central administration were fiall accessible by the President 
but not the Vice-President. The latter, however, had much more access to 
southern reports and files more so than the former; but as these did not have 
relevant impact on the centrally current administration, the Vice-President was 
in a weak position in the overall decision-making structure. 
The reactionary policy adopted by the YSP did not solve the predominancy 
problem in the cenfral administration and, therefore, this problem continued to 
cause political fiiction between the northern and southern leaderships o f the 
ROY. 
4.2.1.2.3 Political Struggle over the Public Sector in the South 
One o f their major disputes at the P.C. level was the power dispute between 
the two leaderships over the public sector in the southern regions. Saleh and 
the ex-YAR central administration were not providing the minimum 
requirements to the southern public sector equally with those in northern 
regions such as the cement, cotton and other industries.-^ Al-Beidh on the other 
hand, was making arrangements for southern public sector support from within 
172 
the southern territory.-'' For example, the fishing corporations which were 
making high foreign profits did not submit these profits to the Ministry of 
Finance and were keeping it to cover maintenance and other running costs o f 
their institutional subsidiaries." Saleh was aiming to make the public sector 
stagnant to assist privatisation, which would likely be undertaken by the 
northern private sector. Al-Beidh regarded the non-support to the public 
sector in the south as an attempt to embarrass the YSP leadership in front of its 
own public. Saleh's struggle against the southern public sector was based on 
the new economic strategy for the ROY which implied the fi-ee market 
economy adaptation for all public sectors in Yemen. Al-Beidh, though, 
accepted the new strategy wi th hesitation and did not trust the northern 
leaderships genuineity/objectivity in the transformation process o f southern 
public sector into a positive course. He was careful that the transformation 
process should not take place swift ly as this might have cost him in person, 
and the southern leadership, politically rather than economically. On the other 
hand, Saleh's administration was not objective towards the southern public 
sector in terms that scrutinised policies were not equally performed in the 
northern public sector and the mixed ones. 
Having examined the way the northern leadership handled the public sector in 
the southern regions, Al-Beidh and his leadership were right in their 
suspicions and consciousness o f the transformation process. This w i l l be 
explained in chapter 5. 
4.2.1.2.4 The Split of the Decision-Making between the two leaderships. 
The two leaderships at the P.C. level were practically split into 
northern/southern leaderships in the decision-making mechanism." Despite the 
agreement on basic policies by the two leaderships, each one performed its 
policies with its authorities. Financial pohcies were totally ran by Saleh's 
administrafion while fisheries policies were under Al-Beidh's control.-' 
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Similarly, this situation was operating with sectors under northern/southern 
ministers. There were, practically, no formal laws, regulafions or institutions 
to restrict the two key-figures at the P.C. from ad-hoc formal 
behaviour/intervention in the executive authority." 
There was general consensus by observers that the two leaderships which 
created the ROY were, ironically, pushing matters to such an extent as to 
endanger the survival o f the ROY. Northern problems, for example, sought 
northern key-figures for solutions at all levels. Similarly, southern problems 
sought their key figures for solufions.^" The split and the distrust in the 
decision-making mechanism at P.C. level reflected itself throughout all lower 
hierarchies in the government, creating the main step towards the 
disintegration o f the unified state. '^ 
4.2.1.2.5 Saleh's Advantages at the P .C . and Al-Beidh's Reactions 
As the ex-YAR administration was running on in the ROY's central 
administrafion. President A l i Saleh enjoyed more privileges than the Vice-
President Al-Beidh. " Indeed, President Saleh enjoyed easy access to all 
northern authorities in his system in Sanaa." He had easy access to all 
Presidential files, portfolios, reports and accords. With major key insfitutions 
- particularly Finance and Civ i l Service Ministries - in northern hands, Saleh 
was able to order/stop expenditure to/from any channels. He could recruit any 
number o f employees to Governmental/Security institutions under northern 
hands. In general, Saleh enjoyed flexible decision-making apparatus in 
national policies at several northern fronts owing to geographical and 
structural reasons." 
The Vice-President, on the other hand, had very limited space for policy 
implications and this was confined more or less to southern regions and 
sectors o n l y . " The first diff iculty faced by Al-Beidh was on the definifion o f 
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his title 'vice', by which his limited authority and function were governed. 
The two leaderships had different understanding to the meaning o f the 'Vice-
President'. The northerners thought that the Vice-President would only be 
functioning on the absence of the President. The southerners' understanding 
to the vice job, however, was a complementary funcfion to the President, i.e. 
all issues were to be discussed and agreed upon simultaneously by the two 
figures; and in case o f dispute, the two men had to forward disputable issues to 
the Council, the Parliament or the public for final say. 
The second diff iculty faced Al-Beidh in his tasks as a second leading figure at 
the P.C. was the northern supremacy in having elastic access to the central 
administration at the expense o f southerners. Presidential reports/files would 
not be retrieved flexibly to Al-Beidh or his faction. Monitoring and screening 
o f southerners work at P.C. (as well elsewhere) by northerners were often 
causing frustrations to the latter. Worst o f all, bugging over telephones 
conversations and inside southerners' lodgings was naively overdone." This 
led to severe reactions by Al-Beidh and his faction who found the situations 
highly intolerable. 
4.2.1.3.The Results of Leaderships Disputes 
No doubt leaderships disputes at P.C. level had negative impact on all national 
dimensions centrally, regionally and on sectors. A t political fronts, the two 
leading parties: the GPC and the YSP - instead o f coming closer - they parted 
further. '^ Through their daily and weekly papers, each accused the other o f 
being traitor to the unification process. Each party media - Sanaa and Aden 
T V and Radios - accused each other o f infringing the provisions o f the 
unification process and sought for solitary domination." 
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The worst measure of disputes between the two leaderships was the 
assassination measure mainly carried out against the YSP. The flexible 
geographical background enjoyed by Saleh's administration in Sanaa made out 
of the YSP an easy target for the elimination of some of its key figures and 
' supporters. Several assassination attempts - 154 - were made on YSP figures 
of whom the Minister of Justice - Mr Abdul Wase'a Sallam was one in 1992."' 
The minister survived but lost one eye plus other injuries.The speaker of the 
Parliament in 1993 Dr Yassin Saeed Noman was another target. Dr Noman 
who was a key polit-bureau member in the YSP had his house shelled with 
heavy attack in the City of Sanaa. The assassination series started in August 
1991 against a southern opposition leader Mr Omer Al-Jawi - Chairman of the 
Yemeni Congregation Party in Sanaa where a northerner member of this party 
was the victim. The northern security forces - under northern leadership -
failed to bring the perpetrators to justice. Saleh's administration was held 
responsible for the assassinations' measurement in view of the failure of 
security forces to bring perpetrators to justice."" 
As a result of these contestations between Saleh and Al-Beidh over power 
control, the latter after contemplating with his YSP leadership, left Sanaa and 
confined himself in Aden to run the southern regions affairs.Al-Beidh was 
discussing all Presidential issues and problems with his Polit-bureau 
colleagues in all meetings, particularly, the top key-figures in the polit-bureau. 
His confinement in Aden received unanimous consensus of the YSP 
leadership. 
4.2.2 The Overall Political Integration of the R O Y before the election of 1993 
Democracy was the major issue that both parties agreed upon to be an 
instrument in the yemeni arena. 46 political parties were recognised in the 
ROY to have equal chances to exercise their political rights in nominafions. 
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voting and participation in political power. Below, the researcher wi l l , 
critically examine the impact o f these parties in the political arena o f the ROY. 
However, in this section, the impact o f the 1993 elections w i l l only be 
discussed. The progress o f integration in the Parliament w i l l be discussed in 
section 4.2.4. 
4.2.2.1 The Parliamentary Election of 1993 
46 parties participated in the National Election o f 1993 o f which 8 political 
parties only competed effectively across the national arena.^ " Out o f the 46 
parties, only 8 parties participated effectively in the 1993 election o f which the 
GPC and the YSP - the two formal parties in the Coalition - had the leading 
role in the election campaigns. Islah, the Sons o f Yemen League and the 
Ba'ath were the other three parties with some decent representations in the 
country.^' The Nasserites were divided into three separate parties and they 
could afford to compete effectively i f they were united. A l l other parties were 
small in number and had no meaningful support at the national level. 
The new Parliament was based on the election results, resulting in a the 
following distribution o f seats:" 
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Table 4.1: Results of parliamentary elections, 1993 and 1997 
% vote Seats % vote Seats 
Party name 1993 1993 1997 1997 
General Peoples' Congress 28 123 42 187 
Yemeni Reform Gathering 17 62 23 53 
Yemeni Socialist Party 18 56 0 0 
Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party 3 7 1 2 
al-Haqq >1 2 >1 0 
Wahdawi-Nasiri 1 1 2 3 
Democratic-Nasiri >1 1 0 
al-Tashih >1 1 0 
Independents 29 48 28 56 
Other Parties >2 >3 
Total 301 301 
In terms o f the absolute results, the above election figures were very much 
misleading. Though the GPC had won the majority o f seats, a substantial 
number o f seats in the northern regions went to other parties, notably Islah. In 
the south, the YSP won 47 seats out o f its 57 consfituencies. The YSP gave up, 
by its own choice, one seat to the GPC, one seat to a Al-Haqq candidate in 
Seyoun district, and 8 seats to independent figures supported by the YSP.*" 
The YSP, however, was very disappointed by the polifical stance o f its 2 
mil l ion supporters in the north, who were supposed to have voted for the YSP 
northern candidates. The handful o f seats won by the YSP in the north, for its 
160 northern members, was far from the target figure envisaged by the 
northern YSP leadership. 
4.2.2.2 The Conduct of The Parliamentary Elections 
There has been a controversial discussion whether the parliamentary elections 
were fair or not in consideration o f the tribal background o f the Yemeni 
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community and its leaderships. The writer was a member o f the reception 
committee and her observations are given below: 
''All parties involved were entitled to get a specific amount from public 
resources for their election campaigns. However, both the GPC and the YSP 
used huge amounts of public resources for their respective election 
campaigns. The former drew resources from the budget and the oil resources, 
and the latter from oil and land resources in southern regions where the YSP 
still maintained predominance. The election campaigns were characterised by 
both tribalism and factionalism. Each side made alliances with other groups 
and parties of rival ideologies. The outbreak of violence, though at a 
minimum, was destructively strong in limited areas. In Hajja area, for 
example, the YSP secretariat building was destroyed on election day by the 
son of Sheikh Abdulla,. Al-Ahmer-Hameed, who was a candidate running for 
parliamentary membership. His rival in that area was a northern YSP 
candidate. Several people were killed and injured. This resulted in Hameed 
winning through tribal supremacy rather than through the established system 
of voting, as reported by eye witnesses of the election poll. " 
However, when considering the tribal community o f the ROY, the writer 
thought that i t was a big achievement to have such a democratic experience 
irrespective o f its negative/positive magnitudes. I f the general educational 
standard o f the public is taken into account, and the fact that firing incidents 
were low during the elections, the experience o f the election was far more 
posidve than could be expected before the event. 
4.2.2.3 The Impact of the Election on the Y S P Leadership 
With the third largest majority in the parliamentary elections, the southern 
leadership in the YSP was compelled to revise its strategy in both northern and 
southern regions. The southerners in the YSP realised that they were under an 
illusion wi th regard to the militancy o f their party members in northern areas." 
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As the impact o f the electoral policies o f the northern leadership on the YSP 
was unable to play an effective role in the election, the YSP southern 
leadership thought it would be able to capture their ex-50% share o f polifical 
power in the national arena. 
In the next sub-section, the impact o f the election results on the political crisis 
between the northern and southern leadership following the creation o f the 
new state administration is discussed. 
The Islah party, which won the second largest majority in the election, formed 
a serious threat to both the GPC and the YSP leadership in policy-making 
structures.^* The Islah party proved to be politically effective in northern areas 
and with a great potential effect in the long run. 
4.2.2.4 The Political Crisis after the 1993 Election 
In view o f the new leaderships o f the post-transitional period, the YSP was 
forced to revise its political position in respect o f the new pohfical parameters. 
Based on the results o f the parliamentary election, the new leadership 
composition for the ROY had changed in respect to the ROY's multi-party 
system. The former coalition enjoyed by the GPC and the YSP now had a third 
partner, namely the Islah party with its second majority in the Parliament. The 
YSP perceived that the election results revealed the dominance o f the northern 
leadership over the southern and were sceptic o f having an effective role in the 
state-building." The decision-making structure had, therefore, a change in the 
composition o f its Presidential Council. A representative from the Islah party 
was included, namely Sheikh A Maj id Al-Zanadani - a formal and well-known 
religious scholar.^^ He replaced A .K. Al-Arashi o f the GPC. Although the 
composition should have been three members from the GPC, 1 member from 
YSP and one from Islah, Colonel Saleh gave up one GPC seat to the YSP in 
order to keep the integration process running smoothly between the north and 
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the south. Everyone, however, knew that such generosity would not continue 
for long.^' 
With only a third of Parliament majority, the YSP revised its critical position 
along specific lines which were contradictory to the process of integration it 
had envisaged.'" In view of the unification process that took place between the 
north and the south, the differences between the two states in terms of 
population, geographical disparities and other parameters were not addressed 
in the shaping of the power centre and political power-sharing mechanism of 
the unified system. However, based on the election results, the YSP started to 
contemplate the new challenges to it. From the YSP's point of view, the 
balancing power had migrated to the northerners, as all Islah figures in the 
Parliament were northerners or north settlers. The new leadership (at all levels) 
from then onwards put 'the former PDRY' in a disadvantaged position. The 
ex-50% share in power was reduced to a third, and possibly less, in the longer 
term. The YSP thought that, i f the population norms would be the only 
measurement for sharing power in the post-transitional period, then this 
measurement would be refutable from the YSP side. The former PDRY, the 
YSP argued, had more than double the area of the former YAR and its national 
resources far exceeded those of the YAR's.*' Such arguments, however, did 
not comply with the type of agreements on which the unification 
announcement was based. The unification agreements had many shortcomings 
but the ultimate responsibility for these shortcomings was blamed on YSP 
decision-making alone for coming to such an ad-hoc integration compared to 
what would have naturally taken place in view of a minority in population and 
a laissez-faire doctrine. 
In view of the composition of the new leadership at all levels, the members of 
the YSP leadership confined themselves to their former power base in the 
south after the results of the parliamentary election." On the eve of the 
formation of the new Parliament, Al-Beidh left Sanaa and stayed in Aden like 
he did in September 1992, but this time he never returned. Furthermore, he 
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refused to attend to give the oath of allegiance as a vice-president before the 
Parliament." Various reconciliation attempts by the leaderships of major 
parties, tribes, factional groups and regional key leaders to bring Al-Beidh into 
the presidential power centre in Sanaa all failed." 
To keep its formal obligation to the integration process intact, the YSP 
leadership constructed an 18 point proposal on state management for the new 
leadership to consider." The GPC also forwarded a 19 point proposal to the 
new administration about the position of the YSP.'* An opposition group of 5 
parties volunteered to study all the points and came up with a 16 point 
proposal." The points forwarded by the YSP could be regrouped into the 
following:'* 
3 points on security: To bring criminals behind the previous assassination 
attempts to justice, to take away military camps from major cites and to 
recruit security/military manpower with respect to qualifications and 
experience only. 
4 points on legislation: To review the constitution in co-ordination with all 
influential/social factions, and to eradicate corruption from the legislative set-
up. 
5 points on political issues: To prevent the Presidential Council interfering 
with executing authorities, to give regions full authority to run their local 
affairs and to finalise laws for the establishment of local governments. 
6 points on Economic Reforms: To decentralise financial and administrative 
systems in order to eradicate corruption. To deregulate and decentralise 
financial power to regions. 
The GPC points could be regrouped into the following: 
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5 points on security/military aspects: Calling for immediate integration of the 
two forces, to be independent from tribes and political affiliation. 
5 points on legislation: Asking the YSP to bind by the results of the election 
and the unification agreements. 
5 points on politics: Asking the YSP to withdraw its hegemony on regional 
/public enterprises, authorities etc., and to reveal what happened to those lost 
in former PDRY political struggles and wars etc., and to bring 
administrative/financially corrupt figures to justice. 
While the YSP points were pragmatic in terms of administrative and 
institutional reforms, some of the GPC points were impractical in terms of 
criticising the ex-PDRY nationalisation law and the extermination of outlaws 
in the past history of the former southern state. Almost all YSP points called 
for a new state-building framework, with which future organisational work 
could be adopted. This was emphasised following the hard and intolerable 
experience faced by the southerners under unity.'' Some of the GPC points, 
unfortunately, were not objective and especially those points related to former 
PDRY policies. There were a few points which i f implemented would commit 
Colonel Saleh and his administration more than that of Al-Beidh's to thorough 
grass-root changes in the administrative set-ups and financial reforms and. 
These points were incorporated within the " Agreement and Pledge Accord" 
which shall be discussed later on in the next subsection. 
As the political differences escalated more between the two leaderships, 
several attempts were made for the reconciliation of the two key figures of the 
President and Vice-President. 
Below, the reconciliation steps shall be examined with their political 
outcomes. 
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4.2.2.5 Reconciliation Attempts and the Agreement and Pledge Accord 
The political crisis period (May 1993 - May 1994) witnessed a series of 
reconciliation attempts made by various national, regional and international 
figures which did not help the integration process positively.™ Since the 
outcome of the results of the parliamentary election, the YSP leadership was 
not at ease in the capital Sanaa. The General Secretary of the YSP - Ali Salem 
Al-Beidh - withdrew from unification politics and confined his activities to the 
affairs of the YSP. He left Sanaa for Aden in May where his former power 
base was. In July 1993, he left for the USA for a medical check and came back 
to Aden instead of Sanaa on August 19th 1993 where he maintained his formal 
office as General Secretary of the YSP." This decision was unanimously 
supported by the YSP leadership in the polit-bureau meeting of the following 
week. 
In the hope of bringing him. back to Sanaa, several reconciliation attempts 
were made by senior national, regional and international figures to close down 
the gap of polifical disputes between him and President Al i Abdullah Saleh." 
Al l reconciliation attempts failed in bringing Al-Beidh back into the 
integration process. Therefore, a national dialogue committee was established 
to lay down the basis for new political and administration strategies for the 
ROY's administration. Key figures fi-om major tribes, parties and public 
associations were included in this national committee and succeeded in 
producing what became known as 'the Agreement and Pledge Accord' 
(APA)." The accord took over 6 months of dialogue between the two major 
northern/southern parties in the presence of other parties' mediators.'" It was 
signed by all parties on 20* February 1994 in Amman, in the presence of the 
King of Jordan." The APA was, in practical terms, a national document 
presenting a new basis for the integration process between the former YAR 
and PDRY.'* 
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The APA basically considered three basic principles for national unity within a 
flexible confederate system. The first principle was the decentralisation of 
administration and financial systems in terms of budgetary control and 
employment." The second one was the involvement of all northem and 
southern factions in central administrative-political power, and in their 
respecfive territories.'* The third principle was that economic progress of the 
ROY had to be realised by central and regional authorifies simultaneously to 
ensure justice in income distribution and employment opportunities." These 
points and others were incorporated in the eighteen points forwarded by the 
YSP to the dialogue committee as well as to the GPC leadership which 
constituted the majority in the new coalifion. 
4.2.3 The Progress of Integration in the Council of Ministers during 1990-1994 
The government between the two leaderships was shared out on a 50/50 ratio 
base and the 39 ministerial and deputy-premier posts of the cabinet were 
divided equally between them.*" The Republic Decree Number 1 for 1990 was 
issued for the formation of the cabinet headed by a southern Premier- Haider 
Abu-Baker Al-Attas.*' The Cabinet was formed of four Deputy-Premiers and 
34 sectoral ministers, who were equally recruited and approved by the two 
leaderships again on a 50/50 ratio base." Armex no displays the cabinet 
members. 
4.2.3.1 Problems arising from the Characters of the Government Personnel 
There were certain basic features in the Council of Ministers which did not 
help the integration process positively. These features were: 
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1. The character of the Premier was not fit for such a powerful, and 
precarious, post. Haider Al-Attas, with an Egyptian education background in 
electrical engineering, started his career after 1968 in PDRY. He was then 
successful enough as Minister of Communication and Construction under an 
administrative machinery governed by good laws and regulations." He carried 
out the ministry's programmes with top class foreign companies which were 
recruited by international agencies in his sector in the south.^ " He also carried 
out a premiership post in the south (1985) and was good enough when 
compared to other southern premiers.However, he failed to carry out the 
position of the premiership of the YAR efficiently for many reasons. Below, I 
shall explain objectively these reasons behind the failure of Al-Attas as a 
premier.^' 
As the new Premiership job required grass-root changes for both parts of 
Yemen, Al-Attas found great difficulty in designing a flexible administration 
and set-up which would promote out the new unified system across the 
national arena satisfactorily. He failed to enforce an effective legal machinery 
or enact objective institutional laws for the central administration. He also 
failed to put trust in his colleagues or to form a team for this purpose. 
Ultimately, he found himself working on his own, suspending the workloads 
of various sectors, and thus causing a total paralysis in major issues and 
subsequently creating problems for the government." This was partly to do 
with the weak monitoring institutional fi-amework which existed to oversee the 
state administration and the top elite.^ ^ Under southern machinery, Al-Attas 
could not have done what he did in the YAR because of him being held 
accountable to the the party and watched by state monitoring systems.*'' The 
Premier in the ROY was not subject to an effective monitoring mechanism and 
the system was therefore easily corruptable.'" 
Furthermore, Al-Attas adopted nepotism in his administration at a remarkable 
rate, following the tribal pattern in the north. He recruited Hashemites, and 
mainly Southern Hashemites, at a much higher scale than their merits 
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allowed." At the same time, he downgraded many good southerners, 
particularly females, to lesser grades than their old merited scales before the 
unification era.'- Worst of all, however, he displayed extraordinary 
administrative and financial corrupfion himself by misusing his power and 
ordering the release of strategic lands to himself, his relafions and faction." In 
general, he allowed the affairs of the council of ministers to become 
increasingly corrupt and, under a tribally based system in the north, he felt 
weak even to support the existing poor legal force in the national system. 
2- The type of figures brought/recruited by the GPC and YSP were far 
from being supportive to the national cause and technically of a poor standard 
for such critical period of time. Ironically, the south, which had more 
technocrats than the north in terms of the population ratio, recruited poor 
standard figures for the Council of Ministers. Southern observers were 
surprised by the YSP figures being recruited into the first government of the 
ROY. Ministers of Trade, Fisheries, Local Administration, Oil and minerals 
plus others were not technical figures and not at a standard to carry out grass-
root changes without causing political fiictions with the northem side.'" The 
YSP could easily afford to recruit the best technical figures it had, not only to 
run sectors effectively, but also to build up a bridge of trust with GPC 
colleagues on an objective platform of understanding.'^ Most of the figures 
recruited by the YSP, unfortunately, were not qualified to fiinction in harmony 
with the GPC figures at that stage." Specifically, Salem Gobran - Minister of 
Fisheries, Fadhl Mohsin AbduUa - Minister for Trade, Saleh Bin-Hussainoon -
Minister of Oil and Minerals, and Moh'd Saeed Abdulla of the local 
administration were traditional politicians who would not be qualified for a 
transitory stage in Yemeni development in the national and global dimensions. 
Experience proved at later stages that those ministries had hardly harmonal 
relationships in their institutions between northem and southern factions." The 
GPC figures were not ideal either, but definitely represented a better technical 
group than those of the YSP. Both Dr Al-Iryani and Dr Al-Attar, of the 
Foreign and Industry Ministries respectively, had high international profiles 
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technically and politically and had better outlook on the global reality than the 
Premier; but again for a transitory stage they were not objective figures who 
could afford to be dedicated for national causes and interests. Indeed the only 
negative aspect in the GPC group was their total unobjective outlook towards 
southerners' conditions in terms of their public enterprises' needs and 
employment in the south. The northern elite under estimated the competence 
of many of the southern technocrats in their sectors. The majority of the GPC 
figures did not welcome southerners in their institutions and badly humiliated 
them with regard to their financial earnings (salaries and allowances). 
Unfortunately, both the GPC and the YSP valued loyalty to their parties as the 
most important measure at the expense of technical competence for the 
national interest in the first government of the ROY. 
4.2.3.2 The Progress of Integration in the Council of Ministers 
The progress of integration in the Council of Ministers was negative owing to 
tribal and factional attitudes and approaches of government personnel amongst 
themselves, and within their institutions towards the alternate faction. These 
parameters wil l be discussed separately. 
The attitude of the two leaderships to each other at this level of the structure 
was very negative to the integration process for the national cause. Neither 
group was really dedicated to the national interest.'' Each group remained 
loyal to its political leadership and its administrative set-up.'"" Both 
administrative systems were handled simultaneously and, because Sanaa was 
the capital, the northern administrative set-up prevailed and itscumbersome 
administrative system was predominant. For instance, each formal paper had 
to be signed by 4 people: the Minster, Deputy Minister, Departmental Director 
and Section Chief In customs clearance, it required in excess of 50 
signatures."" The southerners were not used to such an over-centralised. 
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bureaucratic system. Their Irustrations, therefore, were often expressed 
scornfully because of the delays in recruitment and financial deals. 
The approach of each of the leaderships of this stmcture on national policy 
problems was not in favour of an integrative process.'"- Sectoral problems, 
whether they were for individuals or for institutions, were effectively 
considered and handled by the minister i f it concerned his faction. Northerners 
would, therefore, have their problems solved with a northem minister/deputy 
minister, and vice versa. It would be only occasionally where one would find 
an objective elite to solve the problem of an altemate faction. Thus, trivial 
matters, sometimes, followed northern/southern leaders in the government for 
solutions outside the normal hierarchies. The administrative system was, thus, 
subject to factional groupings rather than administrative laws and 
regulations.In certain cases, illegal actions would be involved when friction 
grew high. 
4.2.4 Progress in the Integration of the Parliamentary Committees 1990-1994 
Up to 1993, the two formal Houses of Representafives were joined together in 
addifion to a 30 appointed members from the two sides. In May 1990, the 
Presidential Council passed a decree joining the Al-Shaura Council of the 
YAR and the Higher Peoples Council of the PDRY into one parliamentarian 
institution.'"" The Presidential Council appointed 30 independent members out 
of public figures in the national arena. Dr Yassin Saeed No'aman was elected 
as the Chairman of the Parliament.'"' 
4.2.4.1The Progress of the Parliamentary Committees before the Election of 1993 
As noted above in section 4.2.2., the progress of integration in the Pariiament 
shall be discussed in this section. 
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The Parliament structure in the ROY is far from similar to that of the UK's. 
The parliament in the Yemeni State functions through a number of functional 
committees.'"* The reports of these committees would then be discussed by 
MPs on the floor. The Chairman of the Parliament and his deputies would be 
members too, and therefore they would have votes - not like the Speaker in the 
British Parliament. With this introduction, we shall proceed in our analysis. 
The Parliamentary institution in the ROY was not functionally integrated in a 
constructive manner between its two northern/southern factions. Before the 
amalgamation of the two legislative houses took place, each house was 
functioning for the benefit of its leadership rather than for the benefit of its 
people.'"' The GPC, for instance, advocated very liberal policies for all 
economic national problems etc. The YSP, on the other hand, defended public 
enterprises, women's emancipation, and addressed administrative and 
financial corruption. In general, each group was not committing itself to 
address national problems objectively or in a compromising attitude.'"^ The 
joint committees were, therefore, working under great stress, reflecting the 
political crisis which existed between the two leaderships. 
There were, however, various supporting factors that contributed to the 
disintegrative attitude between the two groups.'"' The first factor was related to 
the character of the Chairman of the Parliament - Dr Yassin No'aman. Given 
the nature of the very tribal community of the north which represented 4/5th of 
the national population, Dr Yassin No'aman was not the right figure for the 
job. He was neither a strongly tribal man nor educated enough in Islamic 
thought and affairs by which he could appease the northern Ulama in 
ParHament."" Despite his moderate attitude and personality, Dr No'aman was 
seen by the northern extremists as a YSP - communist figure. This by itself 
would make him an undesirable figure for the post. Secondly, his civic 
personality and background did not qualify him to be accommodated within 
the overwhelming northern group of tribes and religion in the parliament.'" No 
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doubt, as this position was for the YSP to take in the sharing power, the YSP 
could afford to bring a moderately religious figure who could foster the stage 
of infancy of the parliament in a positively manner. Many southern figures, 
though outside the YSP polifical frame would have been more suited for the 
job. This was badly needed for a Chairman of Parliament when disagreements 
would arise among different facfions; for he would only have the final say of 
the disputed issue and be able to keep the integrity of his institution. 
The second factor, which did not help the integration process in the 
parliamentary committees, was the framework within which the parliamentary 
institution had to function. Parliament had 17 joint technical committees, from 
the two sides. Unfortunately, the legislative background of the two sides was 
extremely different. The southemers' legal system was too progressive for an 
Islamic state and the northemers' legal system was too old and problematic for 
a modem state. To bring the two under joint fiincfional committees without 
prior preparations on the mode of work was extremely difficult for both sides. 
What happened in practice was that committees headed by northemers 
incorporated their methodology, and committees chaired by southemers did 
the same. When committees' reports were discussed on the floor, observers 
noticed that members of the same committee were violating the committee 
report.'" This way one concluded that the integrative process in the fimcfion of 
the parliament did not exist. 
The best approach to fiinction of the parliament would have been best viewed 
by the realisation of the infancy of the integration process in this institution. 
This could have been tackled by practical measures. No doubt, at that infancy 
stage of democratisation and unification, it would have been better to give 
more power to parliamentary committees to do the major part of parliamentary 
agendas without referring the committees' work to the floor's discussion. This 
policy instmment of Parliament would achieve a two-fold aim. First, it would 
help and train members on team work/function on serious and mutually 
integrative tasks' performance. And it would minimise unnecessarily 
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arguments and differences on the floor. As each member was practically a 
Committee member, the power delegation to committees would have made 
each member busy with its committee work in producing good/sound 
contributions in his field. The main condition for this would be of course to 
pick the right persons for this institution fi-om the beginning with the right 
qualifications because of its sensitivity in the overall state administration. 
4.2.4.2 The Progress of Integration in the Parliamentary Committees after the 
Election of 1993 
A parliamentary election was held in April 1993, where 14 political parties out 
of 46 competed in the national arena for the 301 seats in the Parliament."'' 
When the transitional period was over, the leadership called for a 
parliamentary election to take place on the 27* April 1993. Out of the 46 
political parties registered in the country, only 14 parties participated in the 
elections' campaigns."^ Eight political parties, however, won parliamentary 
seats in addition to 48 independent figures. The party results were as 
follows:"* 
GPC 122 seats 
Islah 62 seats 
YSP 56 seats 
Ba'ath 7 seats 
Al-Haqq 2 seats 
Nasserites (public unitary) 1 seat 
Nasserites (democratic) 1 seat 
Nasserites (public correction) 1 seat 
Independents 48 seats 
Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer, Chief Sheikh of the Hashed tribe and 
Chairman of the Islah party, was elected as Chairman of the Pariiament.'" 
Mohammed Khadem Al-Wageeh of the GPC, Ali Saleh Obad of the YSP and 
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Dr Abdul-Wahab Mahmood of the Ba'ath party were elected as Deputy 
Chairmen to the Parhament."* 
Among the 301 Members of Parliament, there were two females representing 
the YSP from the south.'" 
No doubt the appointment of a figure like Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-
Ahmer had both its pros and cons on Parliament in its integration process, and 
there were positive and negative sides in the election of Sheikh Abdulla Bin 
Hussein Al-Ahmer for the Chairmanship of Parliament.'^" The major posifive 
aspect was his social weight as Chief Sheikh of a sound tribe of which its key 
figures were represented in the leadership. The second positive aspect was his 
leadership capacity of such a tribal institution. Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein, 
tribally speaking, was fit for such a post as he would understand the tribal 
mentality which overwhelmed Parliament. He did not have difficulties of 
communication in that respect. He v/as also, as experienced showed, capable 
of controlling any chaos or unnecessarily long discussions of a topic on the 
floor.'^' 
The negative aspects of the election of Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer 
as Chairman of Parliament were: first, that he was very raw in thinking and in 
expressing technical/administrative issues.'^ ^ Secondly, he favoured his party 
members with tribal perceptiveness, attitude and approach. Specifically 
speaking, priorities for speeches were given to Islah figures then 
Hashedies/Zaydis. I f any time was left over then YSP southemers might have 
the chance to express their views.'" Thirdly, he exhausted the party budget on 
excessive self-expenditures.'^" 
The image of Sheikh A. H. Al-Ahmer however, as a Chief Sheikh of the 
Hashed tribe had damaged the unification image and the democratic process 
for one main reason. The two major formal authorities of the state were mled 
by two Hashedi figures - a tribe which represented a minority in the Zaydi 
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faction, let alone in the national arena. The democratic process, therefore, was 
shaken to its foundation. 
4.3 The Progress of the Integration in the Economic and Social Fields 
The two Yemeni states had agreed to adopt a new economic strategy based on 
an Islamic Socialistic approach for the ROY. This was stated in the Tripoli 
Announcement of November 1972, in articles 6 and 7 which state the 
following:'" 
Article 6 
The state of ROY aims to achieve socialism based on an Arab Islamic pattern, 
human' value, and the conditions of the Yemeni Community. This is to be 
achieved through social justice which bans all forms of exploitation. The state 
shoidd achieve, via socialist relations, production sufficiency and justice in 
income distributions whereby differences among social stratas are peacefully 
eliminated" 
Article 7 
Public enterprise ownership is the basis for community promotion and growth 
and for the achievement ofproduction sufficiency. Private ownership which is 
not of an exploitative nature is protected and cannot be taken away, except by 
law and with justified compensation. " 
The above statements incorporated in the Tripoli Announcement implied the 
market-economy strategy for the economy with public infi-astructure for the 
state to foster. 
It is worth noting that all unification agreements made during the period of 
1972-1990 were valid for the integration process as long as these agreements 
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did not violate the set up of the new unified constitution. The Tripoli 
Agreement of 1972, therefore, was a valid one for the ROY. 
4.3.1 The Progress of Economic Integration in the ROY during the Cooperative 
Unification May, 1990 - April, 1994 
The coalition of the GPC and the YSP (up to April 1993) and with the Islah 
(May, 1993-April, 1994) did not achieve much due to the political escalation 
between/among them, other than implementing the principle agreement on the 
adoption of a free market strategy for the economy.'" 
Within this context, we shall review three basic issues by which economic 
development in the ROY suffered serious setbacks throughout this period. 
These issues are: 
(1) The conflictory visions ofthe elite in the power centre; 
(2) The economic conditions over this period, and; 
(3) The impact of these conditions on southern areas. 
4.3.1.1 The Conflictory Visions ofthe Power Centre Elites on the Economy 
The GPC and the YSP, the two parties involved in the unification process, 
agreed in principle to the adoption of a free market economy as a strategy for 
economic development but with different visions on the state-building national 
system.'" Saleh's administration was dominant in this respect for it had past 
experience of this strategy while the south did not.'^ * Saleh, therefore, thought 
that there would be no need to go through big changes in his former system 
and, with new modem policies for trade and industry, the situation would be 
right for a boost in the economy. '^' Al-Beidh, however, came to the unification 
process with a more modem state vision than the mechanism which existed in 
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the south. He thought of a modem state-building national system which would 
be based on sound institutions and with some state control over fiscal and price 
policies.''" Though Al-Beidh was, to a certain extent, influenced by the past 
Marxist experiences of the south and thus he did not think of the traditional 
laissez-faire system for the ROY. 
After the 1993 elections, Islah came into the power centre but with different 
vision to those of the GPC and the YSP. Unlike the GPC or the YSP, Islah did 
not have any experience of running a state and national affairs.'^' Its key 
members were of traditional tribal roots and thus their ideology reflected tribal 
cohesion and Islamic brotherhood.'" The Islah vision on state-building, 
therefore, was based on the promotion of tribal structures in the society and the 
adoption of Al-Share'a laws for all state pohcies and activities.'" 
The conflictory visions in the power centre regarding possible state-building 
national systems did not give room for the accommodation of appropriate 
pohcies for economic development to take place. The infighting over political 
dominance continued among the factions in the power centre and the 
administration of the country remained in chaos, with sound policies for the 
economic development of the ROY being lost. Political instability continued 
and this led to further complications in the economy. 
4.3.1.2 Economic Conditions during the Cooperative Uniflcation in the ROY 
(1990 -1994) 
The northern/southern leadership entered into unity with a hope they would 
overcome economic problems in the unified system of their respective 
countries through a nation-wide good system of economic integration.'^" This 
hope was dashed by several factors which contributed to worsening economic 
conditions in the newly established republic. The Gulf Crisis (GC) was the 
foremost factor in depriving the ROY of several foreign contracts and aid 
because of its political stance with Iraq.'" The USA reduced its assistance in 
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1991 and 1992 by approximately 92% - from US$ 42 millions to US$ 4 and 6 
millions respectively."* The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) also withdrew 
its annual assistance of US$ 500 millions and the privileged residency status 
which northern Yemenis had before, resulting in the return of more than 
800,000 Yemeni immigrants.'" The return of Yemeni immigrants workers 
exacerbated the unemployment problem in the ROY. It also deprived the 
country of the foreign exchange the ROY would have got from the remittances 
of its workers in the KSA.'^^ However, with regard to the KSA assistance, it 
might have been expected to have been cut off under the unified system of 
Yemen without any other concessions. 
The oil recession following the GC in the region also had a negative impact. 
Aden Refinery lost substantial resources because of boycott by the Gulf 
States.'" Kostiner estimated the ROY losses due to the oil recession in 1990/91 
to be US$ 3 billion, and in 1992 to be about US$ 1.8 billions. The ROY's 
losses of oil concessions only, went down from US$ 700 million in 1991 to 
US$ 100 million in 1992.'^ " 
The last important factor that contributed to worsening economic conditions 
was the absence of good economic policies from the government during this 
period."" As a result, food prices rose by 150-400%, inflation ballooned by 
over 100%, unemployment rose generally by 35%. The blame for such a 
negative performance in the economy was attributed to financial and 
administrative corruption.'"^ 
Despite the rise in oil producfion from 180,000 bpd in 1990 to 350,000 bpd in 
1993, the government failed to resolve these economic issues. This was due to 
the continuing infighting among the factions in the power centre for which the 
Yemeni citizen ultimately paid dearly.'"^ 
4.3.1.3 The Impact of the Current Economic Integration on the South 
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The two leaderships agreed in principle, within the unification accords, to 
adopt a free market economy as the strategy for the economic development of 
the ROY.'"^ In respect to this agreement, for which the north had felt strong 
through its previous experiences, all preparations for the amalgamation of 
central set-ups in the two former states were made as per the meeting of two 
Premiers between the 1" and 4"" June 1990.'"" Financial and planning 
institutions were joined and southern manpower moved to Sanaa. The southern 
leadership practically moved to Sanaa all its central capital assets in 
preparation to work together with the northern leadership in the new economic 
system for the good of the nation. While basic economic issues were settled 
such as unification of the currencies (the dinar and the riyal) and the 
distribution of manpower in the institutions, many relevant economic issues 
were left unresolved to be discussed at a later stage with the new government 
and the unified elite in the power centre.'"' 
In considering the southern state which had over 90% of its activities ran by 
public sector, the free market economy would have needed much longer time 
to have an effect on its public enterprises. To change over from public 
ownership to a private or mixed enterprise system would need studies, well 
planned policies, feasibility studies and rationally based decisions to be 
implemented without causing problems to southern manpower. This, 
unfortunately, did not take place as the power centre elite continued their 
infighting for political dominance, leaving current economic situations in 
turmoil. 
Consequently, the south suffered serious setbacks due to hasty unification 
which left unresolved issues concerning its economic institutions.'"* The 
southern public enterprises were vulnerable institutions and Saleh's 
administration failed to look at them as being beneficial for the whole of 
Yemen in the long run. The northern administration looked at these institutions 
as pillars for the ex-communist regime which had to be demohshed and put out 
198 
of existence."" They also argued that these public sector institutions were 
running at a loss and would cost the public huge amounts to run them. While 
this was true for some, this was not the case for all of them. Most of the large 
public sector institutions were not only covering their rurming costs but 
bringing many returns and profits to the national accounts."*^  Aden Refinery, 
the Electric Power Corporation, the national trade companies, the Insurance 
and Re-insurance Company, and the airways company (Alyemda) were only a 
few of the institutions of the public sector. Cmpared with the northern public 
sector, of which the majority was heavily subsidised by public resources, the 
southerners were running many public plants efficiently with meagre 
resources. The northerners, however, would not accept such arguments at all 
and, therefore, with a tribal mental attitude made the free market economy 
strategy an excuse to demolish all pubhc sector institutions by ad hoc 
privatisation policies, essentially for the interest of the northern private sector 
which key leadership figures had interests in."" 
Tribal attitudes and the approach of the northern leadership towards the 
southern public sector were key issues in the political escalation between the 
two leaderships. There was a major reluctance to handle southern institutions 
with fair judgement, mainly because of their vulnerability both politically and 
administratively. '^ ^ The southern institutions of public enterprises would have 
needed some time to change over from public to other economic modes 
without unnecessary disruptions to its manpower and capital assets. The 
northerners did not want to give the southerners this chance in order not to 
allow any administrative viability or supremacy. There was also another 
reason, namely, that these institutions might benefit southern traders or key 
figures in the leadership i f they were given time for an appropriate 
transformafion. The escalation of political power struggles did not help the 
southern leadership and made these institutions vulnerable. 
In view of the limited manpower accommodated by new economic 
programmes from these public sectors, the problem should not have had a 
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strong negative impact between the two leaderships. The major problems were 
in two basic sectors, namely, the agricultural and the trade and commerce 
sectors. In the agriculture sector, steps were already taken to give cooperative 
personnel lands out of governmental land to live on and to give back original 
landowners their land.''' Al l other aspects of public agricultural infrastructure 
were subject to dismantling policies by the leadership. While maintenance 
expenditure for northern public sectors were met, the southern public sectors 
were negatively discriminated against. The northern leadership failed to show 
objectivity for such a valuable infrastructure. 
As the Ministry of Finance was in the hands of the northern administration, 
southern public sectors suffered serious setbacks in terms of resources and 
programming. '" Most of the key southern figures in the major sectors were 
transferred to Sanaa. In the former PDRY, technical people at the central 
administration were programming and supervising major works for the public 
sectors in view of limited manpower resources for many projects over large 
areas of the country. In their absence, many, public sectors were left alone to 
struggle with technical issues and programmes.'" The critical issue for 
southern sectors in southern regions was the release of public resources for 
basic requirements, including maintenance and salaries. The northern 
administration severely cut the public sectors of the southern regions and 
continued to support the public and the mixed sectors in northern regions out 
of public resources.'" This made the southern leadership to consider refreating 
from the unification process, causing high political tension between northern 
and southern leaderships. 
As the political tension was rising between the political leaderships, no room 
was given to consider economic issues rationally and address their problems 
gradually and positively. 
In the first year of the unification process there were few efforts made to 
address economic issues positively by the technocrats of both parties. In 1990-
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1991, the state planned economic issues between the two former Yemeni states 
though without prior and sufficient studies. It settled the currency issue, 
namely the northern riyal and the southern dinar by imposing a ratio of 1 dinar 
to 26 riyals. It carried out all southern monetary transactions in the north and 
accomplished the structural integration of all financial and planning 
establishments of the south and the north in the capital. (Regional financial and 
planning set-ups were established beforehand (1970's) in all southern regions 
to fulf i l regional activities' needs before the unification, but northern districts 
did not all have financial and planning set-ups). 
The economic problems, at executive level, were the responsibility of two 
strategic ministries, namely, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Development and Planning. The Ministry of Finance was under the control of 
the northerners, and the Ministry of Development and Planning was under an 
independent figure from the south. The Ministry of Development and 
Planning was to deal with launching plans and external cooperation. The 
Ministry of Finance was the key institufion for the performance of the national 
' economy as all public resources and foreign loans/assistance were 
redistributed by it into the national economy. 
The Minister of Planning, however, prepared for a round table conference in 
1992 with bilateral and multilateral donors to ease the economic problems of 
the ROY after the Gulf Crisis. The Round-table Conference, to a certain 
extent, achieved its purpose but the polifical instability in Yemen did not allow 
the minister to continue in work and he left the ministry. The 1994 war 
brought further stagnation to economic conditions in view of the spiralling 
inflation which overwhelmed the economy. 
The Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, adopted harsh policies towards the 
southern public sectors. Resource allocation in the annual budgets was very 
biased against southern public enterprises. Major economic insfitufions of the 
southern public sector were left without resource allocations right from the 
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start of the integration process, while northern public enterprises such as 
textiles, cement, electrical power etc. continued to be financially supported by 
the annual budget. Southern employees of some public sectors came to Sanaa 
protesting about their miserable status and the cut-off of their salaries which 
were the only income for their hvelihood. 
There were, however, two major economic issues for which political problems 
between the two leaderships intensified, namely the oil issue and the state's 
land in the south. Having seen the northern attitudes and approaches towards 
the southern public sector, the southern leadership redirected the southern oil 
resources and its lands to finance and help public enterprises which needed 
money for their running costs. Unfortunately, this was done outside the legal 
scope and pushed political matters out of control on both sides. 
External factors had also played their roles positively and negatively. Some 
European countries objectively helped, in national economic issues, in 
particular Holland and Germany. Others suspended most of their assistance to 
ROY due to the latter's support to Iraq in the Gulf Crisis. The Gulf Crisis 
itself, however, left a negative impact on the ROY's economy. About 900,000 
Yemenis working in neighbouring countries were driven off by the GCC 
countries - mainly KSA - and sent back to Yemen. The unemployment figure 
rose to 35% of the working force in this period. To feed these populations, the 
Government had to provide heavy subsidies for basic food items (see Chapter 
5). This ultimately caused heavy depreciation of the local currency and 
worsened economic condifions, especially in southern areas.'" 
4.3.2 The Progress of Integration in the Social Field 
Principally, the two Yemeni states shared similar social structures, values and 
cultural background but did not share the same degree of social progress and 
social style of life. Tribal attitudes and values, in general, existed in the two 
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states but with degrees of social variation.'^* The south, for instance, owing to a 
background of British occupafion had a strong colonial impact in the colony of 
Aden - the former capital of the south. Women were working with men since 
the 1940's and educafion for girls covered all parts of Aden colony.'" The ex-
PDRY enhanced the education sector for both males and females in all 
districts/villages and centres and led an effective illiteracy campaign 
programme until the ratio of illiteracy went down to 40%i of the population in 
1980.'^ ^ These achievements were made possible by the socialist-orientated 
policies the ex-PDRY adopted, and by the low profile of tribalism in the south. 
The ex-YAR invested in educafion in its development plans, but for males 
more than females. The ex-YAR did not invest in social structures as 
horizontally as the south because of socio-economic reasons. Few cities in the 
north provided decent education to females and, under the impact of tribal 
bonds in the northern community, there was a naturally slow process of 
educational progress for both rural males and females.''' This resulted in a 
wide gap developing in the educational standards of the north and the south. 
With the above background on the key sector of education in the two Yemeni 
states, we can understand some of the apparent difficulties in the social 
integration of the ROY. 
There were, however, hypersensitivities between the two leaderships in the 
integration of the social field which ought to have progressed without 
difficulfies. There were two reasons for these sensitivifies. The first one was 
that there was no question that the south, socially, was more advanced than the 
north and that could be attributed to the political environment of both the ex-
British and communist systems which the northern leadership hated intensely. 
The second reason was that the tribal mentality of the northern leadership, 
which opposed very much the idea of equalisation of men with women, as this 
(from their point of view), violated basic principles of Islam. 
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This northern state of mind crippled the social progress of the southerners and 
any efforts of substantial integration in social fields. Instead, it forced the 
socially advanced trend in the south to regress. 
As the social integration issue is too varied, we shall only pick up a couple of 
issues to show the lack of integration in this field over this period. These 
issues are the family law and the Yemeni womens' union. 
4.3.2.1 The Family Laws 
The family laws were traditionally incorporated within Al-Share'a law, which 
would be subject to multi-facfional Islamic doctrines in Arab and Islamic 
countries of which the ROY is one.'*° In the former southern state, the socialist 
regime enacted a family law (no. 1) of 1974 whereby females would get all 
their Islamic and national rights within their domesfic lives.'" Women for 
instance, would not be divorced without a good reason and without their prior 
consent. They would also have the right of divorce on good reasons via 
courts, in addition to many rights elaborated in the law. In the former northern 
state, there was no family law as such, and women were only subject to the 
traditional code of civil condifions which were incorporated within Al-Share'a 
in its pure form.'" In view of the changing socio-economic parameters in 
Yemeni society, northern females did not enjoy the same formal rights of their 
sisters in the south. Family Law in the south defined the marriage age for the 
female and the age gap between the wife and the husband plus other issues.'" 
It also put a limit on the dowry paid by the man to the women to eliminate 
social stratification in the society.'*" It went fiirther than this in limiting 
polygamy i.e. one wife for a man unless there were good reasons for another 
one and with the consent of the first wife to live with the husband, otherwise 
she could be freed from the marriage.'" Legally the family law put males and 
females on the same legal stance of equality. 
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Under the unified system, the family law was the southern version, but did not 
enjoy recognifion among the judiciary of the northerners.'** It was under severe 
attack by many forces, particularly the power centre and other effective tribal 
forces. 
4.3.2.2 The Position of Women in the Community 
The position of women in the two former Yemeni states was variable and was 
highly marginalised in the unified system. The south, within its socialist 
system, gave women equal rights in terms of employment, payment, education 
and all political rights. Southern women were represented in almost all 
institutions and at all hierarchies of the political and civil administrations 
except the polit-bureau and the cabinet. They were represented in the military 
and security forces, although at lower hierarchies. In the north, women did 
have a state-administrative role but at a far lower level than the southern 
females.'*' 
The main reason for the higher level of southern females than northern females 
in the northern community related to the type of regime and the extent of tribal 
clusters in the power centre of the leadership.'** The tribal clusters in general 
existed in both leaderships, but the ideologies of the polifical systems in the 
two states had different impacts. The social - oriented system of the south 
fostered women's unions in a much more horizontally organised form in the 
state. It created branches of the Yemeni Women's Union across the country 
with a heavy policy impact on women's liberation for self-economic support. 
In the north, the YAR leadership also created such organisations, but in fewer 
regions. However, the tribal mentality in the rulership of the YAR impacted on 
the types of work of these social institutions. The rural women for example 
were receiving some help for rural diversification in terms of economic 
support but the legal backbone of the rural females remained tied up by the 
traditional legal mechanism. 
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After unificafion, these unions were amalgamated and worked together, but 
instead of supporting each other within the Yemeni Women's Union 
framework, they tended to compete negatively with each other. Thus 
reflecfing the political struggle in the power centre of the two leaderships. 
The social dimension, therefore, did not benefit within the unified system, like 
other dimensions. 
4.4 The Military Structures in the Two Yemeni States'*' 
4.4.1 Basically, the two military structures of former YAR and PDRY did not vary 
from each other. The YAR's structure had the same type of forces - Coastal, 
Marine and Navy, and Air Forces - like the PDRY, and all came under the 
, supervision of the Chief Commandant of the Armed Forces. There was, 
however, some difference in the high-level administration of the two structures 
and in the extent of disciplinary systems be^A'een the two. 
4.4.1.1 The Military Structure in the Y A R Before Integration 
The military structure in the YAR was within a military institution chaired by 
the President of the State as the General Commandant of the armed forces at 
the top of the institutional hierarchy. 
The YAR also enjoyed a nafional defence council - the Higher National 
Defence Council (HNDC) - presided by the President of the State, and had the 
key figures of the mihtary institution as members. 
The second figure in the military insfitufion was the Chief Commandant of the 
Armed Forces, who was responsible for the daily routine of all military 
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institution activities. The Chief Commandant of the armed forces was also 
responsible for all other tower hierarchies in training, administrafion, finance, 
technical affairs and ammunition, as well as all military operations. 
4.4.1.2 The Military Structure in the PDRY before the Integration 
The PDRY military structure was within a ministry framework which 
constituted part of the cabinet parastatals though with a unique relevance than 
other , ministries. The Minister of Defence was the top key figure of the 
military structure and one of the key figures in the Cabinet. He was also a key 
member in the Executive Office of the NF or polit-bureau member in the YSP. 
The Vice-Minister of Defence was the second man in the structure and he and 
the Minister were mainly responsible for the policy making of the sector. 
The Chief Commandant of the armed forces was the key figure in the structure 
for implemenfing all acfivifies. 
Below this level, the same hierarchies of the YAR's structure were in the 
PDRY's though with slight differences. 
4.4.2 Manpower Composition in the Military Structures of the YAR and PDRY 
There were differences in manpower composition of the military structures of 
the states both in high-level administration and in the lower hierarchies. 
4.4.2,1 Manpower Composition in the YAR's Military Structure 
207 
Due to the strong tribal bonds in the YAR's society, the YAR's military 
structure was characterised by tribal recruitment both in the higher and lower 
hierarchies. The major areas of manpower recruitment in the military 
institution in the YAR was from the Hashed and Bakeel tribes. Other small 
tribes like the Al-Hamdy tribes from Mareb and Jawf were also recruited. 
Zaydi Hashemites (Prophet's descendants) also enjoyed recruitment into this 
structure. Military power, however, was exclusively for either the Bakeel or 
Hashed tribes' figures. 
On a doctrinal basis the Shafais, who constituted a majority in the YAR's 
population, were fewer than the Zaydis at all hierarchical levels of the military 
institution. Considering the strength of tribal bonds in the society, most of the 
trainees for this institution (locally and abroad) were from the Zaydis who 
always held the policy-planning power of the state. The Shafais had fewer 
chances in this respect and therefore they were recruited into technical 
hierarchies, but away from ammunition storage or military policy planning. 
This resulted in the majority of Zaj'dis being in key positions, and the m.ajorit}' 
of Shafais in lower orders. 
There was a high level of mistrust in this institution between the two main 
factions of the Zaydis and the Shafais. This mistrust was accelerated by a 
Nasserist coup in 1987 against the regime, which failed. Three of its Shafai 
leaders (and one Zaydi) were sentenced to death. 
The military labour force in the YAR was very difficult to estimate for two 
reasons. First, the labour database was poorly constructed and badly organised 
in the national arena, let alone in the military institution. Second, it was highly 
unlikely under tribal bonds to escape tribal loyalty for forces who were paid 
but without disciplinary rules for their presence. In case of emergencies, it 
would be the tribal bonds rather than military discipline which would 
guarantee the defence of the country. However, reliable sources estimate that 
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the military force of the YAR in the preunification period was about 200,000 
personnel. This figure includes children aged (10 years to 15 years). 
4.4.2.2. Manpower Composition in the PDRY's Military Structure 
Some tribal values were inherited from the Brifish military system in the 
PDRY. The British adminisfration in the former Eastern and Western 
Protectorates recruited important tribe's personnel for the military insfitutions 
in southern regions. Aulaqis in Shabwa, Hadhrami Bedouins in Hadhramout 
and the Bedouin tribes in Abyan were ideal for such recruitment. Dhale'a 
Redfan and Yafe'a in Lahj regions were all strongly tribal areas. 
It was, therefore, natural that the PDRY's military institution - in the form of 
the ministry - was composed from these tribal areas, namely Dhale'a, Redfan, 
Yafe'a Awaleq (Shabwah in General) Abyan .and Hadhramout. With such a 
composifion of manpower, the PDRY had a wider spectrum of tribal factions 
from southern regions. The leadership in high level hierarchies of the military 
structure were composed of Redfan, Dhalea'a, Abyan and Yafea. It is worth 
mentioning that the higher presence in the structure as a whole was for the 
Redfan and Dhale'a facfions, whose presence in civil posts was nominal. 
Manpower figures in the south hardly exceeded 70,000. This includes the 
military reserves but not the miliria forces. The formal military forces of the 
PDRY, according to military sources, were between 55 and 60,000. The 
students, who were compelled to join the forces as part of their compulsory 
two-year service, were around 3000 to 5000. The Milifia force was made of 
the civilians of both sexes who would go for 45 days military training with 
Cuban experts. This force was practically ineffective and was created by 
Ismail to assist in urban areas in specific circumstances such as a coup d'etat 
or emergencies, but, they had only light weaponry. 
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4.4.3 The Impact of Ideology in the Military Administrations 
While the PDRY incorporated a Marxist-Leninist socialist ideology in its 
military structure, the YAR stressed further the tribal loyalty ideology in its 
military institution. 
We shall discuss below the extent of the impact of these ideologies on the 
military administration and discipline in the YAR and the PDRY. 
4.4.3.1 The Impact of the Tribal Bonds Ideology in the YAR's Military 
Institution 
The YAR administrative system had built-in formal tribal structures, and this 
administrative system had a deep impact on the military administration. The 
hegemony of the Zaydi cast in the military institution reflected the strong 
loyalty to tribal bonds among the Zaydi tribes and Hashemites. Specifically, 
tribal bonds were the prime ideology spoon-fed to this vital sector which was 
regarded as the backbone for the cast's survival in the leadership of the state. 
The strength of tribal bonds in this institution had a strong negative impact on 
the administrative performance of the military institution. There was hardly a 
Shafai figure in the top 5-6 highest administrative posts. Disbursement of 
tasks, ammunitions and other sensitive functions were fully controlled by the 
Hashed or Bakeel tribes, or another Zaydi faction. This would be subject to 
personnel loyalties to the institution's leadership. Enrolment of forces would 
include youngsters aged 9-15 years old of the same faction. The institution's 
discipline practices in its deployed forces was of a low profile. At lower 
hierarchies, there was hardly a disciplinary order. By 9.30am, the majority of 
soldiers were seen driving their taxis in cities or disposed to personal 
activities, though wearing formal military uniform. As the YAR's borders we 
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assured by all surrounding neighbours - for its non-aligned pohcies - the 
insfitution, probably, had a flexible military discipline compared to its sister in 
the south as the state policies made it open to attacks. 
4.4.3.2 The Impact of Marxist-Leninist Ideology in the PDRY's Military 
Institution 
There was, at least, a touch of tribal bond impact, in addition to the well-
established socialist ideology adopted by the military institufion two years 
after independence (1969) in the southern military institution. Most of the NF 
and YSP Southern leadership had tribal bonds, but of a fragmented nature. 
Because of the civic urban life in the main towns of each southern district, 
tribal bonds tended to have a regional rather than purely tribal basis. The 
military insfitufion was absolutely committed to the polifical ideology of 
scientific socialism adopted and strongly adhered to by the NFA^SP. Despite 
the deep penetration of this political ideology into the military structure, tribal 
or regional bonds among military manpower (at all levels) were remarkably 
observed. The political affiliafion of military personnel was meant to 
supersede tribal and regional bonds but in effect it did not fully achieve this. 
Polifical disputes in the polifical and state administrations in 1969, 1978, 1980 
and 1986 reflected on the military institufion. Deposed state figures were 
followed with deposed military personnel of the same regions or factions. 
On the disciplinary aspect, the southern set-up had a British legacy of 
autonomous administration. The southern military set-up acquired British 
experience, financially and administratively. It had a profound disciplinary 
system, morally and materially. It incorporated serious programmes of 
training, manufacture, manoeuvring and others. Some of its leading figures 
had studied at the British Military Academy, and later on at the Russian high 
level military academies in all fields. 
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Two factors helped its disciplinary progress, namely, the political viability of 
the area and the topography of the country. The institution was under pressure 
to safeguard its territories from neighbouring states, many of which had bad 
relations with PDRY because of the socialist-oriented policies. This had often 
made southern troops along the borders very alert. The geographical 
topography of PDRY was also another factor in the strong discipline of the 
military institution. The total area of the PDRY was approximately 300 sq. 
km, while the military force did not exceed 60,000 personnel in all fields. The 
northern land borders of the country was over 2,000 km and the PDRY coasts 
were of a similar length. To keep well protected from invasion, the southern 
military institution had to have sound disciplinary machinery especially after 
the 1972 war with KSA in which the latter over-ran the Al-Wade'a area north 
of the Hadhramouti border with KSA. Frequent attacks on the eastern sides 
were also further challenges. Al l of these attacks were underlined by the non-
recognition of the PDRY State by its neighbours. 
4.4.4 Military Integration in the R O Y in 1990 
The story of military integration in the newly established republic of the ROY 
is a sad one. Both the former Yemeni states arranged for the integration of 
their two armies but the magnitudes in their variational differences could not 
positively have helped their integration, especially in the way it was handled. 
The two sides exchanged military sites for some of their units; a few northern 
battalions/brigades were in Abyan, Lahej and Hadhramout and some southern 
units were in Sanaa, Dhamar and Harf-Sufian. These arrangements, however, 
were disintegrative rather than integrative measures in the overall integration 
process of the country, particularly in view of no prior preparation for 
establishing harmonial relations between the two forces. 
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Below is an account of the military integration of the ROY and its aftermath. 
The above introduction and the preceding information on the two armies needs 
to be in mind for the forthcoming analysis. 
4.4,4.1 The Ideological Impact on Military Integration in 1990-1994 
One of the major factors that did not help in achieving successful military 
integration was the ideological division in the psyche of the southern and 
northern military persormel. The socialist oriented ideology in southern troops 
was too strong and would not accept the tribal Zaydi (Islamic) mentality into 
the military system. Though tribal influence was a phenomenon in the 
southern army, it was of a much lesser degree than in the northern army, and 
this was related to the community structures of both states. While the socialist 
system helped in disintegrating tribalism in the south, the north was 
characterised by a system which socially supported tribalism. Originally, 
southern tribes were of a fragmented nature while northern tribes, especially of 
the Zaydi faction, were very much consolidated. This had a great impact in 
the northern military force, not only in the enrolment of the payroll sheets, but 
rather in the type of Task Force assigned to specific factions. 
After the integration, the military set-up clearly developed into two military 
blocks with different national attitudes, and politically motivated by their 
respective political leaders. The two top military personnel in the set-up of the 
Ministry of Defence were the Minister of Defence - Haithem Qassen (from the 
south) and the Chief Commandant of the armed forces - Abdulla Al-Basheiri 
(from the north). The two figures were politically committed: the former to the 
YSP and the latter to the GPC. Each one of them had command access only to 
his regional faction in the set-up. Generally speaking, the two military set-ups 
were working side by side under one central roof, owing to the wide difference 
in the ideological impact of the two systems. 
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4.4.4.2 Organisational Problems in the Military Set-up. 
Due to the large ideological chasm between the two military set-ups, some 
organisational problems enclaved within the new joined military apparatus 
became apparent. The two military set-ups maintained in their units 
administrative and financial organs. Both systems used to have budgetary 
resource allocations for their annual needs from the Ministry of Finance in 
each state. This, centrally, remained so but was distributed through the 
southern machinery since the set-up was under the control of southerners. 
Within the military institutions of the southern regions, military expenditures 
were run under a self monitoring financial system, appropriately and 
efficiently. But, within the northern military institutions, this self - monitoring 
system failed to be applied properly as it revealed mismanagement of the 
allocated resources such as imaginary recruitment on the payroll sheets and a 
. highly over-centralised system leading to financial corruption in resource 
allocation. 
On the administrative side, military recruitment continued to be made on 
tribal/ideological bases. The northern side in the military institution was 
recruiting on a tribal basis. I f the father of a family had died, one of his 
offspring would normally be recruited even i f he were a juvenile. The southern 
military elite would never refuse to allow a YSP applicant to join the 
institution. 
Units of tanks, land and other sites were exchanged between the two former 
states. Northern task forces moved to Abyan and southern task forces moved 
to Dhamar and Sanaa under the control of their respective administration. It 
was hoped that after some time there would be some integration at regional 
level as well but the negative experience in that respect brought 
disappointment to central leadership. 
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4.4.4.3 Political Intervention in tiie Military Set-up 
One of the major setbacks to military integration in the ROY was the political 
intervention of the two leaderships in military affairs. President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, who was the General Commander of the Armed Forces of the North up 
to the eve of unification day, remained the ultimate sponsor of the northem 
military institutions. As his tribal members were the elite of the key military 
northem institutions, he kept in touch with all military developments and 
continued to give a helping hand when needed to the northem faction in the 
military. On the other hand, Al-Beidh - the General Secretary of the YSP - was 
also in touch with military developments directly with the southern Minister of 
Defence. 
The political intervention by Saleh and Al-Beidh had a negative impact on the 
military institution. The first reason was the political disputes which 
developed between the two leaderships in running the integration process 
objectively. Neither side, as seen in the preceding sections of this chapter, 
could come objectively to a compromised formula with the other. The rivalry 
of power supremacy reflected in the whole of the ROY systems, including that 
of the military. 
The second reason of the negative impact due to political intervention was a 
constitutional one. In view of the new military institutional changes which 
took place after unification. President Saleh realised that there would be no 
place for him for direct involvement in the armed forces after a defence 
ministry was established. This problem was solved constitutionally. The 
project of the Unified State Constitution involved the establishment of a 
National Defence Council (NDC) in the 4* section of Chapter One. The NDC 
was to be presided over by the President and he was to be responsible for the 
ROY security. This constitution did not involve the Vice-President in the 
affairs of NDC, but only gave access to the President of the Presidenfial 
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Council to run military affairs. Thus, the President's intervention was legalised 
through such limited access. 
On the other hand, the YSP administrative structure implied the inevitable 
membership of key governmental figures of which the Minister of Defence 
was the most relevant one. This allowed the Minister of Defence to provide 
regular reports on the function of his institutions to the polit-bureau of the 
YSP as a key member in the political institution. 
The final reason for such a negative impact from political intervention was the 
concealed loyalty of the leadership to their tribes' Sheikhs and factional 
grouping. 
Military and security recruitment was often observed by the writer to take 
place at high-level authority (Presidential Council) in response to Sheikhs' 
applications (frorn^ both sides) to enrol teams or individuals into the militar>' 
institutions. Several enrolments were also seen by the writer based on 
applications made by the two political organisations - the GPC and the YSP • 
to their respective military leaders. Experience and qualifications were not 
considered for administrative, technical functions, advice, responsibility or 
recruitment sectors. Such acts accelerated the political friction between the 
two leaderships in the military institutions. 
4.4.4.4 The Civil War of 1994 
Due to the acceleration of political disputes between the southern/northern 
leaderships, the country experienced a rough bloody war between the two 
armies which resulted in the national devastation of military manpower, 
weaponry, loss of equipment and damage to public properties. 
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As political frictions between the GPC and YSP leaderships were reaching 
boiling point, the two armies escalated their harassment against each other in 
the different parts of Yemen.'™ This obviously had a negative impact on 
military affairs, and culminated with public speeches by both Saleh and Al -
Beidh in their respective media, each accusing the other of national treason 
against Yemeni unification. The military of the northern faction in southern 
areas, namely, the Al-Amaleqah Task Force Unit in Abyan, irresponsibly was 
publically provocative after the 1993 elecdon. The Minister of Defence, a 
young southern elite, over-reacted to such harassment and often had to be 
calmed by some wise southern elites to keep calm and prevent southern forces 
from reacting. Worst of all, however. President Saleh in whose ultimate 
security the ROY rested, was surrounded by irresponsible over-reacting 
advisors of the northern military institution. These drove him fiirther to deliver 
critical statements in his speeches and in parallel with Al-Beidh's statements 
in the south. 
The war started after a public statement delivered by the President on 27"" 
April 1994 stated that the YSP had opened a war front and commenced with 
military activity in Dhamar and other areas, and warned the YSP that a heavy 
negative impact would be the result of this irresponsible attitude.'" Within 
hours, heavy fighting broke out in a suburb of Sanaa, and a whole southern 
unit was destroyed. 
Several efforts were made with the help of international figures from France, 
and other regional military figures to contain the situation, but all failed. A 
joint military committee was made of the two sides and supervised by foreign 
military personnel from Jordan, France and USA to contain and discuss the 
situation with all concerned authorities in the two leaderships for a few days, 
but in vain. The Harf Sufian incidents, which wiped out all southern units in 
the area, was followed by a similar incident in Dhamar when another southern 
tank force was provoked by northern security forces. The confrontation 
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between the northern/southern units was heavy and on May 4* 1994, a full war 
was launched between the two forces. 
Since 4th May 1994, two months of civil war went on between the two armies 
leaving great military and civil destruction in southern areas. Tanks, airforce 
and land troops were fully mobilised and concentrated in southem regions. 
Military attacks were described hour by hour One Thousand Hours of War by 
Dr Colonel Abdul-Wali Al-Shamiri - a northem Islamist from the Islah party. 
Despite the valuable recorded information on military events, Dr Al-Shamiry 
failed to keep his personal emotions neutral, at the expense of the ex-
communist southem leaders.'^ ' 
The general strategy of the war was to destroy each other's military capacities, 
but then the strategy went further and attempted to deplete the political power 
of the other. No one denied the supremacy of southem military institutions 
against the northem ones in terms of equipment (airforce in particular) and 
trained manpower. In the first two weeks, and despite the loss of all southem. 
tank: forces in northem areas, the northem army suffered heavy losses 
particularly in Dhalea area. This loss was almost equal to the losses of 
southem forces in northem areas. However, later on, Saleh used his valuable 
card, namely, the southem ex-mihtary leadership who fled in 1986 to the YAR 
with the ex-President Al i Nasser. 
Headed by Colonel-Staff Abdo Rabbu Mausoor Hadi, southem ex-military 
personnel arranged themselves in various military groups and marched in 
support of northem forces fi'om all directions against southem regions, 
guaranteeing victories to Saleh. Saleh then appointed Staff-Colonel Hadi as 
Minister of Defence, replacing Staff-Colonel Haithem Qassin. 
Southem military groups, which were mainly from Abyan and Shabwa, who 
were on Saleh's side had a significant role in the victory of northem military 
forces over southemers. They opened the roads in Abyan, Shabwah and 
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Hadhramout regions through old routes into these areas. Backed by northern 
forces, they surprised southern troops from the rear. The southern airforce had 
two roles: hitting the advance of the northern masses (who were mainly 
civilian volunteers from the Islamists) and northern troops marching towards 
Aden from Dhalea's route, and lifting the injured to local hospitals and abroad. 
As the fighting grew severe, the southern leadership realised that it was the 
end of unification with the north and, accordingly, the YSP leadership 
declared the re-establishment of the PDRY once again. Such a decision was 
not made lightly by the southerners. In the south, this was highly welcomed 
but condemned in the north. Under such a situation, the war was accelerated 
and this time the northern side enjoyed more support, politically and militarily. 
Masses of people voluntarily joined forces and outnumbered the southern 
forces. By 7"' July 1994, northern troops achieved an absolute military victory 
in all southern regions. 
There were a few reasons for the northern victory over the southern military. 
There is no doubt that the southern military force in Saleh's hand was the 
major factor in terms of their military experience and in terms of tribal weight 
in their indigenous areas. Of these the most important were Colonel Ahmed 
Musa'ed Hassein of Shabwa, Sulaiman Baqais of Abyan, Faisal Rajab also of 
Abyan, and Qatan and Al-Mohmadi of Hadhramout. With the exception of 
Shabwa, other groups accessed old and left over old track roads which the new 
southern military elite was unaware of or probably never thought it would be 
traceable by the enemy. 
The second reason for the demoralisation of the southern troops was because 
of the swift change in their life which was formally was secure in the centrally 
planned economy, and then became subject to market forces with remarkable 
negligence to their conditions. Under the new economic system, the poor 
soldier would not have the chance to compete effectively with his limited 
technical capacity especially in view of wide-scale corruption. To the majority. 
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however, the situation would get worse i f the leadership was composed of 
northem Shafais, as it was before unification. In consideration to the 
composition of the YSP, the northem shafais members were exceeding 75% of 
the total. Going into sole power in the ex-PDRY, would mean the 
incorporation of those northem shafais again in the PDRY power structure - a 
situation the layman southemer would accept at all. 
Al l these factors made most of the military elite in the southem military 
institution not to be enthusiastic about committing to long drawn out war with 
their northem brothers. The southem force on Saleh's side provided huge 
amounts of money to some southem camp leaders to surrender. Al-Anad 
camp, the largest military institution, and highly equipped as an autonomous 
military site, was, thus, surrendered by a key figure in the southem elite 
(Haithem's cousin) in exchange for US$ 14 million, which tumed out to be 
conterfeit money at a later stage."'' 
The third reason was a political one. It was a historic mistake to re-establish 
the PDRY under its former name. The whole world would not approve of 
having two states under one/similar entity fighting each other again. The YSP 
leadership could have won the war politically i f it chose another entity such as 
the South Arabia Federation for South Yemen. It could only then be given a 
second chance but with a different elite formation. 
4.5 Assessment and conclusion 
In assessing this chapter, the researcher feels that great damage took place 
against the unification process due to tribalism and factionalism in both sides. 
The two sides, unfortunately, did not honour Yemen unity with a positive 
national destiny. Each side wanted to control the whole national arena for its 
party and faction. The two systems, as a result of the unity disfunction, went 
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hand in hand; and the power centre with its tribal attitudes and approaches to 
national issues kept itself occupied by fighting each other for political gains. 
Tribalism in the north was still very raw and the southern leadership, 
unfortunately, was hasty in promoting such a type of unification. The 
southerners realised too late their mistake. However, they did not make use of 
the transitional stage by which they could revise unification steps rationally 
with the assistance of regional and international circles. On the other hand, 
made many mistakes as well. They became corrupt, politically, 
administratively and financially; they even reacted factionally to the tribal 
attitudes of the northern leadership. There were some attempts made by the 
southern leadership to build central institutions based on law and order, but 
this came very late. The southerners did not utilise the strong cadres they had 
in the south and preferred to fill the ministerial posts with 'loyalists' rather 
than strong technocrats. Northerner tribalism, however, did not give any 
chance to build up strong and sound central institutions. They wanted their 
previous mechanisms to continue in order to serve tribal needs in the power 
centre primarily. In general there was a huge lack of understanding towards the 
unification process and for the national needs for Yemen integrity. 
Yemen democracy was good on the surface, but very hollow underneath. Al l 
types of illegalifies, restrictions and prohibitions were exercised in the name of 
democracy. Tribalism, nepotism, financial corruption, forging, assassination, 
kidnapping and theft were exercised in Sanaa against the southerners, some 
opposition groupings, and sometimes against foreigners. Public resources 
were misused and mishandled by the top political parties The YSP, in 
particular, through its corrupt figures in the government, sold southern lands 
and used the money for its election campaign. The GPC with the YSP had the 
major share of the budget resources for their election campaigns and this put 
them at an advantaged state compared to other small parties. 
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Tribalism and factionalism in the power centre of the two major parties had a 
strong impact on their respective communities. This could easily be seen by 
the election results where the major seats of both the northem and the southem 
in the parliament were taken by the GPC and YSP respectively. These 
decisive, and divisive, results showed that the unification of Yemen was not in 
good shape at all. 
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CHAPTERS 
Yemen Integration in the Post-War Period, 1994-1998 
This Chapter covers the integration between north and south Yemen following the 
civil war of 1994. It critically analyses Yemeni integration after changes in the 
unified constitution were made and approved by Parliament in July 1994, and 
were endorsed by the Presidency in October 1994. This chapter shows the 
negative influence of tribal bonds on national affairs and how the unification 
between the two parts of Yemen was heavily damaged in its profile and contents 
as northern tribal power, in different forms, achieved hegemony within the power 
centre of the ROY. 
5.1 Political Measures taken after the 1994 War 
The pattern of co-operative unification, which had existed prior to 1994, was 
changed after the 1994 war into a pattern of imposed unification. One-man rule 
within the context of the Zaydi hegemony over the state - the system which had 
characterised the former YAR - became the framework within which decisions 
were made at the highest levels of the ROY's administration.' 
5.1.1 The Central Trends of Political Organisation in the Post-War Period. 
At the political level, the two most dynamic factors (besides the war) that changed 
the co-operative unification pattern of integration into an imposed one were: (i) 
the changes in the constitution in July 1994, and (ii) the formation of a 
government based on the coalition of the two major northern parties, namely the 
GPC and Islah, with the exclusion of the YSP from the power centre and the 
government. 
The constitution was changed in July 1994, giving the President extensive 
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national powers at all levels, and marginalising the position of the Vice-President 
in national affairs.^ Though this followed the American experience/model, 
Yemeni statutes were not made to conform with the federal statutes of the USA. 
The changes in the constitution gave more power to the President in particular and 
to the Hashedi tribal power base in general.^  The power centre in Yemen came 
under the domination of two key Hashedi figures, namely the President of the 
state, Saleh, who was also the Chairman of the GPC, and Sheikh Abdulla Al -
Ahmer, Chairman of Parliament, Chief Shiekh of the Hashed tribe and the 
Chairman of the Islah Party. It should be noted, however, that although both 
figures were close to each other, they did have some conflicting views on state 
governance. 
The new government, after the war, was presided over by Premier Abdul Aziz 
Abdul Ghani, an ex-YAR Premier from the Taiz region, with all cabinet members 
coming from the two major northern parties of the GPC and Islah."* The only 
independent minister in the new government was Mr. Faisal Bin Shamlan, 
Minister of Oil and Mineral Wealth. He was a southerner from Hadhramout with 
pro-Islamist views, clearly expressed in the 'Al-Minbar' quarterly paper which he 
sponsored.^ Mr. Bin Shamlan, however, resigned in 1996 because of what he 
considered to be unsatisfactory policies and interventions in his sector.^  
The YSP was removed from an active role in government and was generally 
restricted, particularly in the military sphere, effectively removing formal political 
representation to the new leadership structure for the southern regions. With the 
political and the material ground of the YSP destroyed, a political gap was left in 
the southern region which other parties sought to f i l l . The GPC and Islah parties 
both adopted strategies aimed at increasing their roles in the southern regions, and 
enrolled thousands of southerners in the membership of each party.^ 
At the top leadership level of the two parties, few southerners were incorporated 
into the leading bodies. The "General Committee" - the policy making body of the 
GPC presided over by the President - incorporated five southerners out of 31 
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members in 1994. These were:' 
Staff Brigadier A.R. Mansoor: 
Mr Abdul Qader Bajammai: 
Mr Abdullah Al-Bar: 
Mr Abdulla Ghanem: 
Mr Mohamed Al-Shaddadi: 
Vice-President of the State who had 
been a Y S P until the 1986 war. 
Deputy Premier and Minister of 
Planning, who had been a Y S P 
central committe member up to 
1986 war in the south. 
Advisor to the President who had been a 
Polit-bureau member of the Y S P up to 
1978. 
Minister of Legal Affairs who had 
been a member of the Central 
Y S P until 1986. 
Deputy-Governor of Abyan who 
was employed in the Ministry of 
Agriculture in the P D R Y 
It is worth noting that all of the above candidates were from the Al i Nasser 
Mohamed faction which had caused the 1986 civil war in the former PDRY 
and fled to North Yemen.' Two of the above members were from Hadhramout, 
two were from Abyan and one was from Aden.'" Lahej and Al-Mahara regions 
in the South were not represented in the General Committee. The only member 
from Shabwa was Dr Nasser Awlaqi who had lived in North Yemen since 
South Yemen's independence, but was of Shabwa origin. 
The Islah Party incorporated even fewer southerners in its top level policy-
making structure, namely the "Higher Committee". Out of its 16 members, the 
Higher Committee incorporated only two southerners, both of whom were of 
Hadhrami origin:'' 
Mr Mahfoodh Shammakh: 
Mr. Abdullah Bukair: 
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A Hadhrami merchant residing in 
San'aa since south independence 
A Qadi from Hadhramout. 
Neither one of these members had enjoyed any political experience in the former 
PDRY, nor was widely known among southerners, except in Hadhramout. 
It should be noted that both parties had previously sought to ensure that every 
major tribe and region of northern Yemen was represented in their top policy 
making committees. That consideration was achieved in northern regions by 
incorporating key figures from different Zaydi tribal groups (Hashed, Bakeel and 
the Zaydi faction fi-om Medhaj) and similarly of influential Shafai figures from 
Taiz, Ibb, Al-Hudaidah and Al-Beida regions.'^ It was also important to include 
individuals from the Hashamite and Qadi factions, and some Zaydi/Ismaili 
educated figures.'^ However, it was not intended to achieve or maintain a balance 
of power for southern regions or for southerners under the ROY. In view of there 
being only a handful number of members from the southern regions, there was a 
natural tendency to pursue northern orientated goals/policies. 
As can be seen from the information given above, not all southern regions were 
represented in the policy-making committees of the two parties.''' The Islah, 
moreover, incorporated southern figures from Hadhramout with no political 
weight (one was a merchant and the other a religious figure). The Islah party in 
particular regarded the southern population, with the exception of Hadhramis, as 
living outside Al-Share'a law. This was declared formally by Qadi Al-Dailamy 
who was Minister of Justice in the Coalition. 
Both parties were concerned more with gaining control of southern resources than 
with gaining support from the southern population. The southern regions had 
significant potential in their diversified resources, especially Aden and 
Hadhramout where the main activities in oil and minerals, oil refineries and 
international services were concentrated. Shabwa and Al-Mahara had also some 
oil prospect while all southern regions had abundant of fish resources. Most 
important, however, southern regions had various underground water acquifers, a 
characteristic which hardly existed in Northern Yemen and other areas of the 
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Arabian Peninsula. Such diversified strategic resources in southern regions made 
both parties interested in gaining an upper hand in the south at any cost. 
The small number of southern members in the political parties' leaderships 
indicated that neither the GPC nor Islah were keen on having southerners in the 
leadership. They wanted as many southern members as possible but would not 
allow them a 'say' in the policy-making mechanism.'^ The southerners that were 
in the GPC leadership did not carry the same political weight in the leadership as 
their northern colleagues, nor did they have high technical capacities. Apart from 
Mr. Abdulla Ghanem, who was distinguished for his sustained legal experience, 
the rest of the GPC southern elite had little experience as policy-makers. 
The two governing parties used a variety of means to attract southerners to join 
their membership such as offering employment, land and money (and even 
marriage expenses to the very few southerners that became members of the Islah 
party). Some young southerners were genuinely dedicated to the parties' 
principles. The majority, however, were not interested in politics and only joined 
out of self-interest and a desire for self-protection. Some, indeed showed 
resentment at having to join the party for these reasons.'^  
5.1.2 The Formation of the New Coalition Government (1994-1997) 
The new cabinet was presided over by Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani, a key member of 
the GPC. Of the 17 GPC seats in the Cabinet, 5 seats were given to southern 
members of the party.see table no 5-.4. 
The following members of the GPC were in the 1994-1997 cabinet 
1. Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani Premier of the Cabinet (N) 
2. Dr Abdul Karim Al-Iryani Deputy Premier, Minister of 
Foriegn affairs (N) 
3. Dr Mohammed Sa'id Al-Attar Deputy Premier, Minister of 
Industry (N) 
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4. Abdul Qader Bajammal 
5. Brigadier. A.M.AI-Sayyani 
6. Brigadier Hussein Arab 
7. Sadeq Abu Ras 
8. Abdulla A l - Batani 
9. Ahmed Salem Al-Jabali 
10. Abdul Rahman Al-Akwa'a 
11. Ali Hamid Sharaf 
12. Hussein Al-Arashi 
13. Ahmed Musa'ed 
14. Ahmed Sofan 
15. Ahmed Al-Anesi 
16. Mohammed Raweh 
17. Abdullah Ghanem 
Deputy Premier, Minister of 
Development and Planning (S) 
Minister of Defence (N) 
Minister of Interior (S) 
Minister of Civil Service 
and Training (N) 
Minister of Labour and 
Insurances (S) 
Minister of Agriculture and 
Water Resources (N) 
Minister of Information (N) 
Minister of Housing, Municipality 
and Construction (N) 
Minister of Culture (N) 
Minister of Transport (S) 
Minister of Industry (N) 
Minister of Communication (N) 
Minister of Sports (N) 
Minister of Legal Affairs 
(Adeni of northern origin) 
The Islah party held the following eight ministeries, of which only one was held 
by a southerner: 
1. Abdul Wahab AI-Anesi 
2. Ahmed Al-Dailamy 
3. Mohammed Al-Qurashi 
4. Mohammed Afandi 
5. Abdul Rahman BafhadhI 
6. DrAbdoQubati 
Deputy Premier (N) 
Minister of Justice (IM) 
Minister of Endowment (N) 
Minister of Trade and Supply (N) 
He resigned in 1996 and 
Mohammed Othman (GPC) took 
over. 
Minister of Fisheries (S) (never 
worked in the south. He resigned 
and the ministry was left under the 
supervision of A. W. Al-Anesi, the 
deputy Premier.) 
Minister of Education (N) (He 
defected his Party and was 
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replaced by another Islah figure 
Abdul-Majid Al-Mekhlafi (N) 
7. Dr Nageeb Ghanem Minister of Health (N) 
8. Mohammed Dammaj Minister of Local 
Administration (N) 
5.1.3 The Policies of the New Coalition, October 1994 to April 1997 
In July 1994, the new coalition Government which was formed temporarily during 
the war under the premiership of Dr Al-Attar and excluded the YSP members 
began by formulating some security measures. Aden City was placed under a 
curfew for the period from 16* to 27"' July 1994 in an attempt to hah looting and 
violence within the city.''' Between August and September 1994, southern 
fundamentalists of the Islah party started to create security problems by 
attempting to eradicate traditional Islamic practices and destroying sacred tombs 
and graves of traditional Islamic holy figures. This caused a strong reaction, not 
only in southern regions but even in some neighbouring countries where 
influential southern factions supporting financially those sacred sites were living. 
The state leadership used a force of 2000 soldiers, equipped with heavy weaponry 
to crush the revolt of the Islah Islamists, causing the death of 500 persons. 
A further problem was over the heavy machinery owned by the former regime of 
the PDRY. Heavy machinery including tractors, combine harvesters, caterpillers, 
graders, buses and miscellaneous vehicles, and also office equipment and all types 
of weaponry were looted by the northern armed forces (outside their formal 
capacity) and by the public.^" The government called for an immediate restoration 
of security."' In response to Government concern, equipment were returned after 
money was paid to those who had seized them. This Government policy of 
security restoration continued to be at the forefront of the Coalition's concerns for 
some time.^^ 
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A second principal policy for the two parties in government was to move out all 
YSP figures from key posts in government institutions and to replace them by 
southerners and northerners from their own parties. One element of this followed 
automatically from the structure of the new Government of Abdul Aziz Abdul 
Ghani. In so far as it was coalition between the GPC and Islah, there was no 
longer space for YSP members as ministers, vice-ministers and deputy ministers. 
While all YSP polit-bureau and Central Committee members lost their formal 
positions in government it should be noted that there were some ex-YSP deputy 
ministers who had held no leading positions in the YSP and who therefore kept 
their jobs. Among those were Dr Jaffer Hamed in the Ministry of Planning and 
Mr Obaid Ba-Lahmer in the Ministry of Planning.^-' Some YSP technocrats and 
associates who happened to be in Sana'a during the war also remained in office. 
At other levels, the new Government attempted to replace some of the YSP junior 
officials in the central authority and all YSP senior officials at the southern 
regional level. A few southern juniors remained in the central authority in the 
capital, though many of them would have preferred - i f given the choice - to go 
back to work in their regions. This attitude of returning to the southern regions 
was mainly attributed to the deterioration of their living standards in Sana'a, 
especially when equal treatment with their northerners colleagues had lost 
ground.^'' Spiralling inflation in 1994/1995 was also a contributing factor for 
southerners to leave Sana'a and work in their regions where they did not need to 
pay rent or incur extra expenses away from their families. Al l YSP senior 
employees in southern regions were replaced either by northerners or by 
southerners who were members of the two leading parties. 
A third policy between the two parties was the eradication of administrative and 
financial corruption from governmental institutions. This was mainly emphasised 
by the Islah party as the corruption factor in the administration and the finance of 
the country had been going on (since the YAR establishment) leaving negative 
consequences on the nation and its economy. Recruitment, for instance, had been 
influenced by tribal factors; and persons with better qualifications and other merits 
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were often passed over, particularly for higher posts both at the central and 
regional level. The relations of those in the power centre would push forward 
the names of their relatives or tribe members to the authorities concerned 
internally and externally to f i l l higher national and international posts at the 
expense of others with better qualifications and experience ( such as the case of 
Mr. A. K. Al-Arhabi - an in-law of the President - who was appointed to a World 
Bank managerial job for a project worth US$ 80 million.^^ He was among only 
five northern candidates forwarded for the post. Other candidates exceeding one 
hundred in number were removed from the competition even for the second line 
appointments of the project management.^') 
The role of the tribal element in administrative corruption should not be under-
estimated. A Hashedi technocrat would have the best chance to go up the 
administrative ladder within a short period of time. Then would come the Bakeel 
tribe, but still with better chances than the northern Shafai, and at the bottom of 
the ladder would come the highly technical southerner i f he/she politically 
appealed to the power centre. This socio-administrative dynamic and phenomenon 
had become a general characteristic in the Yemeni administration, and Islah, 
which was more Shafai-based, was very keen to eradicate it but experience 
showed that it failed in such detiny. 
An extreme example of administrative corruption was in the financial sector. Sale 
of positions in public services, and particularly in the Ministry of Finance, was a 
strong element in administrative corruption. A prominent figure in the GPC told 
the researcher that he would be willing to pay up to 300,000 Yemeni Riyals to 
obtain a customs post in the Ministry of Finance. He said that within a few 
months, he would get his money back five-fold. 
Tribes' influence on 'resources' posts in the taxation and customs administration 
was great. As the ultimate political power of the two parties was in northern tribal 
hands, many of the taxes and customs posts were determined by those tribal 
figures and their allies.^' Smuggling had been an active trade in the northern parts 
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of the north. °^ It was, in fact, the major resource in those harsh areas. Smuggling 
would involve arms, drugs, crops, gas, oil, gold and other consumer 
commodities.^' Very few customs and tax revenues went to the public budget as 
the major share of it would be absorbed by the tribes in these areas who would 
provide security for smugglers. The tax on qat should have raised around 7 billion 
Yemeni Riyals, but the armual collection hardly exceeded 500 million Yemeni 
Riyals." 
As for bribery which characterised the YAR system and continued flourshing in 
the unification period, it had a significant impact on the population. The 
employee sufferred a substanfial loss by forfeiting at least 20% of his/her 
entitlements. The Ministry of Finance kept after the war, its YAR traditional 
accounts' practices at full fledged scale and cut-off expenses of many budget 
items for savings. The Ministry of Finance then would distribute annual savings 
among its employees/personnel with different rafios. Financial bribery in the 
system was like a major artery in the body, and it was not looked upon as an 
illegal acfion; it was rather treated, customarily, as a normal 'fee service' in the 
community. 
The coalition government, on the basis of the understanding between the two 
parties to eliminate financial and administrative corruption; removed in 1995 from 
positions of authority a large number of deputy ministers and general directors of 
strategic sectors. Among these were Abdulla Kholani, Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture, who was replaced by Farid Mujawwer (a southerner from Shabwa) 
and Hazem Baker, Director-General of the Medical Authority who was replaced 
by an Islah figure. In 1996, the state leadership in co-ordination with the coalition 
moved out and reshuffled 120 accounts clerks and officials in the Ministry of 
Finance and passed a decree ' whereby an accounts clerk or accounts official 
would not serve for more than 2 years in his/her pos i t ion .The President of the 
State was met the Ministry of Finance officials to get this done in 1996. 
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5.1.4 Problems in the Coalition 
Over the three years in which the coalition Government existed, there were a 
number of problems which affected the coalition's coherence. The first related to 
the different experience which the two parties had. The two parties were not on an 
equal basis when it came to running the state's affairs. While most of the GPC 
cabinet members had already been part of the government elite, most of the Islah 
Cabinet members were new to ministerial posts. This created a difficulty in 
having a common language on policy issues, and in the way these issues were 
handled. 
The second problem between the two northern parties was related their differing 
visions of state-building despite the similarities in their tribal attitude and 
approach. Since the start of their coalition, the Islah sought to spread Islamic rules 
and principles in all state affairs, and mainly targeted two basic sectors: education 
and information. The GPC, on the other hand, targeted the control of state affairs 
within the existing tribal set-up. It sought, therefore, to control basic and strategic 
sectors, such as defence, interior and security, foreign affairs, planning, oil and 
agriculture. The two parties held long discussions on the distribution of 
ministerial posts between them. They agreed on the majority of sectors except 
education and information. After thorough discussions, the chairmen of the two 
parties came into agreement whereby the education sector was given to Islah and 
the information sector was retained by the GPC. However, the accommodation of 
the ministerial posts did not solve the basic difference in their vision of state-
building. Differences between the two parties were pracfically settled between 
the two chairmen, each of whom played a supportive tribal role to the other. 
The third problem was that there were certain policy issues on which they did not 
agree. Islah, for example, never accepted the Economic Reform Programme 
(ERP). This was due to the ERP's short-run negative impact on the poor who 
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represented about 70% of the population.The Islah feared that the policy might 
negatively affect Islah's image in future elections. This was clearly expressed by 
its members in parliament in successive sessions following the launch of the ERP 
in March 1995.''° Its objections to ERP policies, however, became weaker over 
time as many of its leaders, especially its chairman. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein 
Al-Ahmer, benefited from the second stage of the ERP. 
The fourth problem was that there was a disagreement over material payments and 
privileges given to military and security personnel. The security and defence 
sectors were absorbing 22-24% of total public budget expenditures. In 1996-
1997, the wage bill of those sectors amounted to 30%) of the total wage bill.''^ 
Military personnel enjoyed higher salary rates than technical civilians and had 
special medical facilities internally and externally. ""^  This was natural as the 
majority of Islah in the Parliament were of Shafais-based figures and did not like 
the Zaydi tribally military and security institutions taking the lion share of 
government support against the majority of poor civilian. 
5.1.5 The Impact of the War and Coalition on the YSP and its Members 
The impact of the war and the coalition on the YSP leadership was, in effect, the 
removal of all polit-bureau and central committee members from employment in 
governmental institutions in addition to all southern technocrats who happened to 
be in the south during the war period. As mentioned earlier (5.1.1) a handfiil of 
YSP deputy-ministers who had no leading positions in the YSP were left in their 
posts as they happened to be in Sana'a during the war and thus maintained their 
offices in the post-war period. Others lost their jobs, maily because they 
happened to be in southern regions before or while the war was on. However, 
those who lost their jobs, continued to receive their salaries, though without most 
allowances. 
At the regional administrative level, the YSP members lost all their formal posts 
in all Southern regions. Both the GPC and the Islah parties put their own figures 
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in all key posts. In the sub-regions in the South, the YSP had no representation 
and, in general, the YSP lost ground in its formal representation in both the central 
administration and the southern regional administrative set-up. ''^  
In terms of the party's physical infrastructure and financial resources, the impact 
of the war and the coalition on the YSP could not be underestimated. The YSP 
lost all of its important buildings and resources in the country, estimated to be 
around US$ 30 million."^ Almost all the key sites centrally and regionally were 
confiscated, partly by the state leadership and partly by the northern forces.'" The 
YSP main building in Aden - built and beautifully equipped by the former USSR -
had its furniture and equipment seized by northern forces and the building was 
handed over to Aden University.''^ Financial accounts of the YSP in Yemeni 
banks were frozen and were still frozen at the time of writing. With no buildings 
and no financial resources, the YSP political mechanism stood sfill for a period of 
time, except in the capital - Sana'a - where current meetings went on to keep the 
YSP operafional. 
A further impact of the war and the coalition on the YSP was the flight of its key 
leaders (both in the Polit-bureau and the Central Committee) from the country. 
They fled to other arab states, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, 
Qatar, Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt and Syria. Some also left for the UK and USA. 
The key figures who left for neighbouring peninsula states were: ''^  
Ali Salem Al-Beidh 
Haider Abu Bakr Al-Attas 
Salem Saleh Moh'd 
Yasim Saeed Noman 
Anis Hassan Yehya 
Haitham Qassem Taher 
Mohammed Abdulla Saeed 
Salem Mohamed Gobran 
Mohammed Ali Ahmed 
Mohamed Sulaiman Nasser 
General Sec of Y S P left for Oman 
Ex-Prime Minister left for Jeddah 
Assist Gen. Sec. left for K S A 
Polit-Bureau member left for U A E 
Polit-Bureau member left for U A E 
Ex-defence Minister left for U A E 
Polit-bureau member left for U A E 
Polit-bureau member left for Egypt 
Central Committee member left for 
UK. 
Central committee member left for 
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Egypt 
The passing of the General Amnesty Law by the State leadership in 1994 did not 
solve the problem of southern YSP members facing discriminatory treatment. The 
General Amnesty law of 1994 (after the war) had hardly any positive impact on 
the YSP southerners inside and outside the country. Dr Saif Sayel and Dr Haidara 
Masdoos, both polit- bureau members, were among those YSP members who 
came back to the country hoping to benefit from the General Amnesty Law and to 
return to their normal life. Neither of them was accommodated in any formal post 
in the administration. The Law, however, had a positive impact on northerners in 
the YSP. Mr Mohamed Yehya Al-Gholy (a Central Committee member), for 
instance, came back and led a normal life in his community. The state leadership 
eventually provided him and his family with overseas medical expenses.^ " 
Ironically, while the General Amnesty Law was being issued, the state leadership 
was also issuing the call for 15 Southerners of the YSP leadership and one key 
southern figure of the Yemen Sons' League to be sued for High Treason in 
Yemen. After the death of one of them in Hadhramout, in the last few days of the 
war, the state leadership continued to call the 14 Southerners who were all outside 
the country to present themselves to the Yemen High Court for the High Treason 
trial.'' 
Despite all types of pressures it faced, the YSP continued to organise itself again 
after the hard blow it had received. It is worth looking at the old and new structure 
of the YSP to compare the difference in terms of the loss of the party leadership. 
The YSP Polit-Bureau members before the war of 1994 are listed below:" 
1. Ali Salem Al-Beidh Secretary General (s) 
2. Salem Saleh Moh'd Assistant Secretary-
General (s) 
3. Haider Abu-Bakr Al-Attas Polit-bureau Member (s) 
4. Yassin Saeed Norman Polit-bureau Member (s) 
5. Staff Brigadier Haithen Qassan Poiit-bureau Member (s) 
6. Mohammed Haidra Masdous Poiit-bureau Member (s) 
7. Saleh MonasserAl-Seyeli Polit-bureau Member (s) 
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8. Ali Saleh Obad (Muqbel) Polit-bureau Member (s) 
9. Hassan Ahmed Ba'oum Polit-bureau Member (s) 
10. Anis Hassan Yahyar Polit-bureau Member (s) 
11. Moh'd Abdullah Saeed (Mohsen) Polit-bureau Member (s) 
12. Saif Sayel Khaled Polit-bureau Member (s) 
13. Abdul-Ghani Abdul-Qader Polit-bureau Member (s) 
14. Fadhl Mohsen Abdulla Polit-bureau Member (s) 
15. Salem Gobran Polit-bureau Member (s) 
16. Mohammed Ali Ahmed Polit-bureau Member (s) 
17. Jarallah Omer Polit-bureau Member (n) 
18. Ahmed Ali Al-Salami Polit-bureau Member (n) 
19. Abdul-Malek Al-Eryani Polit-bureau Member (n) 
20. Mohammed Qassen Al-Thour Polit-bureau Member (n) 
21. Yahya Mohammed Al-Shami Polit-bureau Member (n) 
22. Yahya Mansour Abu-Osbu'a Polit-bureau Member (n) 
23. Abdul Wahed Al-Muradi Polit-bureau Member (n) 
24. Abdullah Ahmed Mugaide'a Polit-bureau Member (n) 
25. Abdulla Baider Polit-bureau Member (n) 
26. Abdul-Ghani Abdul-Qader Polit-bureau Member (s) 
27. Haidara Masdoos Polit-bureau Member (s) 
Ten of the above left the country in 1994 and sought refiage in neighbouring 
countries while the rest continued within the new structure of the YSP. 
When the war was over, the state leadership thought it would allow a new YSP to 
be formed under a leadership which would cooperate with the new state 
leadership. The state leadership initially intended to ask Mansoor Abu-Osbu'a to 
be the new leader, but it eventually followed opinion of a southerner adviser (the 
researcher) at the presidential office, and approached Ali Saleh Obad Muqbel who 
was seen as a more suitable alternative to take over the new YSP leadership. 
The new YSP Polit-Bureau members were as follows: '"^  
1. Ali Saleh Obad (Muqbel) 
2. Ahmed Haidra Saeed 
3. Hassan Ahmed Ba'oum 
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The General Secretary (s) 
Polit-Bureau member (s) 
Polit-Bureau member (s) 
4. Salem Ahmed Al-Khanbashi Polit-Bureau member (s) 
5. SaifSayel Khaled Polit-Bureau member (s) 
6. Salem Omer Bukair Polit-Bureau member (s) 
7. Saleh Awad Sinan Polit-Bureau member (s) 
8. Saleh Nasr Nasran Polit-Bureau member (s) 
9. Abdul Ghani Abdul Qader Polit-Bureau member (s) 
10. Abdul Bari Taher Polit-Bureau member (s) 
11. Othman Abdul-Gabbar Polit-Bureau member (s) 
12. Ali Munasser Mohammed Polit-Bureau member (s) 
13. Fadhl Mohsen Abdulia Polit-Bureau member (s) 
14. Mujahed Al-Quhali Polit-Bureau member (s) 
15. Mahmood Hussein Saba'a Polit-Bureau member (s) 
16. Mohamed Ghaleb Ahmed Polit-Bureau member (s) 
17. Jarallah Omer Polit-Bureau member (n) 
18. Ahmed Ali Al-Salami Polit-Bureau member (n) 
19. Abdul la Baider Pol it-Bureau member (n) 
20. Abdulla Mugaide'a Polit-Bureau member (n) 
21. Abdul-Wahed Al-Muradi Polit-Bureau member (n) 
22. Mohemed Saeed Muqbel Polit-Bureau member (n) 
23. Mohammed Salem Al-Shaibani Polit-Bureau member (n) 
24. Mohamed Qassem Al-Thour Polit-Bureau member (n) 
25. Yahya Mohamed Al-Shami Polit-Bureau member (n) 
26. Yahya Mansour Abu-Osbu'a Polit-Bureau member (n)* 
To restore the right membership, the new structure upgraded some of the Central 
Committee members to become PoUt-Bureau members.^ '' 
The new YSP continued to face severe pressures from the coahtion leadership. 
Apart from the non-restoration of its buildings and resources, the Party found that 
its members were vulnerable to government discrimination and that it could do 
nothing to defend them. Some of its members were prevented from going back to 
their regions after the war. Among the latter, for example, was Abdul Majid 
Wahdain, deputy minister of Culture who was in San'aa during the war. He was 
reftased permission to go back to his region when he was removed from his job. A 
year later, he was allowed to return to his region, Hadhramout. " The YSP 
newspaper (Al-Thawri) was subject to accusations of being a separatist or 
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secessionist publication. Tlie same treatment was applied to YSP MPs who were 
reluctant to speak for their regions and for the deterioration of the living standard 
of southerners in general.' Political harassment was practised on the new YSP 
leadership, as when the security forces in Sana'a attempted to arrest the polit-
bureau member Hassan Ba'oum to keep him from attending a critical polit-bureau 
meeting regarding parliamentary election participation by the YSP. Ba'oum, 
however, disappeared in 1998 following a public demonstration led by him and 
other oppositions figures in the Hadhramout capital, Mukalla. 
5.1.6 The Election of April 1997 
The ROY experienced another general election in March 1997 when the GPC won 
the majority of seats (227 seats of the total 301 seats in the Parliament). Over 14 
parties stood for election, but only a few parties won parliamentary seats:" 
General People's Congress 42% of the vote 
Yemen Reform Gathering (Islah) 23 
Yemeni Socialist Party 0 (boycotted the election) 
Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party 1 
Al-Haqq 1 
Wahdawi Nasiri 2 
Independents 28 
Other parties 3 
The YSP boycotted the elections on the account that its properties were 
confiscated and it was not in a position to campaign fairly with other northern 
parties involved in the power centre. Some of the YSP southern members were 
very active in the national arena and paid a heavy price as the power centre could 
not tolerate their activities and accordingly took harsh measures against them. 
Though the Islah party came second in the elections, it refused to share political 
power with the GPC in the Government which was subsequently formed. This 
was a result of the many political frictions they had in the past coalition and 
' (after 55 footnote) The San'aa T V , the parhamentary daily programme. 
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during the latest elections. They therefore decided that they would be more 
influential in opposition.^^ 
5.1.7 The New Government, May 1997 - Marchl998 
Having won a substantial majority in the elections, the GPC offered the 
Premiership to an independent figure and reserved all cabinet seats to its members 
except the Health Ministry which was handed over to a qualified independent 
figure. An independent southern figure, Dr Faraj Bin Ghanem, became the 
Premier for less than a year.^' Bin Ghanem was a public southern figure with 
experience of operating financial and planning orientated sectors in the south and 
then in the north. He was approached after the war to take over the premiership of 
the coalition government, but, at this point, was very reluctant to do so. However, 
in 1997 he accepted the position only after being promised full support from the 
regime in helping him with all political problems that might arise inhibiting his 
function as Premier. With almost all of the GPC figures in governmental posts, 
Bin Ghanem realised that he could not carry out his functions in the face of power 
centre interventions. He left office in March 1997 and his position was taken up 
by Dr A. K. Al-Iryani, the former Foreign Minister and the General Secretary of 
the GPC.'° 
Bin Ghanem's Premiership was very promising, particularly in tackling nafional 
problems, because of his independent polifical stance and his respectable image in 
society. However, for a tribal society like Yemen, this was not sufficient to 
oversee the smooth transformation of a tribal society into a civic one without the 
ful l support of the power centre in acting in the national interest. 
Conversely, Al-Iryani's Government suited the tribal nature of Yemeni society, 
given that he was an Ismaili with qadi status. However, despite this qualification, 
Dr Al-Iryani faced severe problems, particulary in the internal security. With the 
endorsement of the third stage of the Economic Reform Programme, on the eve of 
his Government (May 1998) coming to power, public riots and demonstrations 
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occurred in the country leaving over 100 dead and many injured. These 
demonstration and public riots broke out in sensitive areas in the north, namely 
Marib and Al-Jawf, with the participation of powerful tribes.* '^ Following these 
public riots, a series of kidnapping took place since July, 1998. The most 
important ones which involved European tourists (German and British), were in 
December 1998. Four Germans were kidnapped by Bani Dhibyan in the northern 
regions and about 16 british and Australians were kidnapped by Al-Fadhli tribes 
in the southern regions. The Government had different attacking measures to 
different tribes. The government forces mishandled the hostages in the southern 
tribes' hands and ended it with a deadly results. The Germans hostages might end 
with the same result i f the government fails to be realistic to the tribes' demands. 
5.1.8 Regional Policies, with Special reference to the South 
In this sub-section we shall examine the following: 
5.1.8.1 (a) The change in the regional administrative structure 
5.1.8.2 (b) The change in regional administrative personnel 
5.1.8.3 (c) The impact of administrative and political changes on: 
(i) Living standards 
(ii) Tribalism 
(iii) Women 
(iv) The Judiciary 
(v) NGOs 
5.1.8.1 Changes in the Regional Administrative Structure 
In terms of geographical division, administrative structures in the south did not 
change. The Southern area continued to be divided into 6 Governorates, namely 
Aden, Lahej, Abyan, Shabwa, Hadhramout and Al-Mahara." Sub-regional 
administrative structures also were maintained, with four districts for each region, 
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except Hadhramout which had eight districts due to its vast area. 
The first critical change in the administrative structure in southern regions was the 
downgrading of sector representatives from deputy minister to director-general. 
While very few sector representatives remaining the same, all new appointments 
in southern regions were recruited as director-generals instead of deputy 
ministers.*-' The central political authority did not attempt to standardise regional 
structures throughout the southern regions as they used to be before the unification 
period. 
The second changing factor was the diminution of the sub-regional (district) 
structures. District administration structures in the south would usually encompass 
the major sectoral administrative structures of those sub-regions, especially the 
social infrastructures plus agriculture, fisheries and/or tourism.*"* Subregional 
structures diminished in authority to such an extent that only mayors were kept in 
those administrative structures, with hardly any other staff for other sectors. This 
was partly due to the over-centralised system in the central and regional 
authorities and partly to the new economic order, which left southern regions with 
the very minimum of budgetary support level. The impact of such ineffective sub-
regional administration was very negative. In view of the absence of public and 
private investment, unemployment was caused in most districts of southern 
regions. Social infrastructure became highly ineffective and many sick people and 
unemployed were forced to travel to major regional towns for health services and 
employment in the private sector ( i f any). 
The third changing factor was in the duality of regional sectoral liability between 
the regional and central authorities. The lack of clarity in regional responsibility in 
southern regions caused some political friction between regional and central 
authorities. Southern governors used to have ultimate power over all sectors of 
their concerned region. Al l sectoral problems in the region would be solved by the 
Governor in co-ordination with ministers of the respecfive sectors. Contrary to 
those old regulations, new director-generals (deputy ministers) from northern 
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areas in southern regions would solve their sectoral difficulties with the central 
authorities directly. There were, however, no formal local administration laws 
which would define the relationship between regional and central authorities in 
this respect. The state leadership launched a Local Administration Law Project but 
at the time of writing this remained under scrutiny by the authorities concerned. 
5.1.8.2 Changes in Regional Administration Personnel 
Following the civil war of 1994, regional administration personnel changed 
dramatically in the southern regions. 
At the top level, regional administration personnel in the south were either GPC or 
Islah figures due to the removal of all YSP figures. At the time of wrifing, the 
Governors of the southern regions were:^ ^ 
1. Aden: Taha Ghanem A known Adeni figure (GPC) 
2. Lahej: Awad Bamatraf Southerner of Hadhrami origin 
residing in the region (Islah). 
Changed to Abdul Jaiii Mansoor in 
1997-aNorthemer(GPC) 
3. Abyan: Ahmed Mohsin Northerner from Al-Beida (GPC) 
4. Shabwa: Ali Sheikh Southerner from Abyan (GPC), 
changed in 1997 to Moh'd Al-Qar'aa from 
Shabwa 
5. Hadhramout:Saleh O. Al-Kholani Northerner from Kholan (GPC) 
6. Al-Mahara: Ali Al-Adhal Northerner from Hudaidah (Islah) 
Apart from the Aden Governor and the last Shabwa Governor, none of the above 
really represented the region under his control. This contributed to the setback of 
regional management and development of Southern regions as shall be explained 
later in other sections. 
At the regional sectoral level, changes in administrative personnel were 
remarkable, particularly in strategic sectors. Trade and Supply, Oil and Gas, 
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Finance, Land, Taxation, Customs, Electricity and Water sectors were mainly 
staffed by northerners, as well as the military and security sectors, in Aden and 
Hadhramout - the most economically viable areas in the south. 
The state leadership targeted its regional policies in the south on the two major 
regions, namely Aden and Hadhramout due to their economic viability. Critical 
changes in administrative personnel had taken place since the war. The following 
are some examples: 
(a) The oil sector in Aden was basically constituted by the National Yemen 
Oil Company (NYOC) and the Aden Refinery Company (ARC) (comprised 
of a well-integrated city under the refinery auspices). Since the war, the 
NYOC was headed by an inexperienced northerner- Yousef Qeleqel from 
Hudaidah (October 1994). Sayed Omer, ex-Director General of NYOC, was 
driven off the post as he was a YSP member.*^ In August 1998, a Hadhrami 
technocrat who came from Kuwait following the Gulf Crisis was appointed 
in place of Qeleqel. Awadh Homran took over the Aden branch of NYOC 
following the bad management of the branch by his predecessor. 
The ARC, on the other hand, was headed by another northerner from A l -
Beidha - Mr Fathi Salem ex-Director-General of the NYOC (of the north). 
Mr Salem did not possess the same technical experience in running such a 
highly technical large-scale enterprise as his predecessor, Mr Hussein A l -
Haj, or other southerners involved in the refinery for years had enjoyed. Due 
to the mistrust with regards to southerners' co-operation, the state leadership 
insisted on northern recruitment for the collection of resources in these vital 
sectors. 
(b) The Government Land & Properties Authority (GLPA) in the central 
authority was attached to the Ministry of Finance in Sana'a for the 
selling/buying function to the Government or individuals. As over 90% of 
southern land was under state ownership, the GLPA was in a financial 
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position to make large sums out of this sector. A son-in-law of the President, 
from Kholan, headed the institution in Aden, and most of the land was 
distributed and sold mainly to northerners.™ 
Up until 1994, land departments in the South were part of the construction 
and housing sector with only one Director-General for the whole sector. 
Because of the nature of resource collection, the state leadership treated that 
section as a separate sector with a director general for it in each region. Mr 
Yahya Al-Duwaid from Kholan in the North and Mr Al-Mattari from Sanaa 
were both appointed as Director-Generals of the GLPA in Aden and 
Hadhramout respectively in place of former Southern technocrats. Their 
appointments eventually allowed northerners to hold many plots of lands, of 
which some areas already belonged to Southerners. Most strategic areas, in 
fact, were handed over to key northern figures inside and outside the state 
leadership." Little northern land was distributed to the southern elite in 
Sana'a and those areas which were distributed were minimal.'^ 
(c) In Aden, the other three major resource sectors, namely Taxation, 
Customs and Trade & Supply were headed by northerners. According to 
observers, there came to be corruption in the handling of money raised from 
these sources. 
(d) The power sectors of electricity and water in Aden were also headed by 
northerners, namely Mr Yehya Al-Abyadh and Mr Abdul-Fattah Nasser. 
The two sectors had enjoyed good infrastructure since the colonial period 
and were actively maintained by the former PDRY leadership. Despite the 
high rise in the price of both strategic items, the new personnel of that 
administration failed to fiilfil peoples' needs by properly maintaining these 
infrastructures. The corruption and the over-centralised administrative 
system that characterised both regional and central authorities caused public 
frustration and led many people to commit defaultory actions on their 
installed regulators, to avoid high price increases.^  
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Changes in administrative personnel in southern regions created some 
administrative friction between the northern and southern groups. It also created 
friction between top regional management and regional sectoral management. 
There were several cases - witnessed by the researcher - where northern personnel 
in southern regions would co-operate together, and separately from southerners 
and vice versa. Southern Governors, however, especially in Aden Govemorate 
found it difficult to exercise control over corruption or programme discipline of 
regional sectors controlled by northerners.'"' 
5.1.6.3 The Impact of the Administrative and Political Changes on Social Affairs 
There is a number of social affairs on which the administrative and plitical 
changes had an impact. These are covered below. 
(i) The Standard of Living of the Southern Population 
The impact of the administrative and political changes in southern regions had two 
dimensions, each having a severe negative impact on the standard of living of the 
population. 
The first dimension related mainly to the inexperience of Governors in dealing 
with the southern govemorates. Apart from the Governor of Aden, who had held 
the post in the 1970s, other governors did not have the appropriate experience in 
handling southern regional issues. Mr Saleh Al-Kholani had served as the 
Governor of Ibb and other areas in the north," but northern regions, then, did not 
enjoy the same social infrastructure and public facilities as southern regions. 
Moreover,the Hadhramout region covered an area which was equal to more than 
half of the former YAR. The inexperience factor of the Governors resulted in the 
accumulation of southern problems in numerous aspects. Even with the help of the 
central authorities in acute problems such as electricity, water or any social 
infrastructural problem, the process of rectification/building up was very slow 
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which left negative repercussions on the standard of living of the southern 
populafion.^^ 
The inexperience of Governors reflected also in the lack of communication 
between the public and the Governor's administration. The public, for instance, 
would ask for maintenance of water pipes, sewerage problems, electrical failure, 
school and hospital maintenance, etc. The governor would not see the validity of 
these claims made by the public to the state". Public resources were hardly made 
available for such public claims in southern regions, especially in view of the then 
current ERP. Northerners, in most regions, did not have such infrastructure 
facilities, with high sunte-cost as the one existed in the south.'^ 
In view of the attitude of the northern Governors in southern regions, the lack of 
their experience led to the frustration of the southern public when their problems 
were left unresolved. Rural public would travel from their villages/centres to 
provisional capitals seeking resolufion for their problems. In some areas, this 
would mean high costs for the public to stay a few days in the regional capital for 
his/her needs to be met. Long queues of people were witnessed in every southern 
region." A handful of people would succeed in seeing the Governor, who would 
more than likely be incapable of meeting the applicant's needs due to a lack of 
resources or the ineffecfiveness of the regional administration.*" 
The fact that all aspects of life in southern regions became highly polificised was 
also due to the Governor's inexperience in handling administrative power 
appropriately. Governors spent great amounts of their time fighting YSP members 
and their associates in their regional activities ( if any) and their movements in 
their regions. Political fricfion was also witnessed between the two leading parties 
among southerners. This had caused serious frustration and anxiousness to the 
extent that many southerners wanted to emigrate. 
As a result of the above difficulties, a high proportion of the social infrastructure 
was either destroyed or neglected, and the standard of living had gone down 
254 
remarkably. This will be explained below at a later stage. 
The second dimension in the impact of the administrative and political changes in 
the standard of living of southerners was represented in the over centralised 
administrative system in southern regions. The state leadership did not attempt to 
delegate regional power to regional administrations.^' This rendered regional 
administration very ineffective resulting in the following factors that had negative 
impacts on the standard of living of the population: 
a. Corruption 
The over-centralised administrative system would usually result in the 
ineffectiveness of the administrative machinery. Financial corruption would, 
therefore, be the only outlet by which some people would have their needs 
met; such as enrolling students in an illegal way, queue-jumping for social 
benefits and so on. As financial corruption increased in formal 
administration, the standard of living of the population would decrease 
further and fiirther. 
b. Immobilisation 
Over centralisation in regional administration also led to the immobility of 
manpower resources. In view of the limited resources available for southern 
regions, most factories and pubic institutions were closed down and became 
subject to privatisation^^. This automatically created high unemployment 
amongst the southern workforce. This factor lowered the standard of living 
of southerners to a great degree, and relative to what it had been before. 
(ii) Tribalism 
A major development which resulted from the administrative and political 
changes in southern regions was tribalism. The former PDRY, and before then the 
British administration in Aden, had tried to transform south Yemen into a modern 
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state where tribalism would have little impact on peoples' life.*^ However, the 
changes in regional administration and politics into the south injected the tribal 
mode of life to these areas. 
The Tribal Affairs Authority (TAA), a major government institution, formally 
accommodated certain public figures in each locality of each district and region -
in the South - as recognised Sheikhs for their groups/tribes with its formal 
governmental area. TAA recognition forsouthern tribes on a formal basis meant 
the transformation of southern communities into increasingly stereotypical 
northern communities. The state leadership found itself obliged to meet financial 
commitments to thousands of Sheikhs of tribes in the South. The TAA generally 
would pay a monthly allowance to each recognised Sheikh of a tribe or group. 
This allowance would be very small compared to that of a northern tribal Sheikh. 
The impact of tribalism in the southern regions was serious. Very 'old blood', of 
50 years and more, accounts were brought for settlement and courts could hardly 
cope with them for the absence of records. Moreover, revival of fiied did not only 
mean greater social divisions, but rather exhausion of material power and social 
degrade when it comes sale of women or forced marraige * 
(iii) Women 
Within its overall internal policies, the state leadership intended to make southern 
regions into a stereotype of northern communities, particularly with regard to the 
status of women. The change in the status of southern women, therefore, was not 
an outcome of the regional changes in politics and administration, as much as it 
was part of central authority policies for the change over of all southern regions 
into a different mode of life. 
The position of women in the south had changed dramatically in their 
communities, both within and outside the household. The hijab, for instance, was 
indirectly imposed on women and young girls of 12 or 13 years (in some cases 
Sometimes part of the material settlements would involve sale or marraige by force of females to the 
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younger than 10 years old).^ "* Aden region before the 1994 war would have many 
girls swimming in the sea. After the war, one would hardly see a female in the 
street without the hijab. Schools, colleges, offices would be seen with females 
wearing the black hijab. (To the vwiter this was a very striking social 
phenomenon). The reason for this social trend was that some Islamists had 
intimidated females in the streets who would not wear the hijab by throwing acid 
in their faces.*' 
The other factor that influenced the position of women in southern areas was the 
redundancies of females resulting from the ERP policies. Women were the social 
victims of bad economic policies conducted by the Government. Women used to 
constitute 60-70% of manufacturing manpower in the south. The closure of these 
factories rendered females unemployed, and therefore weakened their economic 
position in society.** 
The Islamists, also, contributed to the diminishing status of the position of women 
in southern areas by opposing their legal status as qadis (judges) or members of 
the attorney authority. Various syndicates' objected to these policies and in 1996 
some female judges maintained their posts in southern areas.*' 
Women's position in southern areas used to be, socially speaking, much stronger 
than in any other Arab state, by virtue of the Family law of 1974. The new 
coalition government abolished that law and substituted it the former YAR civil 
law, in which womens' affairs had a very restricted role, which was based on 
Sharea'a law in its rawest form.** 
Yemeni women, in general, had some political rights within the democratisation 
process exercised in the country. Social rights, however, had been damaged as far 
as southern females were concerned. 
(iv) Judiciary: 
other party. 
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In its new policies, the state leadership changed the whole legal set-up of southern 
regions into a stereotype of the northern machinery. Civil and Criminal laws of the 
former PDRY were repealed and replaced by new laws that would fit northern 
tribal communities. For instance, the Criminal Law issued in Sana'a by 
Republican Decree No 12 of 1994 repealed the Southern Criminal Law No. 3 of 
1976, issued in Aden. Family Law No 1 of 1974 issued in Aden was replaced by a 
section on women's right within the Civil Law of 1995.*^  
In constitutional respects, the judicial mechanism should be the third independent 
authority after the presidential and governmental authorities.'" This would imply 
that neither the presidential nor the governmental authorities would have any 
impact on it. In reality, however, this independence was not maintained. The 
Higher Judiciary Council (HJC) was presided over by the President of the State.'' 
State intervention in the HJC was often practised, resulting in tribal attitudes 
affecting some criminal cases. In cases where southern and northern factions were 
involved, state intervention under tribal influence would intervene in favour of the 
northern faction.'^ The independence of the judiciary mechanism, thus, was hardly 
maintained as set in the Yemeni Constitution. 
On the functional side, the judicial mechanism in southern regions was the worst 
formal institution with regard to the presence of large-scale corruption.'^ 
Several factors had contributed to the mismanagement and corruption of the 
judiciary in southern regions. First, as the free market economy in southern 
regions was not founded on a clear legal platforms, a mess was created in many 
socio-economic areas, such as selling land with illegal documents, taking control 
of others' land/buildings, or open business on illegal grounds, etc. Cases would go 
daily through the judicial channels and, though the majority would be simple civil 
cases, it would take months i f not years to deal with compiling cases in the 
appropriate legal manner.''' 
Second, the inefficiency of the judicial manpower was be a major problem causing 
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mismanagement and corruption in the judicial apparatus. Most Judges in southern 
regions were appointed by the Minister of Justice Qadi Al-Dailami, an Islah 
figure, who recruited many Islah figures into the judicial mechanism in the 
southern regions. The majority of Islah figures were too inexperienced to deal 
with judicial cases in southern regions. Also, those GPC figures in major southern 
towns did not possess the required legal training in dealing with either civilian or 
criminal cases, and chose to solve the cases by corrupt means.'' The writer had a 
simple civil case concerning a land issue since 1993 and until early 1997, it had 
still not been solved. 
The third factor was the politicisation of the judicial machinery between the two 
leading parties. In all cases, of any level, the Judge would normally pass the court 
order for the benefit of his fellow party member in the case. Some criminal cases, 
unfortunately, would be wrongly judged because of this political bias as in the 
case of the rape of two Hadhrami females by northern security men in September 
1995,* which caused public demonstrations against the regime.'^ * 
Finally, the impact of the ineffectiveness of the regional authorities in the south 
had its repercussion on the judicial set-up. Due to the over-centralisation of the 
regional administrative system, most regional issues in the south were not in the 
hands of the concerned authorities. Most problems were therefore dealt with 
corrupt means. This had a two-fold impact; firstly, judicial cases increased and 
became a heavy burden on an ineffective judicial mechanism; secondly, it 
increased corruption to a high degree in these institutions. 
(v) The Non-Governmental Organisations 
In the face of negligible public resources left for southern regions, the Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) stood a very slim chance for survival in the 
South. There were many reasons for the futile status of southern NGOs such as 
women unions, youth associafions and clubs. 
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The first reason for the low profile of NGO acfivity in the south would be 
attributed to the overall political changes in 1994, where state leadership at both 
the central and the regional levels did not want to leave any socio-political 
phenomenon of the former style of life in the south, and that decision would 
include the NGOs. The new regional administrative authorities were, therefore, 
responsible in keeping up that policy, though the new political changes would be 
in favour of the two leading parties' NGO's only. Specifically, the state 
leadership feared that anti-political activities in the south might take place within 
or in form of various NGO's and therefore, restricted measures were taken in 
order not to encourage establishment of strong NGO's in southern regions without 
monitor. 
The second reason was that the economic situation of the south was very poor. 
Government resources were very limited in those regions and private investments 
were inactive at the required level for fundraising or manpower mobilisation. 
Southerners were very experienced in NGOs manipulating activities and with 
respect to the ineffectiveness of regional authorities, they would be able to activate 
effective NGOs but the material power was not in hand to push them forward. 
Moreover, the safety network, a relevant component in the Economic Reform 
Programme was in the hands of a northerner elite who was reluctant to release 
easy and soft loans to southern NGO's on equal basis as loans to northerners'. 
The third reason for the stagnation of the NGOs in the south was the unavailability 
of the media and access to foreign embassies and international organisations. 
Almost half the work of NGOs would require various means of media; 
publications, radio, television and collective sessions which southern NGO's miss 
very much. In view of non representation of effective southerners in the power 
centre, southerners could not afford to have access to national media unless they 
were ftilly affiliated in the northern parties effectively. Moreover, as foreign 
embassies and international organisations were sited in the Capital San'aa, it was 
not feasible for southern NGO's to have access to these areas for material help. 
Southern NGOs therefore, had no incentive to establish themselves with no help 
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from anywhere. 
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5.2 ECONOMIC S Y S T E M AND PERFORMANCE A F T E R T H E 1994 WAR 
This section will deal with the economic performance of the ROY following the 
civil war of 1994. It analyses critically the integration process in the economic 
field between the two former parts of Yemen under the fully-integrated political 
system. 
5.2.1 Changes in the Composition of the Presidential Council 
The post-war period witnessed greater integration in the economic field, but of a 
kind which would lead to problems in the country's long-term development. In the 
co-operative integration stage, there had been a five-member Presidential body 
made up of members from the two parts of Yemen, with various Yemeni factions 
represented.'' After the war, the Presidential Council changed into a vertically 
integrated structure, with decision-making ultimately resting with the President of 
the State. The change (as regards economic policy as well as all other spheres of 
policy making) represented a step back to the old YAR decision-making process.''* 
The key element in economic decision making after 1994, therefore, was the 
domination of the process by the Northern "power-elite" centre grouped around 
President A l i AbduUa Saleh and Sheikh AbduUa Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer. The 
implications and dimensions of this are sketched out in the following sections. 
5.2.2 Institutions and Individuals influencing Economic Decisions 
The decision-making process rested with the President and key northern figures 
located within the relevant state institutions. 
In the Presidential Office, the President and his office had technical and non-
technical advisors in addition to the Economic and Development Department at 
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the Presidential Office.'^ The two technical economic advisors to the Presidential 
Office, comprising the researcher and Mr. Ahmed Al-Samawi, both had limited 
roles in economic policy consultations; but the Economic and Development 
Department had substantial roles in policy consultation and formulation with other 
key government figures. The president also appointed a team of personal advisors. 
They were not technical advisors, but were brought-in to offer advice on 'regional 
economic problems' rather than 'strategic economics.'""^ They were mainly 
northern figures of high social profile in the Zaydi community, or financially 
empowered Shafai figures, such as merchants and traders. 
At the cabinet level, responsibility for economic policy effectively rested with key 
ministers who held strategic posts. These posts included the Minister of Finance, 
the Minister of Planning and Development (if he was a northerner), the Minister 
of Oil, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
These figures were considered to be trustworthy by the power elite. Northern 
ministers enjoyed more trust from the president than southerners did, and this 
allowed them greater access to the decision-making process. For instance, 
although Dr Al-Iryani was not in the economics field and was in charge of the 
foreign affairs sector, he was entrusted with economic consultations whereas Mr. 
Bajammal, the Minister for Planning and Development and a GPC southerner, 
was not."" 
Dr. Mohammed Saeed Al-Attar, Minister of Oil and Mineral Wealth (1994-1997), 
had always received special attention from the President and was consulted on 
economic affairs often not related to his sector. In this period, Dr Al-Attar, beside 
being Minister for Oil, held the Ministry of Industry until 1996 and the 
Chairmanship of the General Investment Authority (GIA) at the same time. He 
was, therefore, an important strategic figure for the decision-making process in 
economic policies.'"^ 
Mr Bajammal, Minister of Planning (1994-1998) was a Southerner from 
Hadhramout. He did not become a trustworthy economic policy-maker at the 
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same level as his northern colleagues. This was mainly due to his Southern 
socialist experiences which the northern elite considered to be a permanent defect. 
Ironically, the Minister of Finance, Mohamed Al-Junaid (1994-1997), was neither 
an economist nor business/financial graduate (he was a sewerage engineer) but 
being a northerner, he was one of the trusted figures in economic policies. This 
was due partly to his Northern experiences in finance and monetary affairs, and 
also to balance the Shafai figures from different regions in the central 
administration and economic consultanties.'°^ 
At this level, the President and his allies in the decision-making structure tended 
to be listeners than speakers, and in consultation with other influential 
(tribal/polifical) groups, the President would give the green light to economic 
decisions agreed upon by the elite of the power centre.'"'' 
Economic advisors at the Cabinet level and below only enjoyed limited power 
within the system. Although there were be some good advisors for national 
economic policies at various government institutions, their advice was seldom 
sought or used by cabinet members, or by the power elite.'°^ 
At the Premier's office, there were over 20 advisors, of whom the majority were 
ineffective due to their low level of technical expertise. They were accommodated 
for political reasons. At the sector level, there were 2-3 advisors for strategic 
sectors, but again they would hardly be of any effective use in economic policy 
decision-making. It was very rare for a minister to take advice, even when the 
minister lacked experience and technical knowledge. ""^  
While the advisory services had a limited role in decision-making in general. 
Northern advisors enjoyed a better status than Southern advisors at all levels."" 
This was generally attributed to the Southerners' past experiences, particularly in 
the economic field of socialist-orientated economics. The decision-makers, 
therefore, would not trust the advice of Southerners which might be based or 
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influenced by a socialist mentality or approach. The leadership viewed Northern 
advisors as more competent than Southerners, irrespective of the Southerners' 
technical capacities. The tribal element played a significant role in the choice of 
advisors and in making use of their advisory services. 
Economic affairs in Southern regions were primarily run according to the 
recommendations of Northern advisors instead of those of Southerners'. As the 
strategic economic posts were centrally and regionally in the hands of the 
Northerners. Southern economic advisors were not given the chance to advise on 
programmes in their regions. 
5.2.3 The Impact of the Tribal factor on Economic Decisions 
The tribal factor exerted great influence on the economic decision-making process 
and on the shape of the state and the economy to be operated in the ROY. The 
tribal power elite whether in Islah or the GPC did not want grass-roots changes for 
the ROY's economy to be run on modern global grounds with strong and effective 
mechanism for a free-market economy.Nor thern tribes, specifically of the 
Zaydi faction, had been exerting an overall power on major economic institutions: 
the infrastructure machinery (Komatsu, Caterpillars, and other 'Yellow Monsters') 
were in various trading companies (Al-Ahmer Trading Company, Al-Sinaidar 
Trading Company, Al-Hashedi Trading Company and Al-Watary Trading 
Company), Exchange Rate Companies (Al-Hadhdha, Al-Sinaidar, Al-Hashedi and 
Al-Kumaim), Transport and Cars' Companies ( Al-Hashedi and Al-Ruwaishan)."" 
This were very few examples, the researcher could recall, but there many more of 
these gangitic economic institutions which almost had a monopoly in its 
commercial functions. Moreover, there were three basic northern companies for 
basic food items, the wheat, the wheat flour and sugar which were under the 
monopoly o f Al-Fahem, Al-Habbary and Al-Ruwaishan trades men. Al l these 
commercial entities, receive money facilities from the power centre to run their 
businesses with high profits. They take soft loans from the central bank of yemen 
and from other commercial banks in running their businesses. Wether these soft 
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loans were repaidable is highly questionable. The state leadership, in the case of 
basic food items, provided merchants with high profits through special exchange 
rate for these items."" This shall be discussed below. 
The largest trading/commercial enterprise in the ROY was the weaponery trade 
(trading of arms and amunitions) and this belonged to the President's brothers, Ali 
Mohsin Al-Ahmer, in particular. Substantial part of the economic activity in the 
ROY had been the sales of arms and amunition in the yemeni society to tribes and 
individuals. It had been observed that large shipment of arms enter yemen 
(through Al-Hudaidah port) and the sale of these arms had been flourishing for 
years, in particular in the post war period (1995-1998). The ROY, in 1998, had 
about 50 millions piece of arms of different kinds and makes.'" 
The most influential Shafai group which had the strongest impact on the decision-
making process in economic affairs was the Hayel group. This group, from the 
Taiz region, had been an influential economic group in Yemen since 1966. It 
controlled about 70% of the consumption sector in the Yemeni market: soap, oil, 
drinks, livestock, canned food, etc. The Hayel group obtained major parts of 
Southern public enterprises in Southern regions within the auspices of the 
Economic Reform Programme (ERP) at negligible prices."^ They claimed back 
their old buildings which were left over after they left Aden in 1967 to the north. 
Unfortunately, the state leadership had given up, to Hayel group, big public 
buildings of former PDRY insfitutions which could be used for public interest 
rather than private hands. 
There was some Hadhrami-Saudi investment in Southern regions, but this did not 
enjoy the same preference in economic decisions as Northern investors. Bin-
Mahfoodh enterprises, within the auspices of "Yemenvest" for example, had to 
pay very high prices for their investments in the south. For about 1-2 km^ of land 
in Aden, US$ 20 million was paid"^. In an interview with Yemenvest by the 
researcher on the work done on their programme, Yemenvest complained of 
serious harassment by security forces against their programme. 
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The tribal factor did not have a direct impact on the ERP during the stabilisation 
period, but it did after 1996. When the reforms programme started, the tribal 
sheikhs could see the benefits of these reforms through privitisation and free trade 
policies. Various gigantic projects in the oil and gas industries were, thus, granted 
to large foreign companies via tribal agents in Yemen. For instance. Sheikh 
Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer and his sons were the sole agents of the gas 
project (with the Total French Company) worth US$ 4-5 billion, air transport with 
the UAE (the Emirates) and other diversified services such as tourism and printing 
under the name Horizon."'' 
Tribal factors, also, had a strong impact on decisions relating to financial 
expenditures. At the top of the ladder came Zaydi tribes and factions. The 
informal decision-making process, represented by the Chairmen of the two 
leading parties (GPC and Islah), ensured that the northern tribes' demands were 
met in order to avoid rioting. The Shafai tribes of the Northern areas were second 
in priority, and the Southern tribes resided at the bottom of the ladder. Financial 
assistance awarded to the Southern tribes would hardly exceed 100,000 Yemeni 
Riyals a year (this is equivalent to around US$850), this compared poorly to the 
US$ 33,000 given to a Northern Sheikh in 1995. 
Generally speaking, the presidential leadership gave greater weight to tribal 
elements than was acceptable in the national interest. The presidential leadership 
failed to differentiate between its economic national role and its obligations to 
tribes. Economic national interests were not prioritised. 
5.2.4 The Role of the leading Political Parties in Economic Decision Making 
Although the two leading political parties, the GPC and the Islah (up to 1997) and 
then GPC alone (1997-1998) had their personnel in the government authority, 
neither of the coalition parties played a significant role in formulating or shaping 
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governmental economic strategy or policies on their own. No doubt the basic 
ideologies of each party were instilled in the minds of their personnel, but the 
political parties themselves were not capable of launching economic policies."^ 
There were two main reasons for this. First, neither had the infrastructure or 
facilities to develop coherent policies in this sphere. In the secretariats of the two 
leading parties, there were economic departments, but these acted as recipients in 
the decision-making process. The top authorities, comprising a very few key 
figures (mainly GPC), manipulated these policies with the President and his tribal 
circles. 
The second reason for the insignificant role of the two parties, was that neither of 
the economic departments in the secretariats of the two parties had specialist who 
were competent enough to challenge government programmes. The Islah Party, in 
particular, had not been in Government before and did not have sufficient 
expertise to develop an economic framework at national level in its party 
organizafion. The Islah Party talked of Islamic economics, but this was not 
substantiated by material programmes or specific policies. The GPC at least had 
cabinet figures with some governmental experience, but the national policies 
which were pursued were mostly done on an ad hoc basis. 
Another factor in the absent role of political parties in formulafing policies for the 
nation was of the involvement of international agencies such as the World Bank 
(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the national economy. The 
WB and IMF, since March 1995, had launched a reform programme.'" The ROY 
was obliged to follow this reform programme for economic stabilisation and 
growth in several phases. In return, the WB and the IMF provided some cash 
assistance (a soft loan) for the ROY to overcome its economic difficulties. This 
will be examined below."* 
5.2.5 The Role of Parliament in Economic Decision Making 
In effect, the role of parliament in economic decisions was limited. One can 
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identify four principal reasons for the limited role. 
Firstly, the majority party in parliament was the GPC, with 127 members. As 
both the decision-making process and the cabinet were presided over by GPC 
figures; it was natural for parliament to vote favourably for legislation proposed 
by the main party. 
Secondly, the Chairman of Parliament, Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer, 
was - in an individual capacity - a key figure in the decision-making process. In 
order to smooth the transit of bills through parliament, the Chairman ruled out 
much critical discussion."^ 
Thirdly, the Islah and the YSP played a weak role. The major Islah 
representatives were from the Shafai areas of Taiz, Al-Hudaida, and Ibb, and were 
opposed to the policies of the ERP. Yet they submitted to the wishes of their party 
leader, Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer who had a vested interest in the 
success of the ERP. The YSP was unable by itself to counter the government's 
economic programmes. 
Fourthly, although there were some figures in the parliament who could provide 
objective alternatives to the government economic policies, the tribal mechanism 
in Parliament prevented them from making contribution. For example, Dr 
Mahmood Medhi, an MP in the YSP grouping, was an LSE Graduate with 30 
years of experience in economic spheres, yet socialist figures like him were not 
asked for 
their advice following the 1994 Civil War. 
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5.2.6 T H E ECONOMIC R E F O R M PROGRAMME 
The Economic Reform Programme, (ERP) was launched by the Yemeni authorities in 
coordination with the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It 
called for certain economic measures to be adopted, for economic stability to be achieved and 
Yemen's development to proceed."' Specifically, the ERP called for the following 
adjustments: 
1. Macroeconomic adjustments which would include 
(a) Reduction Of Budget Deficits 
(b) Non-Inflationary Resources 
(c) Curtailment of Inflation 
(d) Encouragement of the Private Sector 
(e) The External Debts Problem 
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2. Protecting the poor by specific social policies during the adjustment period and this 
would include: " ' 
(a) The Removal of Subsidies 
(b) Improvement of Social Services (Health and Education) 
(c) The Social Safety Net (SSN) and NGOs 
3. Structural Reforms which would include: '^ ^ 
(a) Liberalisation of trade policies 
(b) Improvement of pricing policies 
(c) Improvement of the Financial and The Judiciary sectors 
These elements will be covered separately below. 
270 
5.2.6.1 Macroeconomic Adjustments 
(a) Reduction Of Budget Deficits 
In making macroeconomic adjustments, the ERP targeted budgetary deficits which had 
to be reduced to a small amount of the country's GDP. According to the World Bank 
Report, budget deficits in 1992-1993 were large, averaging 18% of GDP and increased to 
an estimated 22.5% of the GDP in 1994.'^' The First Five Year Plan (FFYP) 1996-2000, 
reported the following figures for the budget deficits, as a percentage of the GDP,'^-
Table 5.2-1 The ratio of budget deficit to the GDP 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
8.0% 4.1% 12.4% 13.8% 16.2% 8.0% 
Source: The Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance 
However, annual growth for the GDP was reported by other agencies as following 
throughout the period 1991-95:'" 
Table 5.2 - 2 The growth of the GDP over the period (1991-1995) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995* 1996* 1997* 
according to FFYP 0.0 5.3 4.3 0.5 9.6 7.0 7.5 
according to WB 0.0 4.2 5.9 5.7 
according to MEED -5 -2 +3 -1 2 
* Estimated 
Source: Nonneman,G., Economic Indicators of the ROY, presented in a Seminar on tiie 
Future of Yemen Unity, SOAS, London 
For the year of 1995, budget deficits were to be reduced to 11% of the GDP; the 
FFYP reported that deficits constituted only 8% and the financial statement of the 
Ministry of Finance of 1997 addressed to the Parliament, reported a 7% of the 
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GDP did the 1995 budget deficit constitute. 124 
(b) Non-Inflationary Resources 
In accordance with the plans for macroeconomic adjustment, the ERP called for 
the provision of resources without inflating the economy. Measures were required 
to enhance government revenues and curtail real current expenditures. According 
to WB reports, revenue-enhancing measures would include unifying the official 
exchange rates at the parallel market rate and increases in electricity and 
petroleum product prices. In addition, replacing quantitative restrictions of 
imports with tariffs would provide more revenues for the Government.'" 
The adoption of these policies proved feasible and had some success. The financial statement 
of 1997 stated that the general resources of the budget of 1996 were estimated at 155,886 
million Riyals and that of 1997, at 301,222 million Riyals, representing an increase of 93.2% 
from the 1996 budget (1997 - 1996).'^ * Most of those resources came from the oil and gas 
sector.'"' Expenditure-reducing measures were also pursued in the ERP since 1995. These 
were within the framework of subsidies elimination policy and prices restructure of different 
commodities: wheat, wheat flour, water, electricity and petroleum products. 
(c) Curtailment of Inflation'^ 
Inflation in the ROY had been rising over the period from 1990 to 1994 and 
started to be stabilise after 1995. The following table represents the general rise 
of inflation over the stated period. 
Table 5.2 - 3 Inflation Rate in the ROY (1990-1995) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
35% 45% 55% 55% 145% 100% 
Source: Nonneman, G, Economic Indicators of the ROY, presented in 
a seminar on the Future of Yemen Unity. SOAS, London 
Also, according to the formal government financial statement of 1997, inflation 
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would have been expected to be at 55% in 1995 and 30% in 1996. The ERP 
estimated the inflation in 1997 would be at 10% only.'"' 
The curtailing of inflation implied several fiscal and monetary policies being 
applied at different levels. The first fiscal policy was that financing the deficits 
should be from non-inflationary means, i.e. not by increasing the supply of money 
by printing the currency but rather by encouraging the public to save through 
purchasing treasury bills or bonds from the Government. Removal of subsidies 
from many basic products and services was the second fiscal policy adopted by 
theauthorifies.'^" 
The third fiscal policy to curtail inflation was the liberalisation of interest rates and the 
attempt to move towards unifying exchange rates unification. Under the inflationary 
conditions, interest rates at their various levels for saving or borrowing ranged from 6% -
24% and even so, these rates did not reflect the actual economic rates. The Central Bank of 
Yemen (CBY) formally had several exchange rates as follows: 
131 US$/Riyals 
1=5 for Yemeni Diplomats 
1 = 18 for customs 
1= 25 an incenfive rate applied to investment transactions especially of 
oil companies and also UN organisations. 
1=45 for patient transactions 
The CBY was not making normal transactions for the tourists or the citizens. 
These were left for other commercial banks to function on. 
Despite these rates differences, there was considerable depreciation in the parallel 
market, which was trading in early 1995 at 115 Riyals per US$ and in some places 
in Yemen, it traded at 165 Riyals per dollar. 
The authorifies concerned, i.e. the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY), started to take 
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action in 1995 by depreciating formally the local currency, whereby US$ was 
made equal to 50 Yemeni Riyals. This did not work well, and in the parallel 
market the dollar jumped up to 180 Riyals. In mid-1995, the CBY announced the 
floating of the interest rates with the parallel market rates for the riyal becoming 
the official bank rates. Inflation was gradually curtailed.'^^ 
(d) Encouragement of the Private Sector 
The private sector received special attention in the ERP, though over this period, it 
made no improvement. Within the macroeconomic stabilisation component, the 
ERP targeted some policies towards the removal of impediments from the private 
sector which was crucial to the overall economic development in Yemen. The 
Yemeni government tried, with the adoption of the free-market economy, to 
encourage the private sector. The economic environment, however, was still full 
of constraints for the private sector. These constraints were represented in various 
distortionary governmental policies in taxation, trade, prices and subsidies.'^ '' 
The Investment Law No. 22 of 1991 was enacted to encourage the private sector 
through the many facilities it provided. Major facilities for the private sector were 
to cover the initiation period of the projects/enterprises.'^'' 
The General Investment Authority (GIA), a governmental institution, emerged in 
1991 to foster private sector activities, solve problems and make sustained reforms 
in the private sector's environment. The GIA was under the supervision of the 
Premier. 
Other policies related to Private sector will be covered in subsection 5.2.2.3. 
below. 
In practice, the private sector did not develop substantially after the war.'"*' The 
main reason for this was the prevailing post-war chaotic situation, in terms of 
security instability and political and economic deteriorating conditions. Most 
consumer prices had risen and purchasing power had decreased. The speed with 
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which ERP policies were applied to the daily life of citizens did not give 
confidence to investors to invest without political disruption in the near future. 
(The researcher talked to an investor of the Hayel Group about the group's 
hesitation in taking up good projects. He said that he did not believe ERP policies 
would work without a heavy price being paid either by investors or by the 
population {who were not used to such harsh policies}). Investors believed that 
there would be a high risk in taking up large-scale enterprises at this early stage of 
the ERP. 
(e) The External Debts Problem 
External debts were the last item in the menu of the macroeconomic adjustments 
component which the ERP had targeted. External debts were a heavy burden on 
the economy, consfituting 185% of the GDP in 1995.'^ ^ According to the Financial 
Statement of 1997, external debts amounted to US$ 9 billions in that year.'" The 
ERP required the government to approach the Paris Club and other creditors, in 
order not to lose its credibility before the international community. On the 24"' 
September 1996, Yemen signed an agreement with the Paris Club, re-scheduling 
its debts..'^ ^ 
The re-scheduling was made conditional on Yemen going into the second phase of 
the ERP in 1997 where Yemen could be assisted by the ESAF (Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facilities) Programme. That step was, however, necessary 
for the completion of the ERP in all its dimensions. It followed then that Yemen 
gained similar concessions to those of the Paris Club from other creditors also. 
5.2.6.2 Protecting the Poor with Specific Social Policies During the Adjustment 
Period 
The ERP included reforming the social safety net (SSN) and social sectors with 
the objecfive of providing assistance to persons who had fallen below a socially 
acceptable living standard. The main issues of this components will be discussed 
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below. 
(a) The Removal of Subsidies 
The social measures component in the ERP-formulated policies for the removal of 
subsidies in wheat, wheat flour and other power commodities which constituted a 
burden on the economy. This was made in order to encourage farmers and 
investors to obtain good prices for their goods. The heavy subsidies on the basic 
food and power commodities caused price distortion and discouraged local 
farmers and investors from production and investment in the local markets. The 
subsidies on these basic commidities were, eventually, in the benfit of local 
merchants who receive high margin profit from these subsidised goods. The WB 
and the IMF drew this pricing polies which should be concomitant with the 
implementation of other trade liberalisafion policies to be discussed below. 
Subsidies on wheat and wheat flour amounted in 1994 to US$ 271 million and 
constituted 10%) of the GDP.'^ ^ In 1997, the Financial Statement of the finance 
authorifies stated that 42,750 million Riyals or (2.42 billion Riyals) was allocated 
to wheat and wheat flour subsidy in the budget of 1997. This was equal to US$ 
(400,000). But in June 1997, the new Premier, Dr Faraj Bin Ghanem repealed the 
whole subsidies of these two basic commodities in addition to the power 
commodities.'''" The Yemeni public, whom mainly of the poor, did not mind the 
hardship of the ERP, i f in the long run, its impact would be positive, but they 
forsaw that positive impact was not feasible at all. 
ERP policies were also formulated towards the removal of power (electricity and 
water) and petroleum products within the social safety net. Power and petroleum 
products' prices were far below their operating costs. The Financial Statement of 
1997 envisaged an allocation of power subsidies for 1997 as follows:''" 
Power: 8074 millions Riyals « US$ 70,000 
Petroleum Products: 23200 million Riyals « US$ 200,000 
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More often than not, subsidies were awarded to the CBY, and in turn, they were 
allocated to merchants and corporations. Merchants and corporations were then 
able to purchase commodities, and supply the demand of the market. The 
subsidies, thus, were o f greater benefit to the merchant and the corporation than to 
the citizen. The ERP, however, required the financial authorities to incorporate 
any left-over subsidies within the budget into projects for the poor under the 
auspices o f the SSN programme.'"" 
(b) Improvement of Social Services (Health and Education) 
The social measures in the ERP had called for specific policies to be created for 
the health and education sectors, to improve these sectors with cost-effective 
measures. Government expenditures in 1993 in the health and education sectors 
(primary and secondary) accounted for 24% of total government expenditures. 
The majority o f these current expenditures were for education (81%).'"^ The 
budget was biased towards covering operating costs, leaving around 5% only for 
capital expenditures.'"'' This had an adverse impact on the quality of health and 
education services rendered to the public. The ERP, therefore, recommended 
resources provision in the health sector to capital expenditure in terms of 
equipment, laborataries and other non-operational expenditures. 
(c) The Social Safety Net (SSN) and NGOs 
Under its social measures, the ERP targeted some policies for the encouragement 
of non-governmental organisations in Yemen, designed to help the poor through 
various SSN programmes. Up to 1995, Yemen had a small number o f domestic 
and foreign NGOs, which faced serious setbacks in their work. There were 
diff icul t and cumbersome regulations facing NGOs, especially in Southern areas. 
Most Southern NGOs had stopped operations due to difficulfies in fund raising 
and in their general operation, and also for political reasons.'"^ 
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5.2.6.3 Structural Reforms 
The third major component in the ERP were structural reforms, aimed at 
achieving a higher sustainable economic growth via a strong and effective private 
sector. To achieve this, the ERP called for a series of economic measures for the 
private sector to have a strong economic foundation.'''* The first of these measures 
was related to the trade liberalisation policies. 
(a) Liberalisation of Trade Policies 
Within the structural reforms component, the ERP targeted reform of specific 
instruments in trade liberalisation policies for the encouragement of the private 
sector. These trade instruments were, tariffs (taxation and customs), trade licences 
and customs administration. 
With respect to tar i f f rates, the World Bank reported that a restrictive trade 
environment had been maintained because of high tariffs on export-oriented firms. 
The ERP, therefore, called for these rates to be reduced. By 1996, tariff rates 
reached very low levels: 4.2% of their statutory rates."" Also there were no tariff 
rates on investment goods which were all duty free, by the o f Investment Law No 
22 o f 1991.'^' 
On exports and imports, the WB had reported that the trade sector was crippled by 
protective instruments in export and import licences. The ERP, in its structural 
reform component, therefore, emphasised the need for a liberalised trade policy by 
which such restrictions would be removed.'''^ 
The ERP also called for the deregulation of customs administration, which was 
impeding the private sector in its import-export activities. The previous customs 
administration had required 50 signatures for goods clearance.'^" 
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The ERP addressed these above problems and asked for reforms to be made 
within the period 1995-1997. The Financial Statement o f the Yemen Authorities 
in March 1997 stated that basic reforms in the Customs and Tax authorities would 
take place when the ESAF programme came into action. 
(b) Improvement of Pricing Policies 
These were the second item of structural reform called for by the ERP. 
The ERP called for a price adjustment policy for various relevant commodities to 
repeal price distortions in the economy. In its efforts to keep prices at low levels, 
the government had caused distortions in the economy, where financial prices 
were set at levels significantly below economic prices (as in the case of wheat and 
wheat f l o u r ) . T h e low, and controlled, prices o f major items in major sectors 
(power, petroleum, agriculture and industrial) led to the excessive use o f these 
goods and services and overburdened the budget. They deprived the country of 
export opportunities and foreign exchange earnings or savings and caused 
environmental pollution and/or degradation. This provided incorrect signals to 
producers and consumers alike and constituted a significant adverse fiscal impact. 
Based on the above analysis, the ERP stressed the need to implement price 
adjustments and liberalisation to the address commodities: power, (water and 
electricity) petroleum derivatives, agriculture(wheat and wheat flour) and industry 
(cement). As a result, since mid-1995, prices of these commodities rose by 60-
100%.'" In Southern areas (Aden) power prices went up by as much as 500%.'" 
(c) The Financial and Judiciary Sectors were areas in which structural reform 
policies were to be part o f the ERP. 
Within the structural reform component, the ERP called for crucial supportive 
policies for financial and judiciary sectors to remove all restrictive regulations and 
financial distortions surrounding the private sector in the economy. The banking 
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system in the financial sector was very inefficient, with only 19% in the lending 
power function in 1991-93, to a few reliable clients in the private sector.'^" Many 
clients could not repay their banks' debts and banks failed, in view of ineffective 
judicial machinery to obtain its debts from clients. Moreover the system was 
characterised by considerable dis-intermediation which was encouraged by: 
(i) the level and structure o f nominal interest rates 
(ii) the absence o f effective legal recourse for banks to address unperformed 
assets problem 
(i i i ) restrictive Central Bank regulations. 
The ERP addressed banking problems with a deregulation policy in the interest 
rates and liberalisation o f the CBY restrictive regulations. In 1996, with the 
liberalisafion in interest rates and other monetary policies, the country could 
develop a secondary securities market o f Treasury Bills and Bonds Market . ' " 
The ERP, within the structural reform component also called for judiciary reform 
policies to be supportive to the financial policies. In 1996, commercial courts were 
established to look into commercial disputes effectively. '^^Up to 1997, however, 
these courts had not been able to operate successfully. 
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5.2.7 The Impact of the Change in Presidential Power and the E R P on Southern 
Regions 
Southern regions suffered a serious economic setback after the war of 1994. 
Below, we shall examine the factors that had an impact on the southern regions, 
both economically and socially. 
5.2.7.1.The Inverse Relationship between the Decision-making Structure and the 
E R P 
Both the decision-making structure and the ERP were new set-ups introduced to 
the newly established State o f the Yemen Republic after the war o f 1994. Each 
had its own features and dimensions, yet it was necessary for the two to work in 
harmony to achieve sustained development. 
To assess the impact o f the changes in the decision-making structures and of the 
ERP on the development o f Southern areas, it is important to examine the 
variations in the features and the dimensions o f these variables, with respect to 
their functions and to each other in the development process. 
The basic feature which set the new decision-making structure apart from the ERP 
related to structural attitudes. While the decision-making structure was based on 
tribal attitudes, the ERP was based on an ethic o f national interest with a national 
outlook. '" Economic decisions were primarily made by decision-makers of the 
'tribal elite'. The ERP, though harsh in the short-term, was ultimately geared 
towards the national interest. This inverse relationship meant that where the tribal 
elite's interest conflicted with the ERP, the latter failed to be implemented. 
A second variant feature was in the proposed administrative set-up. While the 
ERP called for decentralisation o f all economic activities and regulations, the 
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government leadership wanted centralisation in the administrative set-up of the 
country. In principle, it approved the ERP's mechanisms for decentralisation and 
deregulation o f economic activities, but in practice it undermined these 
procedures. This caused dislocation in the work o f the ERP. For instance, the new 
official exchange rate o f the local currency was to be parallel with the market 
exchange rate, and therefore there would be no obligation for anyone or any 
corporation to exchange foreign currency at the CBY at any specific rate other 
than the one in the market. Some officials, however, would work contrary to ERP 
regulations and would formally oblige oil corporations (for example) to exchange 
currencies at the CBY at a specific rate lower than the on-going parallel rate.'^^ 
A third variant feature lay in the data used by the government leadership and the 
ERP management. The government leaders would rely on tribal information while 
the ERP management sought scientifically-analysed data from the community to 
provide a basis for decisions.'^' 
Finally, the critical feature o f the ERP in its managerial contribution inside the 
country, was his utmost cooperation with the tribal power structure. The ERP was 
run by two categories o f expertise; local and foreign. World Bank expertise were 
'technically' selected and the local 'expertise' were 'tribally' selected.'*" Local 
key figures who handled the ERP in management were purely northerners: The 
fol lowing is a small example; 
1. Motahher Al-Sa'aidi Vice-minister of Planning (relative of Dr 
Al-Eryani - the Premier, ex-Foreign Minister 
2. Abdul-Kalim Al-Arhabi The President's in-law 
3. Amat-al-Ahm Ai-Soswah Deputy Minister in Information (the most influential 
Zaydi lady in the northern community) 
Under such management, the ERP was bound to have many dislocations in the 
implementation, with little scope for achievement. International expertise, however, 
had been misled in many aspects o f those parameters in the above varied features 
and soon would discover the real difficuhies facing the ERP in the long-term. Up to 
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1998, the ERP hardly struck any o f its goals. Indeed, the local currency gained 
some stabilisation for about two and a half years, but since October 1998, the Riyal 
started to loose stability and rose up by about 15 % (from 125 riyal per US$ to 150 
riyal per US$). 
5.2.7.2 Ratio of Resources between Northern and Southern Parts 
It is important to examine critically the ratio o f material resources of the Southern 
region relafive to the overall resources of the country. Table 5-1 shows the 
governmental revenues (in billions o f Riyals) for the year 1997.* 
Table 5.2 - 4 Government Revenues in 1997 
(In bi l l ion Riyals) 
Resources of: % 
Oil & Gas 191 63.2 
Taxes 34 11.1 
Customs 29 9.6 
State share o f profits 16 5.4 
Loans & assistance 19 6.5 
Personnel resources 6 2.0 
Differences in cement prices 4 1.5 
Zakat taxes 2 0.6 
T O T A L 301 100 
* Source - The Financial Statement (1997), Ministry of Finance 
It is noticeable that the oil sector constituted 63% of the total resources. The oil sector's 
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activities were present in Marib, Shabwa and Hadhramout, with Aden as a 
refinery and bunkering area. Only Marib Govemorate is Northern, whilst the rest 
are Southern. The ratio o f oil production for Southern areas to Northern areas was 
55:45 respectively in 1996/7.'*' In terms of refinery capacity, Marib refinery had a 
capacity o f only 10,000 b/d while that o f Aden had a capacity of 170,000b/d.'*-
Refinery revenues according to the Government were 22 billion Riyals and 3.5 
bil l ion Riyals for Aden and Marib refineries respectively in 1997.'*'' Also, while 
Northern oil production was diminishing. Southern oil production was expanding, 
though at a much lower pace than had been hoped. Other revenues would have 
come more f rom Northern areas than Southern, owing to the fact that there had 
been more substantial commercial activities in the north than in the south. But, i f 
state-owned land resources were taken into account, the South's resources would 
appear stronger'*'' On least estimate, therefore. Southerners would have the right to 
enjoy 50% of those resources for the development o f their areas and for improving 
their standard o f l iving. 
One can conclude that although the ERP was bound to lead to high level of 
unemployment (up to 35% in practice for the whole country), it would not be 
expected under an objective policy for there to be a 60-70% unemployment in 
Southern areas alone as there was.'*^ The standard of living in the South declined 
in terms o f nutrition, environment, social facilities and expenditure on food and 
non-food commodities.'** 
Economic enterprises in the South moved from the public state-ownership under 
the ex-YSP regime into the elite's private ownership. Various private groups such 
as Hayel, Al-Ahmer, Bin-Mahfouz and others who were collectively called the 
'money-power' acquired the ownership o f public enterprises or established 
business on old state-owned lands in Southern regions. '*' Southern citizens could 
not afford either to compete in acquiring similar former state-owned enterprises or 
to purchase the expensive services/facilities in their region. The state leadership 
failed to provide effectively any coherent economic framework within which 
Southerners could live satisfactorily. 
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5.2.7.3 Impact of Northern Developmental Poicies on Southern Infrastructure 
Specific elements o f the Southern infrastructure w i l l be examined below to assess 
the impact o f the ERP and the decision-making structure on the development of 
Southern regions. 
(a) Water 
The water infrastructure can be considered according to three dimensions: 
(i) Water Priority in the national economic strategy 
(ii) The Level of Maintenance of Water Infrastructure 
(iii) Water Development Impact on the Standard of Living: 
(i) Water Priority in the national economic strategy 
Water was said to constitute a top priority in national strategy and policies but 
that level o f priority was not maintained in Southern regions to the same 
degree as existed in former PDRY. The state leadership benefited from 
inheriting a sound infrastructure for water in Southern regions. With its 
technical specifications. Southern water distribution was regulated by a legal 
mechanism properly attached to it and was managed by a sound 
administration. The Northern leadership under the Y A R did not give the 
water issue the same priority as the Southerners did.'*^ This resulted in the 
absence of a consolidated water infrastructure in Northern regions which later 
had detrimental results for nearby Southern regions, namely those of Lahej, 
Aden and Abyan. After 1994, the water infrastructure in Southern regions 
was strained by the withdrawing and transfer o f water to the Northern regions 
(Taiz and Ibb regions) 
In terms o f water administrative management, the decision-making structure 
did not attempt to build up a systematised integrated authority for water to 
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reflect development policy across the country. While the National Water and 
Sanitation Authority (NWSA) in the South was a public enterprise, in the 
North, the NWSA was partially owned (60%) by private shareholders.'*' 
Also, there was the General Authority for Rural Electricity and Water 
(GAREW) which existed in Northern regions but hardly had any activities in 
the south. As a partially public institution, the GAREW had never contributed 
to the public budget up to 1996, and government contribution to its overhead 
costs continued as follows:'™ 
Table 5.2 - 5 Government Contribution to the northern overhead cost of 
the mixed sector of Water ( G A R E W ) 
(in Mill ions o f Yemeni Riyals) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
336 369 1000 2000 2646 
Source: The Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance 
This institution was supposed to have made millions of Riyals profit which 
should be subject to taxation and partial donation o f its profits to the public 
budget, but due to the tribal basis o f the shareholders involved, the 
Government continued to support the overhead costs out o f public funds.'" 
The government policy, in the post-war, went further in its discriminatory 
resouces' policies by providing some resources to cover the deficits of some 
northern public institufions while would be refrained from provision of 
resources to some basic needs in the southern infrastructures. This was 
indicated in the Financial Statement o f 1997 as following: 
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Table 5.2 -6 Budgetary Contribution to ( G A R E W ) for Deficts' 
Coverage for the period (1993-1997) 
(YR millions) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 (est) 
20 25 26 36 72 
Source: The Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance 
(ii) The Level of Maintenance of Water Infrastructure in the South 
In Southern regions, basic infrastructural services such as water were handled 
in a discriminately fahsion by the state leadership following the change in the 
decision-making structure and the start of the ERP in the post-war period. 
This can be explained through the aspects covered below. 
(a) Administrative and Financial Management of the Water Sector: 
The N W S A was managed by the Northern technical elite, both in Sanaa (the 
central authority) and in Aden (the major Southern city). The south enjoyed a 
more efficient infrastructure than the north, yet the Northern management in 
both Sanaa and Aden proposed a price increase for the south only, in addition 
to a newly introduced fee on each regulator (per family) at a minimum charge 
of 750 Riyals. Due to variations in climate and the civic style o f life, domestic 
water consumption would be much heavier in Southern areas. The price 
increase, therefore, put a correspondingly heavy economic burden on the 
Southern population."^ 
The new increases in water charges in the south, eventually, were made to 
subsidise the northern sector which received various subsidies which in turn 
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went to shareholders rather than to effective management of these institutions. 
In consideration to the fact that the water institutions in the south were purely 
public, the proposed increases in the water bills (in the south) should have 
gone to the improvement o f their management and maintanance. 
Thus the government would receive resources from all Southern water sectors 
to the budget and would not contribute to the renewal o f their overhead costs, 
whereas the Northern resources would not always meet the operating costs of 
their institutions and would continue to receive subsidies at the expense of 
southerners'. Major portions o f the bills o f some of the elite, influential 
groups or ministries would not have to be paid which would cause high 
deficits in the northern public institutions such as water sector. The 
Government, however, would pay 'its share of the turnover of both Northern 
water institutions (NWSA & GAREW) out of Government resources.''" The 
Government's contributions in the last five years to NSWA is in the table 
below. 
Table 5.2 - 7 Budget Contribution to NWSA over the period (1993-1997) 
(Yemeni Riyal Mill ions) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 (est) 
643 198 636 1400 1440 
Source: The Financial Statement, 1997, Ministry of Finance 
Up to 1997, the above allocations failed to provide an adequate water supply 
system to Northern regions. In the Southern regions, water management 
suffered serious setbacks because o f the impact of the war, yet gained no 
financial support for repairs. Hadhramout, for example, up to 1998, could not 
obtain the required support in finance from the government to rebuild its 
technical infrastructure for water control. 
288 
(b) Technical Maintenance 
Taking Aden as an example, the Northern technical elite failed to provide the 
required maintenance which used to exist in the south for water infrastructure. 
The state leadership in 1994 appointed a Northerner from Hudaidah to 
manage water resources after the war, instead of one o f many highly qualified 
and experienced Adeni figures who could have run the sector efficiently."' ' 
The collected resources, i f utilised properly, would have been sufficient for 
the required maintenance. Also with the support of international institutions, 
the Southern water infrastructure could have been maintained at a very 
sophisticated level. Up to 1997, however, water institutions in the south had 
fallen short o f the adequate standard in maintenance and development. ' " 
(iii) Water Development Impact on the Standard of Living: 
The negative impact o f water development on the standard of living of the 
Southerners was the third aspect o f the impact o f the decision-making 
structure and the ERP in the development in the south. The NWSA had lost 
its credibility as a positive lively sector owing to many reasons. First, the 
decision-making structure had passed/implemented discriminatory policies in 
the South. As a result o f these financial discriminatory policies, the required 
maintenance could not be achieved due to a lack of resources. For instance, 
the quantity o f chloride was lowered and the cleaning of reservoirs was not 
regularly undertaken. This had caused the spread o f water-borne diseases 
among children."* Also, sewerage problems in major cities were not solved 
and very littie expenditure for such programmes would be available.'" 
The second reason for such a negative impact on the standard of living of the 
Southern population with regard to water development was the impact of ERP 
policies. Unlike the Northern system, the Southern water infrastructure 
was\not subsidised before 1994, but could cover its operating costs under 
non-inflationary conditions. The Northern water infrastructure was badly hit 
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impact o f 
in its subsidies to cover its operating cos t s .Cen t r a l authorities, however, 
continued to provide assistance to it in various forms. The ERP pricing policy 
was targeted to effect Southerners only, for the following reasons. Firstly, 
they were consuming more water than Northerners, domestically for climatic 
reasons. So, they would be liable to pay more. Secondly, as they were 
enjoying a sewerage infrastructure, which existed since the 1930s, they were 
asked to pay a minimum charge of 750 Riyals for its maintenance, which 
never happened. And finally, the Southerners (in Aden and Lahej) had to stay 
7-10 hours weekly without water, in order to fill water from these regions into 
tankers for Taiz Governorate. 
2. Electricity 
Southern electricity infrastructure had suffered serious setbacks in the post-
war period due to changes in the decision-making structure and the policies of 
the ERP. These serious set backs had come out as a result of: 
(i) Non-systematic structure o f the Public Electric Corporation (PEC) 
(i i ) The recurrent deficits o f the PEC in its Northern branch and the 
this on the Southern branch 
( i i i ) Power prices made Southerners a disadvantaged group as their power 
need was greater than the Northerners'. 
(i) The Non-Systematic Structure of the Public Electric Corporation 
( P E C ) in the Two Regions of Yemen 
The negative impact o f the decision-making process and the ERP policies on 
the Southern electrical infrastructure, was basically attributed to the non-
systematic structure o f the Public Electric Corporation and ineffective 
management in the two regions o f the country. Typical of any public 
enterprise in the south, the PEC was purely a public enterprise and was not 
290 
integrated totally with the Northern PEC, which was a mixed economic 
institution wi th 49% of it belonging to private shareholders. Such variations 
in their legal entities had caused policy fragmentation within each part of the 
PEC. Shareholders would intervene in management and would add to its 
management complications and corruption. The writer had been three times to 
the main office of PEC in Sanaa and every time she would witness long and 
cumbersome queues at the Executive Director's office door for unsolved 
problems. This implied that most Northern branches were ineffective in 
solving native problems and therefore had to come to the main office. In the 
south however, the PEC used to have the most sophisticated administrative 
system. Since the 1940s, and when enlarged into former PDRY, each new 
installation was independently administered.'" 
Administratively speaking, the impact of the decision-making process in 
particular, was the same as in the water sector. The PEC administration did 
not change hands after the war and was kept under the same old Northerner. 
There was, however, a change in financial pricing policies which had changed 
after 1994 and this was attributed to the ERP policies alone. 
(ii) The Recurrent Deficit in Electricity 
The second reason for the negative impact o f the decision-making process and 
the ERP policies on electrical power was the recurrent deficits of the PEC in 
the northern region due to improper management. Despite the private element 
and its monopoly o f the market, the PEC in the north failed to recover its 
managerial and operating costs even before inflation had reached high 
levels.'^" The Financial Statement o f 1997 estimated YR 56.6 millions profit 
for Government share which the PEC (both the north and south region) would 
be expected to make. This amount would most likely come from Southern 
resources after the high increase in prices were made (on Southerners bills 
which for climatic reasons would come out from Southern areas).'^' 
The recurrent deficits made by the Northern PEC had an impact on 
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governmental resources at the expense of the publicly-owned Southern 
branches o f the PEC. The following figures were paid-out as PEC public 
expenditure (in northern regions) as Government shares in this corporation. 
(YR millions) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
457 246 1539 4076 2784 
Source: The Financial Statement, Ministry of Finance, 1997 
(iii) Power Prices 
As the ERP only recommended a 50% price increase in the first stage to be 
followed by another price increase, power prices became a burden on the 
Southern population.'^^ The climactic variation, especially in summer and 
autumn had made the Southern population a disadvantaged group for 
electrical use. Prices, practically, rose by 100%* and those who could not 
meet such high costs for power suffered f rom deteriorating living standards. 
This was very noticeable in major towns. The infrastructure had maintained 
its facilities without power cuts, in Aden City at least. Maintenance from 
internal resources (in Aden Branch) was adequate. In the north, power cuts 
would be regular and at least twice a day. 
In conclusion, both power infrastructures (water and electricity) were 
insufficiently supported for developmental process while discriminatory 
policies were maintained in favour o f the Northern infrastructure. The 
Southern population, as a result, was badly affected and their standard of 
l iving with respect to this power sectors and sanitation deteriorated 
remarkably. 
5.2.7.3 The Impact of Changes in the Presidency and of the E R P on the 
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Development of Social Services, Health and Education, in Southern 
Regions. 
Both the decision-making process and ERP poHcies had contributed to the 
deterioration of the Southern social services, in the heahh and education 
sectors, following the war period. The deterioration of those sectors had come 
about from two aspects, namely the non-availability of resources to these 
sectors in Southern areas at the required standard and secondly, the 
politicisation of management to their sectors.'^ ^ 
At the level of the deterioration of each of health and education sectors out of 
non-availability of resources, the Southern social infrastructure was badly 
damaged in the former material resources that used to exist before the war 
period. Government resources, despite the strict ERP policies, continued to 
spend indiscriminantly in the north at the expense of the south. Specifically, 
the overall expenditures in both sectors from the General Budget had 
decreased, as will be shown later. The south, however, lost most of its former 
subsidised resources while the Northern sectors continued to get them, but 
under different financial categories in the budget: 
Total expenditure (by sectors):(YR millions) 
T O T A L : 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
General Budget Expenditure 68,984 87,128 119,880 181,146 313,986 
Education 13,531 16,738 22,860 39,808 52,534 
Health 3,102 2,983 4,219 8,041 10,046 
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Expenditures for Institutions ( Y R millions) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 (e 
Education Sector 13,531 16,738 22,860 39,808 52,534 
Research Education Centre (N) 29.7 36.2 34.9 44.3 48.5 
Sanaa University (N) 943 1,049 1,406 3,072 3,813 
Academic Kuwait Hospital (N) 44 152 320 366 
Aden University (S) 432 488 604 1,325 1,629 
Taiz University (N) 23 927 1,302 
Hadhramout (S) 45 388 356 
Al-Hudaidah University (N) 248 
Ibb University (N) 344 
Dhamas University (N) 310 
Yemen Research Centre (N) 20 21 26 65 44 
The Ministry (N>S) 12,104 15,096 20,565 33,688 44,065 
Health Sector 3,102 2,983 4,219 8,041 10,046 
General Authority of Sanaa Hospital*' 
(main) 
General Authority of Sanaa Hospital*^ 
(main) 
236 214 327 432 976 
9.4 26.0 103 189 170 
*' = Resources out of budget (for Public Enterprise Support against recurrent deficit). 
*- = Resources out of budget (for Governmental share in the over-turns of the mixed economic sectorial 
units) 
Source: The Ministry of Finance, 1997 
The examination of the above tables and figures clearly explains the extent of 
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the discriminatory policies of the decision-making structure in resource 
allocation to Southern institutions against public institutions in the south. 
The second aspect with which development of the Southern social 
infrastructure in health and education was deteriorating, was the politicisation 
of the management of these sectors by either GPC or Islah figures. Prior to 
the war, the Southern elite maintained YSP figures at the top of the sectoral 
management but because there was no political rivalry other than 
independents, there was no political friction in the management. After 1994, 
several political problems between the two leading parties were reflected in 
all levels of administration, including students in higher education 
institutions. 
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5.3 The Military Sector in the Post-War period 
The military sectors of both the north and the south were discussed in the 
preceding Chapter 4. In this subsection of Chapter 5, the military sector 
will be analysed on its composition and performance following the civil 
warof 1994.'^' 
5.3.1 The Integration of the ROY's Military Sector 
With the removal of the YSP from all political power in the power centre 
leadership, the YSP military force was also removed from the military 
structure. The new leadership in the military organisation changed the 
structure and brought it again under the command of General Ali Abdallah 
Saleh, the President of the State. A Southern Minister was appointed 
during the war, namely. Brigadier Abdo Rubbo Mansoor who continued 
to hold the post until the war was over. Brigideir Mansoor, became Vice-
President of the State, and the Ministry then came under Brigadier A. M. 
Al-Sayyani, from Sanhan in the north, in October 1994. The hierarchy of 
the administrative structure of the Ministry of Defence is depicted below. 
The President of the State 
The Highest Commandant of the Armed Forces 
I 
The Higher Defence Council The Minister of Defence 
1 
Regional Defence Councils 
Forces 
The Chief Comm. of Armed 
1 
District Defence Councils Deputies to the C.C.A.F. (4) 
Under the deputies of the C.C.A.F. there were several departments in 
296 
charge of the various technical functions of the ministry. Very few 
southerners were incorporated in these senior departments, and these were 
from the Al i Nasser faction who played a big role in the victory of the 
northern forces over the South. However, these southern forces were 
mainly part of the GPC political set-up and none of them represented the 
YSP. 
5.3.2 The Immediate Effects of the War on the Southern Armed Forces 
The southern armed forces suffered serious setbacks in the post-war period 
under the new fully integrated leadership of both former parts of Yemen. 
Those setbacks were very serious in two forms. Firstly, that some armed 
forces fled the country and, secondly, that some remained in the country 
but outside military service, apart from the those in GPC organs. 
However, even those who fought on the northern side and were integrated 
in the military set-up did not enjoy the same authoritative power as their 
northern colleagues. The tribal bonds within the northerners was too 
strong to allow equal treatment between the northern and southern forces 
take place at any point of time during the period 1995-1998.'^ ^ 
5.3.2.1 The Southern Armed Forces Who Fled 
Different levels of the southern armed forces defected to neighbouring 
countries. For example. Staff Brigadier Haitham Qasem, ex-Minister of 
Defence (1990-1994), left for the United Arab Emirates (Abu-Dhabi). His 
assistants. Colonel Ahmed Al i and others, left with him. Some of the 
well-trained airforce pilots left to KSA and Gulf States. Some military 
leaders preferred to stay in Cairo and Damascus. A handful of the security 
and defence forces fled to the UK and USA, joining their relations, who 
were British/American nationals. The majority of junior military staff, 
however, fled and preferred to stay in military training camps abroad 
and/or near Yemeni borders. 
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Political harrassment was observed along the Yemeni-Saudi borders from 
these camps during 1996 and 1997. They were signalling their threat to 
the country's stability. 
5.3.2.2 Southern Armed Forces in the Country 
For analytical purposes it is important to distinguish between two factions 
of the southern armed forces in the country. The researcher is identifying 
them as faction A and faction B. 
Faction A was that part of the southern armed forces under which the co-
operative unification was made between the two former states: PDRY and 
YAR. 
Faction B was that part of the southern armed forces which defected from 
the south of the country, after the 1986 civil war, to the north. 
The two factions were involved in the 1994 war but on different sides and 
came out of the war with differing results. 
a. Leadership Recruitment: 
The immediate effects of the war and of the political changes in the 
country were negative in all aspects for the southern factions, for many 
reasons. The first and the major reason was related to the ideological 
background of the southern armed forces. In view of the fact that the 
whole military set-up of the south was politicised by YSP-Marxist 
ideology, there would hardly be an accommodation for southerners in the 
northern military force under the new political administration of the State. 
Faction A, in particular, had lost all possibility to be incorporated in the 
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new military leadership.'^ ^ 
The second reason for the negative impact of the war and political changes 
in the southern armed forces in the country was the narrow vision of the 
northern forces with regard to national interest for the establishment of a 
strong military for the country. Northern forces had been living in a very 
tribal-orientated set-up. Their victory over the then gigantic YSP military 
force was over-estimated and not properly analysed with respect to their 
modest capacities, particularly in war strategy and air-force utilisation. 
They lost many forces and volunteers at the start of the war. The really 
decisive role in the war was played by Faction B of the Southerners. Under 
the influence of tribal attitudes. Northern forces failed to foresee the 
national need for a fully integrated military organisation. As a result of 
that unawareness, the Hunaish problem developed in the Red Sea with 
Eritrea in 1995/1996 and the boundary issue between Yemen and 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remained as a source of constant anxiety to the 
state leadership. Within these threats, the new military establishment failed 
to objectively absorb the forces of the South. 
The third reason was the inability of the tribal power centre to accept a 
change in its power composition and its military force for the benefit of 
the new unified state. There was strong tribal attachment between the state 
leadership and the military set-up. Unlike in other sectors, the military 
sector mirrored the decision-making structure in its tribal features. The 
Southerners' forces, therefore, would not be accepted in any 
accommodation within such a power centre characterised by such tribal 
features."" 
Faction B of the Southern forces, however, was in a better position due to 
their role in assisting in the victory of the North over the South. The new 
military establishment placed them in high positions, though with 
insufficient authority. Staff-Colonel AbduUa Elaiwah, who was Vice-
299 
Minister of Defence in 1985 in the PDRY and defected with Al i Nasser, 
was recruited as Chief-in-Command of the Armed Forces, a secondary title 
in the military organisation after the Minister of Defence. Colonel 
Sulaiman Qais, another Southerner, was recruited as the Director of 
Military Operations Department in the central organisation but far away 
from the centre of the establishment.'" Colonels Qatan, Rajab, and many 
more who had vital roles in the war victory were recruited into the new 
unified structure, but far away from sensitive areas of the organisation 
such as those of logistics and the airforce. No Southerner in a high position 
enjoyed the same authority as their northern colleagues. This was, 
however, partly due to the over centralised administration that had 
characterised northern institutions since the YAR period. The office 
director of the Minister would have equivalent authority in the military to 
Southerners, for example. 
b. Junior Recruitments: 
The impact of the war and the political changes on recruiting junior staff 
from the southern armed forces, of whom the majority were of Faction A, 
was not positive. While the above reasons for the poor recruitment of 
Southerners remained valid, junior staff recruitment had further restrictive 
factors too. The first reason was the impact of poHtical changes. The Islah 
Party had brought forward many junior staff from Northern areas to be 
incorporated into the new military organisation. The Islah had more 
grounds to claim for the introduction of its faction as it lost most of its 
volunteers in the war than others, namely the GPC or southerners of 
Faction B. The second reason was economic. In view of the spiralling 
inflation in the period following the war, the government had to make a lot 
of cuts in its budgetary expenditure, and particularly of that of the armed 
forces. This could only be achieved by the expulsion of all of the Southern 
leadership and the major portion of the junior staff. 
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As a result of the above analysis, the Southern armed forces suffered 
heavy losses in their jobs and entitlements. Southerners of Faction A, at 
all levels, lost employment, their salaries and allowances, during the first 
6-9 months."^^ The majority remained in their regions, waiting for the right 
time to go back to Sanaa to claim their entitlements of salaries, allowances 
or pensions i f they were driven away from the service. 
In view of the economic crisis situation in the country after the 
commencement of the ERP, the state leadership released only basic 
salaries to the leadership of the Southern armed forces in the country in 
August 1996, a year after the 1994 war. '^ ^ 
Junior staff were called for recruitment but in remote areas which were far 
away from their regions. They faced a difficult choice: either to be in 
service in remote areas or to stay in their regions without any salary. 
Faction B, on the other hand, though recruited with no power-authority, 
enjoyed many material facilities, particularly at the beginning of the new 
period. Southern military vehicles, houses and properties of Faction A 
were mainly taken inappropriately by them. Some of them had misused 
their military power in taking over the houses of civilians in the Southern 
regions on the grounds that 10 years previously (in 1985) these properties 
were theirs."^ 
5.3.3 Southern Military Institutions: 
Southern military institutions in the south were numerous, diversified and 
economically viable to Northerners. South Yemen was large, in terms of 
its geographical area and had a sparse population, and its military force 
was under great pressure from neighbouring states. Consequently, 
Southern forces built highly equipped military sites in all provinces, where 
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local staff and foreign expertise could be accommodated comfortably. Al-
Anad military camp, as explained earlier in Chapter 4, was similar to a 
Russian Military City, with a housing compound, hospital, entertainment 
facilities, plane hangars, lodgings and military training facilities. Another 
large complex in Hadhramout, near Al-Khash'aa, had similar diversified 
facilities and functions. Military camps along the eastern borders were 
fully equipped with all military equipment, including tanks and 
helicopters. In Aden, various military and security sites were situated in 
the best locations of the city, which Northerners considered to be the most 
economically viable locations for businesses. Tariq site (near the ex-
Elizabeth Hospital), Al-Fath site in the Steamer Point area, the Marine site 
on the Steamer-Point coast and the Gold-Mohr sites, the best coast in 
Aden, all of which represent some of the many economically viable sites 
taken over by the northern forces.'"' 
The value of southern military institutions and equipment ran into billions 
of US dollars. On the external account only, debts to the former USSR 
from the former PDRY amounted to US$ 7 billion, of which 70% was in 
the military sphere. Cuba, Germany and local material input would amount 
to at least US$ 3 billion during the past 27 years of the existence of the 
PDRY. 
The largest institutions in the South were taken over and fully staffed by 
Northern forces, such as Al-Anad, where hardly any Southern leader 
would be found. Following the war, a Southerner would not be allowed to 
get into such premises.''' 
Southern institutions were exclusively divided. Southern forces of Faction 
B, who hoped to have some share in administration over these institutions, 
were disappointed when all the administration of these institutions in the 
south were kept under the President's relations and his faction alone.'^ * 
Colonel Dhaif-UUah (who became the Minister of Defence in April 1997) 
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was in charge of Al-Anad complex. Colonel Moh'd Ismael, also from 
Sanhan, the President's area, was in charge of all military institutions in 
Hadhramout. Aden was left to the President's brother. Staff Colonel 
Mohamed Abdulla Saleh, Chairman of Central Security. Areas such as 
Jabal Abu-Hadid,'^' and Tariq had been cleared of military equipment to 
become commercial sites for northern companies. 
5.3.4 The Progress of Military Integration in the Post-War Period 
In this subsection, we shall analyse critically the progress of the 
integrated military organisation of the ROY. 
5.3.4.1 The Ransacking of the Southern Infrastructure 
The Northern forces were highly irresponsible in the restoration of 
security in southern areas and a raw tribal mentality prevailed in the 
attempts to preserve state interests after the July 1994 victory. After the 
departure of the Southern forces, the northern forces looted the major 
cities of the South The majority of the stolen material was taken away by 
Northern forces with the approval of the leadership.^ "" 
5.3.4.2 The Harassment of Southerners by Northern Forces 
The behaviour of the Northern forces was intolerable because of the high 
degree of harassment they exercised against Southerners, particularly in 
the south. There was a high degree of military deployment right from the 
beginning of the victory in the southern areas by the Northern forces. In 
the first few weeks of July and August, there were some confrontations 
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between Northern and Southern forces who belonged to Ali Nasser's 
faction in Aden. The city was too small to accommdate 6 battalions in 
addition to the Salah-Uddin Camp in Little Aden. Despite this fact, the 
military leadership decided to split the 6 battalions between the two 
factions: three northern and three southern battalions. Fortunately, 
external forces intervened and advised the government to move all 
battalions out of the city. This policy was not that successful as some 
semi-defence forces (Security and Republican Guards) came to Aden as 
security forces in addition to the formal security forces of the interior and 
of the Political Security Organisation. Aden, Mukalla, Seyoun. Abyan 
and other southern cities became practically under the hegemony of 
security forces of all colours. 
The presence of a high number of military/security forces in these 
provincial cities was not only for security reasons as they also caused 
serious harassment to people and land. They were deployed in every 
public institution as guards, and in many cases they were taxing people 
for getting into these offices to pay bills or to conduct official business.""' 
The researcher happened to be in such a situation and was denied access 
to a public institution because she did not pay the security guards. The 
security guard felt that he was above her status and did not bother with 
the possible legal implications. Similarly, tens of cases everyday were 
faced by Southerners with Northern forces harassing them in their daily 
routines, and their leadership being incapable of controlling them. 
One of the main reasons for the deployment of Northern forces in the 
south was the security of the resource-rich southern regions. From the 
leadership's point of view, Aden and Hadhramout were more 
economically important than the whole of the northern region; and that is 
why they had to have strong control over these Southern places. From the 
point of view of a Northern security man, it was his aim to get a piece of 
land in the South sell it quickly for a large profit. This could not happen 
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in the north as the land was owned by tribes. The south was very large in 
area and diversified in resources but, above all, it was mainly owned by 
the state.^°-
Outside their formal capacity, northern forces had taken over complete 
civil and public institutions (with the land, buildings and equipment for 
their personnel ownership such as irrigation department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, USSR-Yemeni programme sites, milk factories, plus many 
others). Up to 1996, most military factions on those sites were prepared 
for privatisation programme within the ERP auspices, but the presence of 
the military forces on them impeded the process. 
The Northern force's behaviour in the south was aggravated by their 
determination to stay in southern areas with their tribal attitudes and 
behaviours. In Aden, for instance. Northern forces would patrol the 
streets with heavy weapons on their cars, as they used to do in the north. 
As most southern cities and towns would be more civic and be unused to 
such a patrolling phenomenon, northern forces were resented by the 
southern population who found it difficult to cope with the new 
militarised situation in their region. Despite their various privileges in 
their sector, northern forces competed very much with the population of 
the south for southern lands, houses and traded goods. Many military 
figures, at various levels, in major southern regions had acquired good 
plots of land in the south and traded them and acquired again other plots 
until they made large fortunes at the expense of the locals. 
At the military level, northern forces set a very bad example. There were 
cases of rape, theft, and the shooting of civilians. Three cases took place 
in the Hadhramout region. The first was in February - March 1995 when a 
woman and her daughter were raped by two security men from northern 
forces. The whole of the 'northern machinery' (judicial, security, defence 
and the press) were on the side of the two men, accusing the mother and 
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her daughter of seduction. After a public uprising in the region, the 
northern judge ran away to Sanaa and the two men were tried under 
another judge before being sent to Sanaa for a further trial. 
The second case was in Hadhramout when three northern forces men tried 
to kill a husband and to rape the wife on the Khalf Road in Mukalla. The 
man shot one of them and the other two ran away. The husband, Mr Al -
Somahi, was imprisoned. The Somahi tribe threatened to commit a 
collective action, which would damage the political stability in the region 
i f their son was not released. After his release, the three men were called 
back to Sanaa. 
The third case was in Thamoud in April 1997, where 2-3 northern 
soldiers blocked the road between Yemen and the UAE. Three members 
of a family were killed by northern forces who also stole their belongings. 
After thorough investigations by local al-Share'a courts, a court order was 
passed to execute the three armed forces men by crucifixion. 
5.3.4.3 The Loss of Hunaish Island 
Despite the new challenges posed internally and externally to the country, 
northern armed forces proved that they were incapable of defending the 
state against serious external challenges. In December 1995, the Eritreans 
attacked Yemeni forces in the Red Sea and overran Hunaish Island, which 
was regarded as an important military garrison for the security of the 
ROY in the Red Sea. It took two years for Yemeni to reassert its 
sovereignty through the International Court of Justice in October, 1998. 
5.3.4.4 The Operational Efficiency of Northern Forces 
306 
Northern forces failed to fulf i l their roles efficiently and meet the new 
external and domestic challenges. Several factors were responsible for the 
general relaxation of the northern forces. The main factor was the tribal 
arrogance attributed to them after the July victory by which the Northern 
leadership had given them the absolute freedom to misbehave in the 
south. They therefore tended to be more merchant than soldier. 
The second factor for the arrogance of the Northern forces towards 
southerners was the feeling that the tribal military institutions had come 
back into power with a new material form. There is no doubt that the war 
victory brought a lot of materials to the northern armed forces. In the first 
place, the military wealth of ex-southern armed forces (of buildings, 
vehicles, weapons - heavy and light - planes, ships, cars, etc.) were of 
high value. Also, the two million dollars per annum paid by the oil 
companies for the security of sites was an additional resource to their 
budget. What was more important was the fact that the majority of the 
60,000 enrolled southern forces on the monthly payment sheets were 
deleted from the payroll sheets, by either retirement, leaving the country, 
or stayed in the country without payments. This meant an extra transfer of 
funds within the military sector in favour of northern forces. The 
intentions of the military forces in the north, unfortunately, were closely 
associated with material acquisition, rather than self-pride, integrity, or 
military discipline. 
At the same time the country's borders were severely threatened by the 
Saudis. Border encroachments were repeatedly taking place and Saudi 
forces advanced to Yemeni areas due to the ineffective defence of 
Yemeni forces. Such a relaxed attitude in military discipline was critically 
observed by the public. 
In conclusion, the northern armed forces did not adopt themselves to a 
modern acceptable level of military integrity. Tribal influence made the 
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majority of them very raw in their behaviour in civic areas. They would, 
therefore, need a long time to have adaptable changes to a modern 
standard of military life with dignity, integrity and national responsibility. 
The military organisation needed to define its role appropriately within 
the military framework and away from civilian activities. Unfortunately, 
so far, the military forces continued to exercise dual roles both in the 
military and civil spheres and this caused serious damage to integrity of 
the military. 
Conclusion 
The post war period, up to 1998, witnessed a high degree of integration, 
both politically and administratively at the national level between the 
northern and southern parts of Yemen. Unfortunately, this high 
integration was not naturally positive and it led to many complications. 
While the tribal power centre ruled, they did not govern all aspects of 
state affairs as these were left to the tribal technocrats who could not 
afford to lead the nation into a healthy unification between its two parts. 
Tribal interests and ambitions grew in because of ERP activity in terms of 
privitisation policies, free market strategy and opened southern resources. 
Tribal technocrats and other interest groups in the governmental 
institutions launched political and economic programmes and activities 
for the new tribal corporates' benefits without forgetting their share of the 
new economic pie. Close advisers in the power centre circuit were those 
in the key posts of the government and who opted to serve tribal interests 
rather than the national one. 
Politically speaking, the two major northern parties enjoyed a good 
honeymoon, though with problems between them from time to time until 
April 1997. However, the two top figures (chairmen of the GPC and 
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Islah), remained intact as far the tribal interest was concerned as both of 
them represented the top two figures of the Hashed tribe. The 1997 
Parliamentary election which was boycotted by the YSP, the southern 
major party, saw the GPC unanimously winning the election, gaining 228 
seats out of 301 seats. The new government was composed of the GPC 
and headed by an independent southern Premier who did not last more 
than 10 months in office. The GPC and Islah failed to be in harmony in 
the 1996 government for their conflictuary political views on the building 
of the state. 
In general, despite the differences in the views of the GPC and Islah on 
the building of the ROY, the basic tribal administrative structure 
remained strong. The difference between the two was that the GPC 
advocated some liberal and modern state polices, at least superficially, 
while Islah insisted in having the ROY strictly based on Islamic laws and 
tribal structures. 
The YSP lost all hope in getting a chance to advance some modern state 
changes based on institutions and law and order away from the impact of 
tribalism. The YSP, however, continued its fight for a popular political 
participation within the opposition parties which were ineffective in their 
political mandate. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter consists of two parts: conclusions and recommendations. The 
conclusions section is derived from Chapters 2 to 5. It will analyse the 
unification problem of Yemen, emphasising the effect of Yemeni tribalism 
and political factionalism. This tribal and factional dimension became the 
pivot of all political developments in Yemen, in both northern and southern 
parts. 
The second part of this chapter will incorporate some recommendations for 
Yemen's political problems. It will be in the form of scenarios put forward for 
the future of Yemen's development. 
6.1 Conclusions 
Chapter 2 dealt with the political developments of the two Yemeni states and 
Chapter 3 addressed the unification process over the period 1968-1990. The 
two chapters revealed inter-related problems of factionalism in the two states. 
Chapter 4 dealt with the cooperative unification between the north and the 
south, examining those aspects which ultimately undermined the integration 
process. Chapter 5 covered the unification process under an imposed 
integration whereby the government leadership was exclusively made up of 
northern parties and the power centre was confined to a one man-rule from the 
north as had been the case in the YAR. 
Below, an analysis will be given of the main factors which affected the 
unification process between the north and the south. 
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6.1,1 The Tribalism and Factionalism Problem in the two Yemeni states 
While tribalism and factionalism in Yemen were common characteristics in 
Yemeni communities, like most Arab/Muslim communities, the factional 
problems in the two former Yemeni states were intertwined with the political 
and administrative structures. The Zaydi/Shafai division in the north was 
basically a religious doctrinal problem, which was politicised due to a lack of 
proper accommodation by both factions in the power centre of the north. 
Similarly, the south had fragmented factional problems within its 
communities, but found itself affected by the Zaydi/Shafai problem through 
the influence of the northern Shafais in its political organisations. Ismail, a 
northern Shafai figure, was at the head of the southern policy-making 
apparatus. He was supported by his faction in trying to bring down Zaydi rule 
in the north. Ismail was very much dedicated to socialist oriented ideology and 
advocated strongly leftist policies in order to transform ''the Yemeni workers, 
farmers and all productive people" in the two Yemens into revolutionary 
instruments to force all reactionary and revisionist forces from their power 
base in the north. These revisionist/reactionary forces were the Zaydi ruling 
elite and their tribal supporters. 
The southerners accepted socialist ideology to serve that particular stage of 
southern development which required large investment programmes with very 
limited resources. Presidents Rubayye'a and Al i Nasser did not want to 
become involved in the northern Zaydi/Shafai problem which was not 
addressed formally in the PDRY's political arena. Even with the two YAR-
created inter-state wars of 1972 and 1979, the southerners only reacted within 
the limit of northern aggression against their borders - counter to Ismail's 
wish. 
The Northern Shafais, suffered serious grievances from the long lasting Zaydi 
rule. Since the start of the republican regime in the north, the YAR's 
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presidency had never been under Shafai control and the Shafai regions were 
left in a disadvantaged state, both politically and economically. Apart from 
strategic projects and basic infrastructures in the Shafais' regions, such as 
Hudaidah port, Taiz and Hudaidah airports, and main roads connecting the 
region to the rest of the country, the Shafai areas continued to be 
predominantly poor and highly disadvantaged. The Zaydi areas were also 
poor, but at least this was made by the choice of their tribes' leaders. In 
general, however, a junior Hashedi governmental or military figure would 
enjoy more authority than any Shafai at the top of government. 
This political status had a severe negative impact on the Shafais and led to 
political difficulties and insurgencies. The Shafais wanted national rights, and 
sharing central power with the Zaydis was the major objective. The tribal 
power-centre, composed of Shi'ites, made no constructive response to this 
problem. Ambitious Shafai politicians therefore found in the insurgencies 
against the Zaydi rule a possible solution to their problem, especially as the 
southern revolutionary regime was dominated by the Shafai faction in Aden. 
On the other hand, the Shafais who could not afford to run away had to stay in 
their villages or emigrate to Saudi Arabia and work abroad. Those who stayed 
in their areas were subject to hard political/security measures. They carried out 
insurgencies from time to time against the regime, although at a cost. The 
more political awareness the Shafais had about their political status, the more 
the Zaydi rule employed harsh measures against them. 
Willingly or unwillingly, the southern regime was involved with this 
Zaydi/Shafai problem. As was described in Chapters 2 and 3, Ismail was 
totally dedicated to gaining power for the Shafais within the northern regime, 
or independently of it. Under the socialist ideology, Ismail and his faction 
created an ultra-socialist scenario, in order to lead to the elimination of Zaydi 
rule or to the creation of a third Yemeni republic for the Shafais in the North, 
called by them Jumhoriyat Al-Liwa 'a Al-Akhdar (the Yemeni Republic of the 
Green Land). 
To achieve this target, Ismail and his northern Shafai faction supported all 
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revolutionary forces in the north against Zaydi rule and helped the latter in the 
insurgencies in the north in the seventies. 
While these political activities were met with some satisfaction by the left-
wing groupings in the southern regime who constituted the military and 
security power, the right wing represented by the state adminisration 
(Rubayye'a and Al i Nasser) were not happy about them as it cost the PDRY 
heavily in terms of resources and in damaging its political profile, both 
regionally and internationally. 
The state's persormel in the PDRY opposed the General Secretary over his 
stand on this northern political issue. The political confrontation between the 
two wings in the southern administration resulted in a drain of resources. 
Though convinced of the validity of their case, Rubayye'a and Ali Nasser did 
not want to create intra-state clashes over the northern issue. But, as they could 
not stop Ismail and his faction undertaking radical policies, serious 
confrontations between the southern state apparatus and Ismail's party power-
centre occurred in 1978 (with President Rubayye'a) and in 1980 (with Ali 
Nasser) and finally in 1986 (the moderates against the radicals). The common 
factor in these confrontations was Ismail and his faction, until Ismail's death in 
1986. The southern military apparatus was completely under southerners' 
hands but ideologically, it was under the Soviets and Ismail's influence until 
1980. As Al i Nasser did not show dedication in integrating the military 
apparatus in his policy-making structures, they turned against him and 
confided with Ismail and his faction again. 
The Zaydi/Shafai political problem in the north, thus, evolved into a 
southern/northern problem in the south. 
6.1.2 The Impact of the Factional Political Problem on the Unification Process 
1972-1990 
Despite the aspiration of both Yemeni states to unity, the unification problem 
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ran a hazardous course because of the Zaydi/Shafai problem in the north, and 
the southern/northern problem in the south. 
The problems of factionalism in the two states had acute political implications. 
The Zaydi/Shafai problem, though of religious-doctrinal origin, was a political 
issue to Ismail. It was at the top of his political agenda, irrespective of the 
southern attitudes towards it, and what effects it might have. Ismail did not 
want the unification process to go ahead between the Zaydis in the north and 
the Southerners in the south leaving the northern Shafais out of the unified 
power centre (as happened at a later stage). His alternative revolutionary road 
to unification would have cost the southerners and northerns more blood rivers 
and it might not be achieved for centuries. 
The promotion of revolutionary measures and programmes in the north was 
Ismail's strategy, and the result was the crippling of the unification process. 
Ismail failed to grasp the illogical situation which he and his faction were in: 
he was at the head of another country's power structure and was using this for 
objectives not accepted by the native demands in the power structure. It was 
the result of his radical policies and his factions pressures on southern politics 
after his death that the south went through a hasty unification with the tribal 
power centre in the north. 
Ismail's programme for the unification with the north was translated in what 
became known as the 'fmanlisation of the function of the national democratic 
state' (maham al-marhala al-wataniyyah al-dimocratiyyah). Ismail wanted 
unification with the north after the finalisation of this stage, whereby the north 
would have been expected to be socialist like the south. He claimed that 'true' 
unification could only be meaningful when the 'revolutionary instruments' in 
both the north and south were the same and equal. 
Under this pattern of unification ideology, there were a series of conflicts, 
wars and assassinations, including the 1972 war staged by the north and the 
1979 war. Several assassinations were carried out by the Ismail faction in the 
north against Shafai figures. Presidential assassinations occurred in the north 
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of Al-Hamdi (because of a federal unification which was about to be made 
between the northern and southern presidents) by northern elements, and in the 
south, the assassination of Al-Ghashmi by the southern administration 
(Rubayye'a). Rubayye'a, however, was executed by the polit-bureau members 
headed by Ismail in the southern administration. 
The two systems, in general, were devastated by this factionalism within their 
systems. Both states had weak economies and failed to achieve the desired 
standard of living promised by the respective administrations to their 
nationals. 
6.1.3 How Unification was Achieved 
As can be seen in chapter three, there were three main factors which 
contributed to the revival of the unification process: the 1986 war; the global 
changes in favour of the capitalist system; and the third factor which was more 
important for having a defensive unionism between the two states, was the rise 
of political power of northern shafais in the southern state and their bad 
performance in it. 
As noted in chapter 2, the tension between northerners and southerners in the 
PDRY adminstration was aggravated by the mismanagement of the 
government under Dr. Yassin Noman (1986-1990). Dr. Neman's Government 
had at least eight northern ministers, many of them newly recruited to 
compensate the northerners for the loss of Ismail in the 1986 war. However, 
they were both corrupt and incompetent, effectively stopping southern 
technocrats from functioning; taking southerners' houses, and illegally 
obtaining many resources. The Southern elite in the party and the state became 
frustrated by complaints about the northern elite which allowed the southern 
public to ask for unification with the Zaydi rulership at any price in order to 
remove the 'irrational' northern Shafais from the southern administration. 
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The above three reasons, compelled the southern state to take the initiative in 
the revival of the unification process in 1988 with the north. The north 
welcomed the step and reciprocated with similar visits. In 1988, serious 
agreements were made between the two states on citizens' movements and 
some joint ventures for the public interest. 
6.1.4 The Continuation of Factionalism During Unification 
Unification between the two former Yemeni states was achieved in May 1990. 
It was a unification between the southern and northern central power 
authorities of the two formal states. 
While each of the political organisations, namely the GPC and the YSP, 
incorporated opposition members of the others state, the unified central 
authority of the ROY did not incorporate any opposition figures from within 
either system. The GPC had a substantial number of southerners associated 
with ex-President Al i Nasser in its set-up. Similarly, the YSP incorporated a 
substantial number of the NDF/Hoshi figures in its political set-up. Neither of 
these opposition groups were part of the central unified power-centre of the 
ROY during the period of co-operative unification. Yemen's unification, 
therefore, was as a basis of some factions coming together - but not all. 
The joint central administration of the ROY was a new experience for Yemen. 
Northern presidential power had been monopolised by the Zaydis until 1990 
and now were having their first joint political experience of formal 
cooperation with the southern leadership. The southern leadership had had 
some experience of cooperation among different groups in the power/policy 
making mechanism, but this new experience had a different political profile. 
The southern leadership was a minority in terms of population, though they 
had a theoretical 50/50 ratio in the central administration. In practice power 
was not distributed on this basis. Worst than that, they were sharing in a 
central authority located outside their natural territories. This was a difficult 
experience for them as they felt they were subject to theft, bugging in their 
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telephones and residences, and easy targets for assassinations and intimidation 
in the ex-Capital of the north, Sana'a. The Northern leadership failed to bring 
perpetrators of such intimidation to justice and political conflicts escalated 
along tribal/factional grounds. 
Chapter four revealed the disagreements and conflicting policies of the two 
former systems in the unified administration in almost all fields. Despite 
general agreement during the last steps of unification that the best parts of the 
two systems in each field should be adopted, there was in fact a complete 
denial by each side of the other's experiences. For example, the former PDRY 
administrative and financial systems, which were British-based, would have 
been ideal for the ROY's administrative and financial mechanisms. The 
northern elite in the ROY would not accept this as they believed that their 
systems were better and/or suited them more than the southern systems did. 
The financial system in the ROY, therefore, continued to operate according to 
the YAR system, in its fully centralised manner. The presence of old 
traditional figures at the top of sectors, as Ministers, contributed to the growth 
of the tribal and factional problems in their previous modes. 
The central authority of the ROY, therefore, had a split administrative 
mechanism: one in the north and the other in the south. In practice, the ex-
YAR and the ex-PDRY were functioning separately under one flag. Though 
the problem in the power centre took on the colour of a political version of the 
northern/southern problem, in essence it represented a heritage of tribal 
struggle in governance, rather than an understanding of national management. 
The Zaydi/Shafai division was marginalised publicly but still pervaded overall 
outlooks. The northern Shafais who were politically motivated by the southern 
leadership looked at the division as a Zaydi/southerner problem, and they were 
included in the southerners. The southerners looked at the division as purely a 
northerner/southerner problem and included the Shafais with the northerners. 
The Zaydi faction (in the rulership) did not formally recognise the 
factionalism problem at all, but accused the rival factions of being separatist 
and treasonous against the Yemeni state, particularly when the rivalss 
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threatened to leave the partnership. 
The whole system in the ROY ran into a northern/southern problem which 
divided Yemeni society again into two national identities. The factional 
northern/southern problem brought about continued in-fighting between the 
two parties in the power centre which aggravated national political and 
economic problems. Corruption of all types found its way into all fields. The 
Ministry of Finance allocated resources to northern public sectors, but 
refrained from doing so to public sectors in the south. The southern Premier, 
Al-Attas, found it hard to control his northern ministers on national policies, 
and ultimately failed to impose a respect for national interest on factions. 
As a result of such rigid factionalism, the southern regions remained 
functioning according to the ex-PDRY mechanisms and the north functioned 
according to the ex-YAR system. The Vice-President, Al i Al-Beidh, left 
San'aa and confined himself in his residence in Aden, where he acted as 
President of the South. Political friction rose high in the first quarter of 1994 
and, with the mediation of top national and regional figures, the two sides 
signed the 'Agreement and Pledge Accord' in Amman on 20"^  February 1994. 
The accord was signed by the President and the Vice-Presidents and was 
witnessed by King Hussain of Jordan and all the chairmen of Yemeni political 
parties. 
The factionalism problem, however, was too strong to have been eliminated 
by signatures on accords and agreements as it required a grass-root change of 
attitudes, and a respect for the national interest. 
A civil war between the two factions broke out which resulted in the complete 
destruction of the ex-PDRY infrastructure, public sector and overall law and 
order system. The northern forces which won the war were supported by the 
southern military faction which fled to the north following the 1986 war. 
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6.1.5 The Impact of Factionalism/Tribalism in the Post-War Period 
By the change of the constitution and the return of the YAR administrative 
system, the cooperative Yemeni integration phase was finished. The ROY 
became an enlarged YAR mechanism after the constitution was changed in 
July 1994, giving the President many new powers. The one-man-rule 
Presidential structure was dominant, and the Premiership was taken over by a 
northerner, though of Shafai origin as in the pre-unification period. There were 
a few ineffective southerners in the system such as a southern Vice-President 
and a handful of southern figures in governmental authority, but they were 
there as a fa9ade, simply to show that northern/southern unification was still 
being maintained. Real power was held absolutely by the Zaydi (Hashedi) and 
Ismaili minorities. 
The factionalism problem at the start of the post-war period became more 
devastating than before in terms of the socio-political-economic framework 
under the imposed integration. The power centre became based on a form of 
Sanhan rule, where key posts were held by the Hashed tribe and especially 
those from Sanhan region. This can be clearly seen by identifying the 
backgrounds of central figures in high positions. The President, Al i Abdallah 
Saleh, was from the Hashed tribe. The Chief Sheikh of the Hashed tribe. 
Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer, was the Chairman of Parliament. 
Sensitive posts in the Government (both military and civil) were firstiy 
reserved for the Hashed tribe. After that would come other Zaydis, then 
northern Shafais. I f anything remained, a handful of well-qualified southerners 
would be considered. 
Chapter five revealed that the already considerable administrative and 
financial corruption was enlarged, under the new mode of integration, due to 
tribalism and factionalism at the power-centre. The country was passing 
through critical political and economic stages and the tribal/factional problem 
led to further complications in political and economic conditions. The key 
posts in the government were handed over to the traditional 'loyalists' in the 
system. These loyalists were working for tribal interests rather than the 
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national interest. 
Ironically, some key figures who were highly educated in the west and well 
experienced in governance did understand the requirements of national interest 
but opted, out of fear mixed with self-interests, to support tribal and factional 
interests. As a result of their supportive attitude to the power elite, major 
projects, ventures and installations were put under the control of key tribal 
figures in the elite such as the President's and Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein's 
relations. 
6.2 Factors Supporting Factional/Tribal Problems 
Tribalism and factionalism have been basic elements in the Yemeni society, 
encouraged by many factors. These factors were not affected by the 
developmental process carried out in the Yemeni states. Because of tribalism 
and factionalism, the integration between the two parts of Yemen cannot be 
achieved. The stronger tribilism/factionalism is, the lower degree the 
integration. For this reason, we need to analyse the factors behind the 
sustianability or the growth of this social phenomenon. 
Below, we shall examine the supportive factors of tribalism and factionalism, 
despite the presence of republican structures and institutions which were 
supposed to have a positive impact in dissolving tribal bonds. 
6.2.1 The Socio-PoIitical Factors 
There were a number of socio-political factors which contributed to the 
growth of tribalism and factionalism in Yemen, particularly in the north. 
The first reason was the absence of a solid and sound infrastructure in tribal 
regions. The researcher observed through her experiences in the south and 
north that tribal mentalities and attitudes grew stronger in regions or areas 
where the state's role in development was passive and infrastructure was 
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absent. In the south, for example, Redfan, Dale'a and Yafe'a were the most 
prevalent areas of violent tribal actions as these areas did not enjoy 
developmental priorities in southern investment plans. The state could not 
afford to push adequate developmental projects and programmes to these more 
remote areas because they were correspondingly costly. In view of the scanty 
resources available to the ex-PDRY, the tribal areas which needed high sunk 
cost resources were not within the national plans. They therefore lacked 
adequate education, health facilities, production potent realisation and its 
population thus had to resort to their only employment option, and that was in 
the military. In the north, different factors were apparent. The tribal areas on 
the outskirts of the capital city were under the tribal Sheikhs' influence, and 
they did not want to see these areas to develop at the expense of their control. 
I f everyone was allowed access to education, health and employment, then 
tribal bonds would be loosened and tribal transformation would be enhanced, 
which would not favour the Sheikhs. These regions therefore, were developed 
into centres of Sheikh-dominated tribal manpower. This manpower, under the 
state umbrella, would join the military organisation as the only available 
option in the unity programme. Tribal clusters in the armies contributed to the 
ongoing problem of tribalism and factionalism in Yemeni politics. The armies, 
therefore, contributed to the tribalism and factionalism problem. 
The second factor was the blurred understanding of the northern leadership as 
to the distinction between the tribal role and the state role. The Zaydi elite in 
the power-centre failed to distinguish between their duties to tribal members 
and their duties to other citizens of the state. They therefore looked at national 
interest with a perspective dominated by tribal attitudes, and could not 
separate it from the tribal interest. Al-Hamdy tried to do so but he faced 
natural resistance from many Zaydi tribes, who ultimately took his life for 
attempting to transform the society. 
The south had a strong integrated leadership in its power centre, but the 
tribal/factional structure, though weak, nonetheless had a strong impact. 
Ismail's factionalism based on northern Shafais undermined national 
sentiment in the south. Being at the head of the policy-making structure. 
Ismail had a strong impact on the developmental process. The military group 
who supported him in the policy-making process had strong tribal mentality as 
they came from areas neighbouring the northern borders. They looked at the 
national interest from the security point of view. They defended the ideology 
which provided their livelihood in the military service and did not put priority 
on the overall development of the state. As a result of this built-in tribal 
structure in the power-centre, the whole administrative system became 
saturated with tribalism (in the mountainous areas) and factionalism (in the 
cities). 
The governments did not adopt serious measures to combat the impact of 
tribalism and factionalism in their institutions. In the north the Zaydis did not 
want to do this, and, the Shafai elite figure did not dare to address the problem. 
In the south, on the other hand, the government abolished tribalism by the use 
of force. It stripped the tribes of their arms and ammunition and enacted laws 
to abolish tribal names on official papers. These forceful measures, however, 
did not abolish tribalism in practical terms. 
The third factor was the passive role played by the northern technocrats, 
advisors and academics in both the central authorities and academic 
institutions. Strategic key figures such as Dr Al-Iryani, Dr Al-Attar, ex-
Premier A Aziz Abdul-Ghani, Dr Maqaleh (Director of Sana'a University) 
and many others, indeed, sometimes even played a supportive role towards 
tribalism and factionalism. As key advisors to the presidency and responsible 
for the future of successive generations, they could have directly or indirectly 
drawn the distinction between the dual roles of tribe and state. 
They could at least have incorporated from an early stage educational 
programmes on the danger of tribalism/factionalism, and institutionalised such 
teachings into the central mechanism of the national authority. Such attitudes 
and approaches would, at least, provide warning signals for national stability 
and prosperity. The Zaydi elite would have needed to provide honest 
persormel at a much earlier time to help in launching objective developmental 
programmes at the national level without putting the interests of their 
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tribes/factions in political or social jeopardy. No doubt they would have 
needed courage and there was a cost to be paid, but it would have led to a 
better situation than the one which developed. What was needed was a 
decisive stand in favour of national concerns. But they opted for an indifferent 
attitude and approach. 
6,2.2 The Economic Factors that Contributed to the Growth of Tribalism and 
Factionalism 
There was one major economic factor which contributed to the growth of 
tribalism and factionalism: the ability of some regions to have more access to 
national wealth/resources than others. This was complemented by a 
subordinate factor: some regions had their own outlets to the external world, 
such as ports and land routes. 
In the northern case, tribalism and factionalism were, to a great extent, 
supported by these economic factors. The Zaydi regions were not resource-
rich, other than having fertile soils in some of the plateaux areas. They also did 
not possess ports, airports (apart from Sana'a) or important land routes. The 
Shafais' regions were, relatively speaking, more promising in terms of 
resources and the possession of a sea-port (Al-Hudaidah). The discovery of oil 
in Marib (a Shafai region) fiarther strengthened the resource base. 
The Zaydis, therefore, had a strong incentive to maintain a strong grip on state 
power and key strategic sectors. Sharing presidential power with the Shafais 
would mean sharing these strategic economic sectors and the military set-up as 
well. This would lead to the gradual elimination of the tribal society and the 
tribal power structure. 
As the major portion of public resources came from the Shafais' regions 
(taxation, Hudaidah port and airport, fisheries and the mainly Shafi 
remittances) the Zaydi elite gave some room to loyal Shafai figures in the 
cabinet, though with limited authority. The word loyal meant loyalty to the 
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regime, with no links at all with the southern regime, even i f the individual 
had relatives on the other side. 
The south had a different experience. The British system had resulted in there 
being a good modern state administration. The factionalism problem in the 
south, therefore, developed as a result of there being two different mentalities: 
that of the southerners (although from bedouin origins, they were enlightened 
in administrative affairs), and that of the northerners (who under the Imamate-
rule had found it hard to grow used to the law and order machinery of the 
central authority). 
As there was no substantial personal wealth in the south under the socialist 
regime, inequalities could not constitute a contributing factor to factionalism. 
The factionalism problem in the south came about as a result simply of the 
different mentalities. It was a conflict between the 'native born souls' and the 
'strangers' which undermined unity in the southern leadership. 
In the ROY, the factionalism problem of northerners versus southerners 
became sharp because of economic factors, and this jeopardised the 
cooperative unification between the two states. The economic sections of 
Chapters 4 and 5 revealed that the south proved to be more resource rich than 
the north in terms of natural resources (oil, gas, gold and above all, water). 
The northerners could not put their hands on these resources during the period 
of cooperative unification as the YSP leadership was manipulating southern 
resources to keep them away from Saleh's central authority - a main reason 
that led to the civil war. In the post-war period however, everything came 
under absolute power of the northerners, both centrally and regionally. 
Hadhramout, for example, had a northern Governor, Al-Khowlani, and a 
Sanhani military commander, Mohd Ismail. Both figures failed to provide 
employment, safety and security to the average Hadhrami citizen. The 
northern leadership would not recruit Hadhrami leadership for the region 
because of the need to control the oil resources. 
334 
6,2.3 The Military Factor and its Contribution to Tribalism, 
The military factor was decisive in leading to the integral strengthening of 
tribal bonds in the two former states of Yemen. 
By the nature of the highly vertically integrated tribal system in the north, the 
military set-up followed the central authority in style and was highly tribal and 
centralised in its mechanism. The military personnel in the north were 
predominantly recruited from the Zaydis, particularly in the higher 
administration. It was directly administered and directed by the state President 
until 1990. The President lost this position in the cooperative unification 
period (1990-1994) but regained his former title as the Commander-in-Chief 
of the armed forces in the post-war period. In theory, the Premier was 
responsible for the activities of the Ministry of Defence, like other sectors, but 
in practice the President directed the ministry through the Higher Defence 
Council. A l l the top figures in this council during the YAR period were 
Zaydis, thus strengthening tribalism in this institution. The shafais in the north 
were made up of tribes but as the Imamate were of zaydi origin, shafais were 
not allowed to hold weaponeries, though many owned their weapons but 
without formal liscences. 
The southern military set-up, despite the socialistic ideology of the system, 
was also saturated with tribalism/regionalism. The set-up was predominantly 
ruled and run by the highlanders, namely those from the Dhale'a, Radfan and 
Yafe'a regions. The Abyanis, Hadhramis and Shabwanis did have some 
representation but this was limited as they sustantially sharing power in civil 
structures. Strategic posts in the top administration of the military hierarchy, 
therefore, were almost equally shared by highlanders groups with some 
representations of other regions. Ministers of Defence in the south were: Ali 
Nasser, (Abyan), A l i S. Al-Beidh (Hadhramout), Mohammed Saleh Awlaqi 
(Shabwah), Al i Anter (Radfan) and Saleh Musleh (Dhale'a), but the majority 
of its structures had been from highland regions of Dhle'a, Yafe'a and 
Radfan.. 
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The main two factors that prevented the southern military set-up from having 
strong tribal growth similar to the north was the fragmented nature of tribalism 
and factionalism in the south and the socialist-oriented ideology of the 
political organisation over the period (1969-1990). 
The sociaUst ideology weakened tribal practices and withheld all weaponry 
from southerner tribes in the early stage of the socialists' rule. Maybe the strict 
rules covering all military staff, including being incorporated within the party 
system, made the military organisation very conscious in avoiding tribal bonds 
as much as possible. At the end, however, one could see that regional clusters 
had an impact on the institution. 
6.3 The Impact of Tribalism/Factionalism on Yemen Unification 
Below, we shall examine factors responsible for the haphazard path of 
Yemen's unification. 
6.3.1 The Political and Military Factors 
Tribalism/factionalism was a key factor responsible for the haphazard nature 
of Yemen unification. The political in-fighting between the two leadership 
was natural and expected in view of their tribal/factional attitudes. The 
political instability of each state in the pre-unification period was naturally 
reflected in the unification period. In view of the preceding analysis on 
tribalism and factionalism, successful integration would have needed to be 
founded on a new and different basis. 
The military dimension, where tribal clusters of both sides were 
accommodated, was dangerous to the cooperative unification and brought it to 
an end by the civil war of 1994. Chapter 4 revealed the story of this 
dimension in detail. 
The military power centre in the post-war period was exclusively made up of 
effective northern elite. There were a few southern figures in the military 
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institution, but these were ineffective. 
6,3,2 The Weak Democratic Structure in Yemen 
The democratic development of Yemen was addressed in Chapters four and 
five. Democracy was represented by: political pluralism, with over 40 parties 
in the national arena, over fifty national and local newspapers, and, above all, 
free elections taking place for parliament in 1993 and 1997 as mentioned in 
4.2.2. Such democratic measures were, in reality, very misleading for they hid 
the realities of power. The basic requirements of modem democracy were 
simply not present in the ROY. 
These basic requirements should have been provided by the central authority 
of the system: the integration of, and respect for, the laws and regulations of 
the state, full freedom and access to all national media for all citizens, and 
prevention of the misuse of public resources for factional interests. 
Unfortunately, none of these pillars were in existence in the ROY's short 
democratic experience. 
The ROY's laws and regulations were mishandled and were subject to the 
wishes and moods of the leading figures. This was largely due to the 
tribal/factional power impact, especially through the security organisation and 
the Presidential Office. 
Public resources were highly misused in favour of tribal/factional power 
groups. In the 1993 election campaigns, public resources were distributed to 
political parties which participated in the election, and specifically the two 
major parties (the GPC and the YSP) had most of their campaigns financed 
from public resources. 
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6.3.3 Other Problems Related to the Dislocation of Unification 
On the political front, there was political fragmentation within political parties, 
a matter that put the ruling elite(s) in an advantaged position. As mentioned in 
Chapter four there were 46 political parties in the ROY, of which the major 
three parties, the GPC, Islah and the YSP (southern) had strong positions in 
the political arena. Such political fragmentation, however, provided a strong 
tribal platform for the ruling elite against a fragmented opposition. 
Economically, the ROY experienced hard economic conditions since its 
formation. The Gulf Crisis had a severe impact on it due to the return of 
900,000 Yemeni emigrants expelled from KSA and other Gulf states, joining 
the growing unemployed already in Yemen. To a large extent, the Yemeni 
economy had been dependent on foreign exchange entering the country as 
remittances from Yemen emigrants from the Gulf states. Also, because of its 
political stance, Yemen lost all Saudi and other Gulf states' assistance in terms 
of building schools, medical units and other infrastructural items. 
The security factor played a negative role in the internal stability of the 
country. Often, the security forces themselves created instability, due to their 
tribal attitudes. They were involved in kidnapping, assassinations and 
humiliation of figures of other factions, particularly the Shafais, both northern 
and southern. The Central Security Organisation, run by the President's 
brother was particularly bad in its attitudes, approach and behaviour towards 
citizens. The recurrent kidnapping of tourists, diplomats and nationals were 
common events in tribal regions. Cars were stolen with the compliance of the 
security forces, and the aggrieved citizens could not regain them without a 
cost. In general, the role of the security forces in dislocating the unification 
was critical. 
The negative support of the tribe/faction groupings in positions of authority 
reflected tribal attitudes and behaviours which worked contrary to national 
interests. 
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6,4 The Outcome and Recommendations 
There was a substantial element missing in the overall political system, 
namely the recognition of a demarcation between the tribal/factional role and 
the operation of the state on the basis of national interest. The country's 
development needs to be re-structured on the basis of this demarcation. Below 
are three scenarios for the development of Yemen. 
6,4,1 The First Scenario 
Having examined the ROY's problems in the past period, the researcher sees 
three different scenarios for the development of Yemen in the forthcoming 
period. 
The first scenario portrays a political unified system whereby the ROY 
maintains its full integration in one complete unified system, as in the present 
case. This will be achieved i f the power centre can afford the required changes 
necessary to this scenario. 
6.4,1.1 The conditions for this Scenario 
The present situation does not please most Yemenis other than the Hashidis or 
some of the smaller interest groups. This is a natural outcome as the tribal 
mentality in the power centre is incapable of providing good administration 
without incorporating other Yemeni factions in the national administration 
across the country. To maintain a good unification profile between the two 
parts of Yemen in particular, and among all Yemeni factions, the ROY needs 
to adopt balanced and integrative strategies in all sectors, and particularly in 
terms of human, material, legal, social, political and military resources. 
It would be important to concentrate on basic strategic issues which will give 
room for a peaceful accommodation of various national factions and to 
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safeguard a smooth transformation of all resources for the development of the 
ROY. These basic issues would be incorporated in the following measures: 
1. The establishment of a presidential council composed of influential Yemeni 
groups, namely the tribes of the Hashed, Bakeel and Medhaj, the northern 
Shafais, and southerners. However, the presidential council will need to think 
nationally and not tribally. Tribal representation should not mean that those 
in the power centre pursue tribal roles in government. 
This rule would hopefiilly bring about political stability. The key figures in the 
power centre will need to be elected by their ovra factions and not appointed 
by the desire of one man in a position of supreme authority. The recognition of 
major powerful factions in the Yemeni communities will be the real 
progressive spark for the ROY, particularly in view of the democratisation 
process in the national arena. It is time that the northern Shafais and 
southerners are accommodated in the power centre by legitimacy rather than 
by loyalties; and to have their say in national and domestic affairs with regard 
to their regions. 
2. The realisation of the relevance of the integrity of laws and regulations 
nationwide and their enforcement in the national administration. This weak 
link in the ROY's administration has been so far an obstacle to the ROY's 
development in all dimensions. However, this problem will need the first 
condition to be fulfilled. 
The integrity of national laws and regulations will have a strong positive 
impact on many present weaknesses in the present system. The financial and 
administrative corruption, the nepotism/tribalism in the national 
administration, the radical attitudes of some factions, the kidnapping, the theft, 
the misuse of power in the security and/or military, plus many other issues will 
only be overcome by the establishment of a good legal machinery and the 
proper enforcement of laws. This would not be an easy objective to achieve, 
but the solidarity of the power centre elite can make it happen i f they desire to 
do so for the improvement of the country. A legal machinery with enforceable 
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laws is a must for the development of the ROY. 
3. To support the above rules, the third rule for this scenario is the adoption 
of decentralisation in the national administration, with well-enforced policies 
in the local administration and local government. For the power centre to 
succeed in its aims, the national administration must be decentralised and 
deregulated to cope effectively with the free market economy strategy in the 
ROY. Decentralisation of administration will be powerful and achievable with 
the enforcement of a local administration law. This in turn will give room to 
the power centre to deal with more relevant issues at the national level. 
Decentralisation of regional affairs will have positive impacts in various ways. 
On the one hand, it will minimise political friction among factions and enable 
regional peoples to reach agreement among themselves without taking the 
time of the top elite. Decentralisation will give more room to the power elite to 
consider issues of major national importance, particularly in view of the 
precarious economic position of the ROY. Moreover, decentralisation will 
assist the regional mobilization of the unemployed and might help in placing 
human resources optimally in their respective areas. Regional competition for 
attracting projects or activities will be for the national benefit as long as each 
region is governed by its own people. It is important to avoid regional political 
friction occurring through the employment of inappropriate figures in 
positions or in inappropriate regions. Exchanges of human resources between 
regions is best to come about naturally without higher political involvement, 
as the latter may lead to complications as has happened in the past. 
4. Complementary laws and regulations in the national and regional 
administration should be favoured in view of the conditions of economic 
hardship in the ROY. Many countries minimise their economic and social 
losses by safeguarding their national administration by complementing laws 
and regulations. In other words, the state must avoid enacting conflicting laws 
or adopt double standard measures in its national administration. 
Supportive laws and regulations are necessary for newly-established states or 
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states which suffer serious economic hardships such as Yemen. With the 
decentralisation of the national administration, national laws must be strongly 
supported by regional and local laws and regulations in all areas of the state. 
For instance, i f the national law forbids the carriage of weapons in the major 
cities, this law must be enforceable in all capital/major provincial cities and 
the state must look into this matter with concern and support regional and 
local regulations. Similarly, i f an outlaw went to a territory in one of the 
regions, the state must ask the authorities concerned to bring him to justice. In 
the trade or economic sphere, there should be complementary regulations at 
regional levels to support national economic or trade laws. 
Of great importance in this field is the compliance of economic/political 
liberalisation policies with liberal social laws. Illiteracy campaigns, 
encouragement of positive policies for youths and females in education, and 
utilisation of their capacities must be encouraged to open opportunities 
positively impacting national development. This may require cuts in military 
expenditure to fund such projects. 
6.4.1.2 The Argument Against this System/Scenario 
The majority of the Shafais and the southerners (outside the elite circle) are 
now pessimistic/sceptical of this scenario. In fact, no southerner is interested 
in unification any more following the treatment of the south by the power 
centre in the north. The southerners and the majority of northern Shafais 
whom the researcher interviewed pointed out the defects of this scenario, 
despite some positive benefits. 
The strongest point against the scenario is the unlikelihood of a transformation 
of the tribal/factional attitudes in the power centre occurring. Tribal and 
factional attitudes have, so far, made national laws and regulations powerless 
instruments and thus too weak to be enforced for the national cause. Tribal 
rule, for example, has continued to affect employment recruitment, leaving 
many Yemenis unemployed and poor. The Local Administration Law has also 
been waiting for five years to obtain the go-ahead from the government and 
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Parliament for approval, but so far with no effect. A southern legal adviser 
said that, in any case, southerners expected a Local Administration Law (if it 
came about) to be a futile law with little implications for actual local 
administration. 
A further sceptical view of this scenario concerns the weaponry held in public 
hands. Yemen is distinguished from other countries in the Middle East by the 
large store of ammunition in public hands and particularly that held by the 
tribes. Some Yemeni tribes would counter a formal governmental attack in 
their areas. The state law is too weak to withdraw these weapons from tribes 
or the public. In view of this situation the power centre, which strongly 
supports these phenomena, will not be able to effect grass-root changes under 
the present system. 
Generally speaking, for the system to be changed from a tribally dominated 
system to a national one where all Yemeni citizens have an equal say in 
policy-making, the constitution must be adjusted to serve such a democratic 
purpose. But, again, the majority of the Parliament are from the ruling party 
(the GPC) which is chaired by the state President (Ali Abdallah Saleh) while 
the Parliament chairman is Sheikh Abdulla Bin Hussein Al-Ahmer who, 
alongside the President, represents the highest authority in the Hashed tribe - a 
minority in the Yemeni population. It would be, therefore, very unlikely that 
constitutional transformation would be undertaken whereby grass-root 
changes can be achieved in favour of this scenario. 
6.4.2 Scenario 2: A Federal State 
This scenario calls for Yemen integration within a federal state. During the 
last 30 years, three main factions have been involved in the political conflicts 
of Yemen, namely the Zaydis, the Shafais, and the southerners. Each of these 
three factions requires a degree of power to rule its own region fairly and 
squarely. Of course there are sub-sections in each of these factions but for 
practical analysis it is convenient to consider the problem of factionalism by 
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this three-way division. The geography of Yemen helps us in drawing clear 
boundaries between the three regions. 
6.4.2.1 The Arguments in Favour of this Scenario 
Under this scenario, there would be 3 major semi-autonomous governments in 
the country, under a central federal arrangement. There would, then, be a 
Zaydi government, a northern Shafai government, and a Southern government, 
the federal power centre would be composed of a federal council of the three 
factions, headed alternately by one president of each faction. 
The federal system would need to have a central (federal) government made 
up of representatives of the three factions in the three states. The federal 
Premier and the cabinet would need to be appointed by the federal presidential 
council. 
Each state administration would run its own affairs primarily from its own 
population, manpower and resources. There should be no role for the federal 
authorities to recruit, employ or deploy anyone or anything from one state in a 
different state. Each state would enjoy full autonomy in running its affairs for 
the best interest of its native population, in conformity with federal 
integration. 
The state President would mainly responsible for monitoring the legal 
functions of the state government such as elections, appointments etc. He 
could be an appointee or an elected figure. Governors of the regions would be 
elected together with other members of regional executive offices. 
Each state would have to contribute to the federal treasury/finance 50% of its 
public resources in terms of taxes, natural resources and customs. The other 
50% would go to the development of the state's infrastructures, programmes 
and other needs. 
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Federal resources would go to the development of the least developed areas in 
the country. For example, most of the Zaydi regions are in a very poor 
economic condition (such as Saada, Kholan and Dhamar) and thus need 
financial assistance directed to their social infrastructures in the fields of 
education, health and environment. 
The adoption of decentralisation would help the state administration to give 
attention to immediate problems and needs that have to be resolved. To 
guarantee sustained economic growth, the federal state would have to pursue a 
clear developmental strategy. I f one of the states did not fulf i l its programmes, 
it would need to sacrifice its allocated resources for projects at the federal 
level. 
The legal machinery at both the federal and state level would need to be 
integrative and complementary to each other and never be in conflict. A state's 
laws and regulations would have to be supportive to the federal ones and not 
be competitive. 
It would be important for the federal system to handle tribalism with care. 
Special programmes for the promotion of tribal culture may be valuable, so as 
to ensure that the tribe keeps its heritage but for the benefit of the nation. The 
federal system and the states would need to incorporate tribes in their 
development programmes and activities. 
To ensure the democratic process operates effectively, the federal parliament 
would need to be composed of representatives of the constituent states' 
parliaments. Speakers for both the state and the federal parliament would be 
appointed (without voting power) by the federal authorities. 
Having drawn the main outlines of the federal state for Yemen, we shall 
examine the arguments for this option below. 
The first merit of this federal option is that it minimises the tribal problem to a 
large degree by the division of the power centre into federal and state 
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identities. Each faction would compete in the state power centre, and the 
ability of one tribal grouping to monopolise power would thus be limited. 
The second advantage of this scenario is that it creates competitiveness among 
all factions within the statehood frameworks, but under the federal umbrella. 
Each state will be bound to submit a developmental plan for its region and 
would strive to show its seriousness towards this goal. The state which does 
not ful f i l its developmental plans would loose federal resources. 
The third merit of this system is that it would minimise corruption in both of 
the power centres. The monitoring mechanism would be at different levels; at 
the federal level and the state level, in addition to public assessment of the 
performance of three states under the federal umbrella. 
Above all, however, Yemeni unity would be maintained. Although it might 
constitute a retreat of one step back, it would give Yemen a chance to survive 
under some form of unification. 
6.4.2.2 The Arguments Against this Scenario 
The first point against this option is that it represents a retreat from the form 
of Yemen unification which has been proceeding for the last eight years. 
However, i f the present integration was doing well, this would have been 
urmecessary; but in view of the real situation, the present form of unification is 
not satisfactory. The majority of the Yemeni population did not benefit from 
this unification. It is important to amend the mistakes and try to take up the 
right path. Yemenis in the rural areas in the south and even in many of the 
Zaydi areas have paid a heavy price in the recent political and economic 
turmoil in Yemen. 
The second point against this federal option is that the federal system does not 
guarantee the removal of the tribal/factional problems in the federal and state 
administrations. While this point is valid, the federal system by nature would 
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have at least managed to break the power centre elite into three main factions. 
No doubt there would be some tribalism or factionalism within the state 
administrations; but at least there would be some integrity of the law 
machinery to effect the participation of various tribes/factions/groups in each 
state and the federal monitoring system would need to safeguard the rights of 
citizens to participate in the political sphere in his/her own state. 
Whatever the disadvantages of this option, the federal system still remains a 
better option for the Yemeni citizen in each faction than the first one. 
6.4.3 The Third Scenario: Independent Yemeni States 
The third and last option for Yemen is to be divided into Independent Yemeni 
states. This option also has its pros and cons. Below, we analyse this option in 
political and economical terms. 
6.4.3.1 The Arguments for this Disintegrative Scenario 
The southerners (in terms of general opinion) constitute the only faction in 
Yemen who are interested in this option. The high rate of unemployment, the 
deterioration of their living standards in addition to many other factors have 
led them to complete disbelief in the value of Yemeni unification. 
The first merit of this option is the freedom which some factions would have 
from the tribal mentality which has deprived them of playing a national role. 
I f the south regained some part of its former international status, it would no 
doubt be better off than under its present conditions which may be charcterised 
as northern occupation of its land. 
However, this option might also benefit some factions in retaining former 
minor entities in the form of sheikhdoms, emirates or sultanates and thus 
would be attracted to join other similar entities in the region. While this is 
also predictable i f matters deteriorated in the future, the researcher does not 
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agree with this option at all. 
6.4.3.2 The Arguments Against this Scenario 
There are many points against this option. 
The main one is that this disintegrative option for Yemen is indeed a complete 
retreat. It represents a set-back for Yemeni heritage and Yemen's prosperity in 
the future. The researcher would accept a degree of retreat, but not a complete 
retreat from Yemeni unity/integration. Yemen seek a strong positive impact at 
the regional level on the basis of its natural and manpower resources. Its 
disintegration might be beneficial to some, but would mean that the country 
could not have a positive impact at the regional level. 
6.5 The Outlook of the International Community to Yemen Unity 
It is important to conclude this chapter on the outlook of the international 
community to Yemen unity and its problems. 
The Yemeni citizen, on average, believed that unification did not come up to 
his/her expectations in performance and the future would be very gloomy. The 
international outlook is not far from this belief, but tended to turn a blind eye 
to the problem. The international community, however, employs a double 
standard towards the Yemen's leadership. In the first place, it held a negative 
attitude towards Yemen for its political stance in the Gulf Crisis of 1990/1991. 
Conversely, in view of the economic conditions of deterioration in Yemen, 
the international community, and mainly the USA and UK dominated IMF 
and WB, the Paris Club and others, promoted policies only when Yemen 
showed complete submission to their rules and measures. The budget was, 
therefore, scrutinised to a great extent and subsidies were removed irrationally 
and rapidly, causing severe damage to the rural population. The international 
community, unfortunately, blessed the reform programmes irrespective of the 
negative impact on the nation and thus opened the door of instability inside the 
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domestic arena between the natives and the leadership. The international 
community cared for its interests in the country and the safety of its nationals 
rather than the stability of Yemen. However, it gave priority to some political 
agendas such as human rights and democracy. 
The international community depended largely on the assessment of strategic 
key figures in the leadership in Yemen who were not giving the full picture of 
the true structure of the power centre. The international community may 
believe that it knows everything which occurs. The researcher, however, from 
the many international reports of some western organisations and international 
projects' personnel believes that many relevant parameters are hidden or at 
least imicorrectly estimated. 
Democracy in Yemen, while taking a positive profile world-wide, is far from 
the real democracy western countries enjoy. This is natural as tribalism and 
democracy do not go hand in hand. The presence of 45 parties cannot be 
marginalised to that extent in a tribal community i f something did not go 
wrong with the ruling party's performance. The human rights file of Yemen 
was not a good one. Although it did not include as many serious violations as 
actually occurred, what it had was more than sufficient to keep Yemen under 
strong international scrutiny. 
The international community needs to re-assess its neutral attitude and 
position towards Yemeni unification, especially as it played a great role in the 
ultimate result of the civil war of 1994 between the south and the north. With 
a proper assessment of the human right's file of Yemen, the international 
community can support the best option for the Yemeni people in deciding for 
themselves. It is never too late to do so for the real stability of Yemen and the 
whole region. 
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Table 2a: Number of schools, classrooms, students (by sex), teachers (by 
nationality and sex) at all stages of education for 1992/93 
Stage 
Secondary 
4 yrs 
Secondary 
3 yrs Basic 
Schools 86 766 8079 
Classrooms 1053 2577 61200 
Students (male) 32045 90597 1477084 
Students (female) 13069 15145 534640 
Students (total) 45114 105742 2011724 
Teachers (male) 1692 4186 47875 
Teachers (female) 908 506 10752 
Total Teachers 2600 4692 58627 
Yemeni Teachers 2465 1171 53213 
Non-Yemeni Teachers 135 3521 5414 
Source: Ministry of Education 
Table 2b: Kindergartens (Public and Private) by children, education list and sex 
in the Republic of Yemen for 1992/93 
* No. of 
teachers 
* No. of children No. of Kindergartens 
Governorate Total Females Males Total Private Public 
Sana'a City 71 916 388 528 16 14 2 
Aden 255 4298 2008 2290 13 - 13 
Lahej 30 335 166 169 3 - -> J 
Taiz 32 314 132 182 1 2 
Abyan 110 1327 375 352 7 - 1 
Al-Hodeidah 12 586 258 328 3 3 -
Shabwah 18 671 307 364 5 - 5 
Hadhramout 105 1289 828 461 6 - 6 
Al-Mahrah 26 457 251 206 4 - 4 
T O T A L 659 10193 5013 5180 60 18 42 
Source: Ministry of Education 
* = estimated data. 
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Table 4; Total of Labour Force, Employed and Employment Rates by Sector 
and Sex 
Employment 
Rates 
Employed Labour Force 
Sector total female males total female males total female males 
Government 0.969 0.983 0.966 235152 38932 196220 242628 39602 203026 
Public 0.919 0.963 0.914 51126 6024 45102 55622 6258 49364 
Private 0.923 0.993 0.902 197773 
5 
491086 148664 
9 
214251 
8 
494341 164817 
7 
Mixed 0.878 0.785 0.898 11056 1714 9342 12591 2183 10408 
Co-operative 0.938 0.851 0.947 10012 812 9200 10669 954 9715 
Not Stated 0.383 0.813 0.346 25247 4251 20996 65874 5229 60645 
Source: Labour Force Survey, 1991 
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Table 5: Movement of Passengers and Freight at Domestic and 
International Airports during 1991-1993 
Movement of Freight (Ton) Movement of Passengers (OOP) 
Airports Total Departing Arriving Total Departing Arriving 
Sana'a Airport 7390.5 1274.9 6115.6 451.1 235.8 215.3 
Aden Airport 2438.5 759.8 1678.7 234.2 120.2 114.0 
Rayan Airport 389.0 60.4 328.6 85.9 41.8 44.1 
Sayoon Airport 42881.0 5468.0 37413.0 36.9 20.0 16.9 
Al-Ghaidaha Airport 39.9 5.1 34.8 21.8 10.3 11.5 
Qishn Airport 2.9 0.1 2.8 6.4 3.5 2.9 
Beihan Airport 1.8 - 1.8 3.6 1.9 1.7 
Ataq Airport 0.4 0.1 0.3 1.7 1.0 0.7 
Socotra Airport 3.8 0.8 3.0 2.1 0.9 1.2 
Taiz Airport 127.9 1.3 126.6 41.5 22.8 18.7 
Al-Hodaida Airport 317.3 206.9 110.4 62.7 33.4 29.3 
TOTAL 53593.0 7777.4 45815.6 947.9 491.6 456.3 
Sana'a Airport 10434.7 1658.4 8776.3 586.4 292.6 293.8 
Aden Airport 3206.0 835.0 2371.0 273.0 136.0 137.0 
Rayan Airport 417.0 30.0 387.0 86.0 42.0 44.0 
Sayoon Airport 42.9 5.5 37.4 36.9 20.0 19.9 
Al-Gliaidahia Airport 65.4 5.7 59.7 26.7 13.5 13.2 
Qishn Airport 1.0 - 1.0 2.6 1.3 1.3 
Beihan Airport 0.602 0.002 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 
Ataq Airport 1.0 0.2 0.8 1.8 1.1 0.7 
Socotra Airport 7.4 2.9 4.5 3.8 2.0 1.8 
Taiz Airport 183.9 13.4 170.5 74.0 40.5 33.5 
Al-Hodaida Airport 58.6 22.7 35.9 66.2 36.4 29.8 
IVlolviras Airport - - - - - -
TOTAL 14418.5 2573.8 11844.7 1158.2 585.8 572.4 
Sana'a Airport 11436.6 2025.0 9411.6 665.7 315.9 349.8 
Aden Airport 10039.2 8067.0 1972.2 316.1 16.0 150.1 
Rayan Airport 605.8 44.6 561.2 163.6 82.8 80.8 
Sayoon Airport 12.8 2.6 10.2 25.6 14.3 11.3 
Al-Ghaidaha Airport 38.8 3.9 34.9 20.4 11.3 9.1 
Qishn Airport - - - - - -
Beihan Airport - - - - - -
Ataq Airport 10.3 2.1 8.2 3.4 1.6 1.8 
Socotra Airport 5.3 2.9 2.4 4.7 2.4 2.3 
Taiz Airport 67.0 0.0 67.0 81.2 41.6 39.6 
Al-Hodaida Airport 64.8 29.92 34.88 64.8 35.2 29.6 
Mokiras Airport - - - - - -
TOTAL 22280.6 10178.0 12102.6 1345.5 671.1 674.4 
The data for the airports in the southern governorates are estimated for 1993 
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Table 6a: A snapshot of three political openings in Yemen 
Location & time period political circumstances 
British colonial authorities 
authorise syndicates, 
propose constitutions, 
elections for minority of 
Legislative Council seats; 
restrict political organising, 
strikes, opposition press 
Economic conditions Civil society activity 
Aden and Protectorates, 
1950s-1960s 
Foreign currency investment 
in transport, commerce, 
utilities, health-care, 
education, military; high 
inflation in post-W.W.II 
recession 
Labour unions, cultural clubs, independenlj 
presses, labour 
Political parties, rural movements, local sel|f 
help; independence movement 
Yemen Arab Republic, 
1970s-early 1980s 
Military corrective 
movement suspends 
constitution; no press, party, 
labour rights; accedes to 
demands for local autonomy 
and local elections 
Aid and labour migrants' 
remittances, finance 
consumption, commerce, 
infrastructure; second-hand 
prosperity ends in early 
1980s 
Self-help roads, schools, water supplies, 
pressure for release of taxes for local 
services to elected bodies; local elections 
Republic of Yemen, 
1990-1994 
New constitution and 
legislation permit 
independent parties, presses, 
associations; civil war and 
constitutional amendments 
retract freedoms 
Development of Yemeni oil 
industry attracts investment, 
raises expectations; fallout 
from Gulf Crisis causes 
unemployment, inflation, 
structural adjustment 
Multiparty competition, pres^ 
conferences, organising provide multiple 
forums to pressure for political and 
constitutional reform human rights. 
Table 6b: Regime changes in the YAR and PDRY 
Date Event Deposed Inaugurated 
The Y A R 1962-1990 
September 26 1962 
November 1968 
June 13 1974 
October 1977 
June 1978 
Free officer coup, YAR 
declared compormise ends 
civil war corrective coup 
mysterious assassination 
briefcase of PDRY emissary 
explodes 
Imam Ahmad 
'Abd Allah al-Sallal 
'Abd al-Rahman al-lryani 
Ibrahim al-Hamdi 
Ahmad al-Ghashmi 
'Abd Allah al-Sallal 
'Abd al-Rahman al-lryani 
Ibrahim al-Hamid 
Ahmad al-Ghashmi 
' A l i ' Abd Allah Salih 
The P D R Y 1967-1990 
November 30 1967 
June 1969 
June 26 1978 
April 1980 
January 1986 
Independence day, NLF 
assumes power corrective 
move death by firing squad 
"retirement for health 
reasons" thriteen day civil 
war, 'Abd al-Fattah Ismai'il 
and others killed 
Colonial system 
Qahtan al sha'bi 
Salim Rubayi' Al i 
'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il 
' A l i Nasir Muhammed 
Qahtan al-Sha'bi 
Salim Rybai' Al i 
'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il 
' A l i Nasir Muhammad 
' A l i Salim al-Bid 
Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas 
Yasin Sa'id Nu'min 
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Table 6c: Major Cabinet changes, Repubic of Yemen, 1990-1997, by Party 
Post 1990 1993 1994 1997 
Prime Minister YSP YSP GPC Independent 
Deputy PM GPC GPC Islah 
Deputy PM GPC Ba'ath 
Deputy PM YSP YSP 
Cabinet Affairs GPC 
Foreign Minister GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Minster of State, Foreign 
Affairs 
YSP 
Oil YSP YSP GPC GPC 
Planning Independent GPC GPC GPC 
Administrative Reform YSP Islah 
Awaqf GPC Islah Islah al-Haqq 
Civil Service GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Construction GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Communications GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Culture GPC YSP GPC GPC 
Defence YSP YSP GPC GPC 
Education GPC GPC Islah GPC 
Electricity and Water GPC Islah GPC 
Finance GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Fisheries YSP YSP Islah GPC 
Health GPC Islah Islah Independent 
Higher Education Independent 
Housing YSP YSP GPC 
Industry GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Information YSP GPC GPC GPC 
Interior GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Justice YSP GPC Islah GPC 
Legal Affairs GPC GPC GPC 
Local Administration YSP Islah Islah GPC 
Labour YSP Independent 
Migrant Affairs GPC Islah 
Social Affairs GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Parliamentary Affairs YSP Islah Islah GPC 
Social Affairs GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Supply YSP Islah Islah GPC 
Tourism GPC 
Transport YSP YSP GPC GPC 
Youth GPC GPC GPC GPC 
Without Portfolio GPC Islah 
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I N T E R V I E W S / M E E T I N G S 
In Sana'a: 
Meetings in the Presidential Council/Presidential Office with 
Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani Member of the Presidential Council (1991-1994) 
on a daily/weekly basis as Economic Adviser. 
Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani Premier (1995-97). 
Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani Chairman of the Consultative Council (1997-
1998). 
Al i Mohammed Al-Anesi Director of the Presidential Office, seen often by 
the researcher in his office. 
Hussein Al-Maqdani Ex-Secretary of the Consultative Council, the 
researcher often talked to him during 1991-
1994 in his office and had two meetings in his 
house in 1996 and 1997. 
Lutf Al-Kulabi 
held 
Advisor to the President's Office, often 
meetings on current issues in the office on 
weekly/monthly basis (1991-1998). 
Ahmed Al-Samawi Governor of the Central Bank of Yemen and an 
ex-Adviser to the President's Office, several 
economic meetings were held with him over the 
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period 1993-1997. 
Yahya Musleh Adviser to the Presidential Office. Three 
interview sessions in February/March, 1998. 
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